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ABSTRACT 
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SINCE THE 1960s 
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Dawson Barrett 
 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Joe Austin 
 
 
 
 
This study explores the structural, tactical, and strategic legacies of 1960s era 
activism on subsequent American social movements.  Specifically, this project 
explains how the ascendancy of neoliberal policies on both national and global 
scales has dramatically shifted opportunities for social change.  Case studies for 
these developments include Earth First! and the punk rock movement during the 
1980s, the Student-Farmworker Alliance in the 1990s, and a variety of anti-war 
organizations in the 2000s.  
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INTRODUCTION: 
THE SHIFTING POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE NEOLIBERAL ERA 
 
 
1960s Movement of Movements  
 
 
 Neoliberalism  
 
 
1980s Direct Action Movements  
 
 
 Neoliberal Globalization 
 
 
1990s Global Justice Movement  
 
 
 The War on Terror 
 
 
2000s Anti-war Movement  
 
 
Under neoliberalism everything either is for sale or is plundered for profit. 
Public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate ranchers; 
politicians willingly hand the public's airwaves over to powerful 
broadcasters and large corporate interests without a dime going into the 
public trust…As markets are touted as the driving force of everyday life, 
big government is disparaged as either incompetent or threatening to 
individual freedom, suggesting that power should reside in markets and 
corporations rather than in governments (except for their support for 
corporate interests and national security) and citizens. Citizenship has 
increasingly become a function of consumerism and politics has been 
restructured as "corporations have been increasingly freed from social 
control through deregulation, privatization, and other neoliberal 
measures."  
 
          - Henry Giroux, “The Terror of Neoliberalism”1 
 
 
  
 
 2	  
For several weeks in February and March 2011, tens of thousands of people –
more than 100,000 on peak days– marched through the streets of Madison, Wisconsin to 
protest the state’s new “Budget Repair” bill.  Despite Governor Scott Walker’s threats to 
mobilize the Wisconsin National Guard, the protestors –including labor activists, 
teachers, students, firefighters, and police officers– maintained an around-the-clock 
occupation of the state’s capitol building.  Concerned citizens also provided seventeen 
hours of public testimony on the bill and symbolically blockaded the offices of state 
representatives in order to keep them from voting.  On February 16, forty percent of 
Madison’s public school teachers called in sick, forcing the district to cancel classes for 
the day.  On February 17, as protests spread throughout the state, students at Milwaukee’s 
Rufus King High School organized a walkout and marched four miles to join a 
demonstration at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.  The same day, the state’s 
fourteen Democratic senators fled to neighboring Illinois, in order to deny a quorum.  
Meanwhile, solidarity demonstrations were held in every state capital in the country.2 
 The “Wisconsin Uprising,” widely cited as Madison’s largest protest since the 
Vietnam War, ultimately could not stop passage of the bill.  It did, however, draw 
national scrutiny to the newly elected governor’s proposals.  Walker had presented the 
bill as a necessary fix for the state’s $100 million budget deficit – a shortfall, it turned 
out, that he himself had created the previous month.  Included among the bill’s many 
inflammatory provisions were increased barriers to maintaining labor unions and the 
effective elimination of collective bargaining rights for hundreds of thousands of state 
workers.  Walker’s agenda was much more extensive, however.  It included handouts to 
energy corporations through “no-bid” contracts, decreased accountability for corporate 
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negligence through tort reform and the repeal of the state’s Equal Pay Act, and the 
loosening of regulations on the state’s telecommunications and high-interest loan 
industries.  Walker also cut more than $1 billion from the state’s K-12 and university 
education systems, while encouraging the privatization of public education through 
charter schools and voucher programs.3 
 As this was happening, several other states, including Ohio, Indiana, and New 
Jersey, were also pushing legislation to undercut workers’ rights.  Moreover, additional 
new bills from Wisconsin legislators mirrored controversial immigration laws in Arizona 
and Alabama, as well as the “Stand Your Ground” justifiable homicide laws of states 
such as Florida.  The parallels were not coincidences, however.  All over the United 
States, these agenda points, and the bills that accomplished them, were being advanced 
by conservative think tanks like the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and 
their backers, such as the billionaire brothers David and Charles Koch and Wisconsin’s 
own Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation.4   
These policies exemplified neoliberalism, an economic and political philosophy 
that seeks to maximize the wealth and power of the elite.  By cutting services for the 
poor, eliminating regulatory protections (such as labor and environmental laws), cutting 
taxes and other obligations for the rich, and redistributing public resources to 
corporations through privatization, neoliberalism attempts to reduce capitalism to an 
extremely raw form.  This Wild West, no-holds-barred vision for society has led some to 
label the neoliberal end goal as a sort of “cowboy capitalism.”5  Another description, 
“casino capitalism,” is even more appropriate, however, as neoliberalism ensures that the 
house always wins.6  Its deregulatory approach is not an across-the-board elimination of 
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big government’s rules; it is, rather, a re-purposing of the state as a tool for business but 
not for the citizenry.7   
By the time Wisconsin residents occupied their capitol building in 2011, the 
neoliberal project was already several decades old.  ALEC had been giving American 
corporations the opportunity to write their own legislation since the early 1970s and 
boasted a membership of more than 2,000 state legislators by 1987.  David Koch, 
meanwhile, established the Cato Institute, a Libertarian think tank, in 1977.  In 1980, he 
ran for vice president on a Libertarian Party platform that promised the elimination of 
Social Security and minimum wage laws.  So while protests in Madison and elsewhere 
may have paralleled Vietnam War era demonstrations in their size and zeal, they occurred 
in vastly different contexts, separated by four decades of political struggle.  This study 
seeks to outline some of the major clashes that were shaped by neoliberal policies in the 
post-1960s period.8 
 
RESISTANCE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
In his influential work on the “weapons of the weak,” James C. Scott argues that 
the “parameters of resistance are…set, in part, by the institutions of repression.”9  In 
other words, the forms that resistance to oppression takes are largely determined by the 
context of the struggle.  For Scott, this understanding allows for a re-envisioning of the 
past and present that recognizes acts of rebellion almost everywhere, even when overt 
clashes are absent.  So while open revolt by, say, slaves and peasants has been relatively 
rare in recorded history, subtler forms of resistance, like “foot dragging, dissimulation, 
false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, [and] sabotage,” have been 
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nearly ubiquitous.10  Importantly, however, this “everyday” resistance rarely actually 
challenges systems of domination.  Its primary purpose, rather, is to retain some level of 
personal dignity in circumstances in which the repercussions for open revolt are 
extremely severe.11   
Recognizing these weapons of the weak has allowed scholars to approach 
histories of oppression with a much keener eye for resistance, which has in turn allowed 
for a less condescending view – one that recognizes the agency of the oppressed rather 
than simply underscoring their weakness vis-à-vis oppressors.  Among the many 
significant applications of this lens are Black Noise, in which Tricia Rose examines the 
everyday resistance of hip hop; To ‘Joy My Freedom, in which Tera Hunter explores the 
labor struggles of Southern Black women in the aftermath of the US Civil War; and Free 
Spaces, in which Sara Evans and Harry Boyte outline the role of community meeting 
spaces in the formation of US social movements.12   
While Scott and these other scholars focus on “everyday” resistance in the 
absence of open rebellion, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, in Poor People’s 
Movements, explore the circumstances in which overt protest movements emerge.  They, 
too, find the context of the struggle to be key:  
Just as quiescence is enforced by institutional life, and just as the eruption 
of discontent is determined by changes in institutional life, the forms of 
political protest are also determined by the institutional context in which 
people live and work.13 
 
Contrary to common tropes, resistance is not necessarily sparked by sudden change or a 
decline in quality of life.  Afterall, political instability, economic change, and social 
inequality have been near constants in modern human history, while revolutions have 
been few and far between.  Furthermore, the human capacity for survival amidst suffering 
 6	  
has proven rather immense.  In other words, the worse things get…the worse things get.  
Piven and Cloward contend that protest movements emerge only on the rare occasions 
that large numbers of people simultaneously 1) reject the legitimacy of the dominant 
system of control, 2) believe that a better arrangement is possible, and 3) see some hope 
that their actions can effect a change.  To combine these observations with James C. 
Scott’s, a major shift in both collective consciousness and political context is required to 
convince those with relatively little power to take the immense risks (i.e., imprisonment, 
beatings, death, job loss) inherent to confronting structures of power.  Otherwise, though 
people are still likely to resist authority, they will do so in a less confrontational, and thus 
less dangerous, manner. 
Long-time activist Tom Hayden explores these issues on an even larger scale, 
providing a model that frames clashes between movements and centers of power.  
Drawing on historical examples, Hayden argues that successful social movements 
typically follow the same basic dialectical pattern.  Emerging from the margins, 
movements grow until they enter the mainstream and clash with elites and their 
representatives.  Over time, both movements and elite power brokers (whom Hayden 
calls the “Machiavellians”) split into respective militant and moderate wings.  Often, the 
moderates of both sides are able to reach agreement on a number of reforms that address 
the movement’s grievances.  These reforms, such as new laws or policy changes, are both 
real gains for the movement and attempts by elites to halt the movement’s momentum.  
At this point, movements tend to claim victory and slowly de-mobilize, while elites, led 
by their militant wing, begin forming a counter-movement to dampen the impact of the 
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reforms and re-take lost ground.  Meanwhile, both sides continue to fight over the 
historical legacy of the struggle, via museums, monuments, and history books.14 
Using this model, Hayden presents a narrative of on-going struggle between those 
with power –wealth, force, or both– and those whose primary advantage is their strength 
in numbers.  Regardless of the choice of terms, whether “Right vs. Left,” “the oppressed 
vs. the oppressors,” or Hayden’s “movements vs. Machiavellians,” these conflicts are 
between, on the one side, powerful elites (and the structures they use to maintain their 
power), and on the other, the “weak.”  This same basic framework can be applied 
whether structural inequality is rooted in race, gender, sexuality, economic class, or, as is 
often the case, a complex combination that includes all of them.15 
With Scott, Piven, and Hayden in mind, the history of the United States can be 
understood as a history of conflict, along many overlapping, and often contradictory, 
axes.  The struggle for workers’ rights, for example –a fight for, among other things, a 
living wage, safe working conditions, and some level of input into the decisions that 
affect one’s employment– has undergone several phases.  During the 1930s, the labor 
movement, including organized masses of the unemployed, was able to compel President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to implement the New Deal, a series of reforms that included 
minimum wage laws, maximum hour protections, bans on child labor, and the legal right 
to join a labor union.  Even before the Great Depression, however, these very reforms had 
already been won and lost many times by social justice activists and movements of mine 
workers, railroad workers, domestic workers, dockworkers, and factory workers, among 
others.  Labor activists used strikes, factory occupations, mass protests, and pickets to 
apply economic pressure on their employers.  Business owners, however, because of their 
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positions of power, had different methods at their disposal.  They used political influence 
to eliminate laws that protected workers and to make labor organizing more difficult.  
They closed and moved their factories to undercut organizing drives.  They hired police 
and private security to attack workers, for example, in the Great Railroad Strike of 1877, 
the Ludlow Massacre of 1914, and the Memorial Day Massacre of 1937, among 
countless similar clashes.  After both World War I and World War II, they also elicited 
the help of the federal government in gutting the labor movement by harassing, 
imprisoning, and deporting thousands of people under the banner of anti-communism.  
Since the New Deal, laws such as the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act –and Wisconsin’s 2011 
“Budget Repair” bill– have steadily weakened the rights of workers, while the 
globalization of manufacturing has led to a purging of unionized production jobs. 
 Other American struggles, including those for the rights of immigrants, racial and 
ethnic minorities, and gays and lesbians, have followed a similar pattern, with each side 
attempting to outflank the other.  The feminist struggle –the fight for legal, political, 
social, and economic equality for women– is particularly illustrative.  In 1920, the 
passage of the 19th Amendment granted many American women the right to vote, but 
only after more than seventy years of agitation, including state and national-level 
campaigns, parades, mass protests, pickets, civil disobedience, and hunger strikes.  In the 
1960s and 1970s, a second wave of feminist activists won a series of additional reforms 
that gave women some level of control over their bodies through access to birth control, 
legal abortions, domestic violence shelters, welfare funds, and laws against rape and 
sexual harassment.  By the late 1970s, however, many of these gains were already being 
rolled back.  The very words “abortion” and “welfare” became pejorative, and the idea 
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that the US Constitution should outlaw sexual discrimination was decried as a Leftwing 
conspiracy. 
 Despite the back-and-forth appearance of social movements’ gains and losses, 
however, the common political analogy of a swinging pendulum is not appropriate.  
These struggles are not right to left, but rather top to bottom.  The two sides are not on 
equal footing.  Even at the height of its political clout, the American labor movement was 
in a position to negotiate some key concessions, but not dictate overall terms.  American 
economic elites were not forced from their positions of power.  Likewise, the substantial 
gains of several generations of feminists forced changes to American patriarchy (the 
system of male supremacy) but not its collapse.  The pendulum analogy does not work 
because it implies an equal swing, when in fact the center is consistently skewed to one 
side.  Moreover, such a view of history implies repetition, when in fact the terms of these 
struggles are constantly changing, with substantive effects for each side.  In the context of 
the present day United States, employers can still push for anti-worker legislation, but 
they typically cannot rely on police to shoot striking workers, as they did in Chicago on 
Memorial Day in 1937.  Instead, they are limited to means that do not publicly violate 
societal norms, in this case the generally accepted legitimacy of non-violent protest.  
Likewise, workers cannot pressure their employers using the popular practices of the 
1930s, as the globalization of production has made disrupting the assembly line a much 
more difficult task.  The occupation of a factory or warehouse, for example, has much 
less impact than it did when products were assembled, start to finish, under one roof. 
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OVERVIEW  
This study is primarily an examination of how shifts in political context – 
increased levels of cultural hostility, the likelihood of violent repression, the vulnerability 
of ruling parties, and changes in global economic and political conditions – both create 
and limit opportunities for activists.  Beginning with the many American social 
movements of the 1960s era, this study borrows heavily from Tom Hayden’s model, 
particularly his notion of a perpetual struggle between movements and counter-
movements.  It is not a history of revolution or the pursuit of a final, utopia-creating 
victory.  Rather, it is an attempt to provide a framework for understanding the recent 
history of American activism by showing 1) how economic, cultural, and political elites 
in the post-1960s period used specific policies to turn the tide against the movement gains 
of the previous decades, and 2) how those changes impacted the efforts of American 
activists.   
To do so, I include a variety of what I believe are important, or at least 
illustrative, case studies and examples.  However, this is not a complete history of 
activism in the United States, any particular movement, or even any specific activist 
organization.  In fact, I neglect many significant actions, events, activists, organizations, 
and movements.  Thankfully, other scholarship details some of them, and when possible, 
I have tried to use my notes to refer the reader to it. 
Likewise, this is also not a complete political history of the post-1960s period.  
For reasons that will become clearer throughout this work, I delineate paradigmatic eras 
roughly according to dominant struggles, political policies, and Presidential 
administrations, namely those of the 1980s of Ronald Reagan (roughly 1975-1988), the 
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1990s of Bill Clinton (1988-2001), and the 2000s of George W. Bush (2001-2008).  But 
while I refer to, say, Ronald Reagan individually, and to the specific policies of his 
administration, I am primarily interested in the sum total of government policies during 
the respective period.  So, for example, I deliberately focus very little on inter-party 
struggles or whether specific policies are the work of the Congress or the President.  In 
the United States, the executive has considerable powers of initiative and a veto; it seems 
fair to link laws and policy to the President, even if they are a group effort.  To that end, 
for the sake of simplicity, I also focus primarily on the impacts of federal policy, even 
though the same dynamics were often at work at the state and local levels (as became 
evident in Wisconsin in 2011). 
Chapter 1 presents an overview of the social movements of the 1960s, with a 
specific emphasis on the peculiar political context in which they operated.  In the case of 
the Southern Civil Rights Movement, activists confronted an elaborate and repressive 
white supremacist regime known as “Jim Crow.”  Beyond the region, additional 
contradictory political dynamics provided both opportunities and barriers.  The 
Democratic Party, the party of every president from 1933 to 1969 other than Dwight 
Eisenhower, was simultaneously the party of the progressive New Deal and the party that 
dominated the American South and disenfranchised the black population.  Internationally, 
the propaganda battles of World War II and the Cold War forced the US government to 
differentiate itself from its totalitarian enemies (by de-segregating the military, for 
example), while also providing an excuse to silence its domestic critics (as through the 
Red Scare of the 1940s and 1950s).   
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 Though they faced intense repression, and many activists were killed, beaten, and 
falsely imprisoned, the movements of this period were able to exploit weaknesses in the 
American power structure and force significant reforms.  In addition to major cultural 
shifts around issues of race, gender, sexuality, and warfare, pressure on the American 
elite also produced a series of legal changes and policy shifts on issues such as civil 
rights, women’s rights, and the environment. 
 Chapter 2 presents the first major wave of neoliberalism, as reflected in the 
policies of the Reagan Administration.  In the early 1970s, economic elites began 
working in earnest to counter the movement gains of the previous decade, launching 
organizations such as ALEC, the Business Roundtable, and the Heritage Foundation.  
These groups pursued the de-regulation of industry (such as the lifting of environmental 
and labor standards), the privatization of government services (which allowed taxes to 
become a source of corporate profits), and massive government cuts in the form of tax 
cuts for the rich and service cuts for the poor.  Throughout the decade, these groups made 
common cause with conservative cultural elites, such as Jerry Falwell and his Moral 
Majority, who embraced a similar brand of Social Darwinism and also sought to turn 
back gains in women’s and LGBT rights.   
By 1980, this coalition found its champion in Ronald Reagan.  President Reagan, 
as promised, delivered massive cuts to programs that guaranteed the rights of women and 
African-Americans.  He also limited aid to the poor, eliminated environmental and labor 
regulations, and radically decreased the tax obligations of the rich.  Reagan’s election, 
however, did not just result in policy shifts.  Equally as important was how Reagan 
implemented those changes.  Many of the major reforms of the 1960s had taken the form 
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of federal laws and programs, and rather than battle to eliminate them in the halls of 
Congress, the Reagan Administration simply refused to enforce them.  Reagan also 
appointed saboteurs to head key federal agencies.  He appointed industrialists to 
administer environmental programs, anti-feminists to lead women’s programs, and white 
supremacists to oversee civil rights programs.  The effect of this “Reagan Method” was 
not only to incapacitate those elements of the federal government that oversaw human 
welfare, but also to render ineffective any form of progressive political lobbying.  In 
other words, even if American social movements could pressure their representatives to 
pass legislation that curtailed pollution or opposed racial discrimination, Reagan’s 
appointees were guaranteed not to enforce it. 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 also show how the activists of the 1980s, with the 
possibility of political lobbying effectively eliminated, turned increasingly to disrupting 
Reagan’s policies at their points of impact.  While the American environmental 
movement had previously excelled at pressuring politicians of both major political 
parties, activists in groups like Earth First! and the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society 
instead defended forests by occupying trees and blockading access roads, dismantled 
illegal whaling ships, and otherwise harassed both government agents and corporate 
polluters.  By using direct action tactics, they were able to slow down, though not stop, 
Reagan’s environmental offensive.   
During the same period, cultural movements like hip hop and punk rock also 
emerged, primarily in urban areas where neoliberal policies had eliminated public spaces, 
cut recreation programs, and criminalized youthful behavior.  Graffiti artists reclaimed 
public walls, while the DJs, rappers, and break dancers of early hip-hop turned city 
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streets and abandoned lots into performance spaces.  Similarly, the punk movement also 
embraced a direct, grassroots approach, developing its own media and using abandoned 
warehouses and the basements of houses as show spaces.  As neoliberal policies 
eliminated the public commons, other activist groups also embraced the tactics of re-
purposing space.  Critical Mass, through enormous bike rides, temporarily took city 
streets from cars, while Reclaim the Streets used dance parties to occupy intersections.  
Food Not Bombs activists, meanwhile, used public space to provide free food, often for 
the homeless (and were frequently arrested for doing so).16 
Chapter 4 presents the second major wave of neoliberalism:  globalization, 
through the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton.  While publicly less 
hostile on social issues than Ronald Reagan, Bush and Clinton largely continued the 
neoliberal economic trend.  The Clinton era, for example, included substantial de-
regulation of American media and Wall Street speculation.  The game-changer of the 
1990s, however, was the acceleration of globalized neoliberalism, specifically through 
the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.   
During the previous two decades, the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) had imposed neoliberal policies on other countries through perpetually 
indebting high-interest loans, the terms of which required concessions to corporate 
interests and cuts to social programs.  NAFTA and the WTO, meanwhile, worked to 
facilitate the movement of global capital, in the form of investments as well as production 
sites.  They also provided mechanisms by which global corporations could challenge and 
ultimately trump state and national laws. 
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However, more than a decade of adapting to the neoliberal assault had allowed 
activists to develop a repertoire of direct action tactics as well as an increasingly 
sophisticated post-Cold War understanding of global power structures.  So while 
economic elites formed new institutions to further expand their power, activists 
responded by finding new weaknesses.  For example, following the implementation of 
NAFTA in 1994, the indigenous rebel Zapatistas (EZLN) seceded from the Mexican 
state.  Meanwhile, United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS), an American 
university-based activist network, acted in solidarity with garment workers by pressuring 
their schools to attach labor standards to their multi-million dollar clothing contracts.  
Other global justice activists pursued a different strategy against globalization:  mass 
disruption.  Perhaps most famously, this included protests by environmentalists, 
anarchists, indigenous rights activists, labor organizers, students, and others, which 
literally shut down a Seattle meeting of the WTO in 1999.  Since Seattle, nearly every 
meeting of the WTO, the Group of 8 (G8), and the World Bank has been greeted with 
massive protest.   
 Chapter 5 presents the third major wave of neoliberalism, the “War on Terror” of 
the Bush Administration.  Many of Bush’s policies were merely extensions of the de-
regulation and privatization drives of the Reagan era and the globalization and “free 
trade” agreements of the Clinton Administration.  However, following the attacks of 
September 11, Bush expanded neoliberalism to new levels by privatizing key defense and 
police services, both domestically and in US-occupied Afghanistan and Iraq.  The Bush 
Administration further extended the reach of the WTO/IMF/World Bank system by 
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forcing neoliberal policies, including the privatization of state resources, the elimination 
of tariffs, and a “flat tax,” onto the people of Iraq by fiat.   
 Using the methods and organizational infrastructure of the social movements of 
the previous decades, the US peace movement mobilized millions of people in mass 
protests and disrupted political events with civil disobedience.  However, the movement’s 
successes were limited by the extreme hostility of the political climate, the seeming 
invulnerability of American war profiteers, and the results of decades of de-regulation 
and mergers, particularly among US media corporations. 
 Though perhaps outwardly similar (conservative pundits often used “hippie” as a 
pejorative term to describe protestors in the 2000s), the movements of the 1960s and the 
2000s confronted vastly different US power structures with different strengths and 
vulnerabilities.  Much of this shift can be attributed to the rise of neoliberal policies and 
their divergent effects on the rich and the poor.  Under the Obama Administration, 
covered briefly in the Epilogue, a growing movement, including the protests in 
Wisconsin and Occupy Wall Street (OWS), emerged to challenge neoliberalism directly.  
But while they operate in divergent contexts, many of the ideas and methods that have 
guided this modern movement –especially elements of OWS– have significant roots in 
the movement of movements that developed during the 1960s. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
THE 1960s:  A MOVEMENT OF MOVEMENTS 
 
 
 Jim Crow / New Deal / Cold War 
 
 
1960s Movement of Movements  
 
Civil Rights Movement  
Student Movement  
Peace Movement  
Women’s Movement  
Etc. 
 
 
 
 
 In order for us as poor and oppressed people to become a part of a society that is 
meaningful, the system under which we now exist has to be radically changed. 
This means that we are going to have to learn to think in radical terms...It means 
facing a system that does not lend itself to your needs and devising means by 
which you change that system. 
 
             - Ella Baker, Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee1 
 
 
 There's a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious—makes you 
so sick at heart—that you can't take part. You can't even passively take part. And 
you've got to put your bodies upon the gears and upon the wheels, upon the 
levers, upon all the apparatus, and you've got to make it stop. 
     
                              - Mario Savio, Berkeley Free Speech Movement2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
20	  
Considered broadly, the many movements of the Sixties era (roughly 1955 to 
1975) were a project for participatory democracy – real democracy that went beyond 
voting to include the right, and the ability, for regular people to shape the world in which 
they lived.  And while the activists of these movements did not always see their common 
interests, they did face common opponents.   For African Americans living in the South, 
freedom required dismantling, piece-by-piece, a system of white supremacy that 
maintained a racial underclass through social, economic, political, and physical control.  
In the urban areas of the North, meanwhile, activists confronted a system that achieved 
similar results through a process of ghettoization and political exclusion.  As the Civil 
Rights struggle grew nationwide, it influenced an entire generation of “New Left” 
activists, who applied its values and its methods to their own surroundings. High school 
and college students throughout the country pushed for input into their schools’ rules, 
admissions policies, investments, and curriculum.  Peace activists attempted to gum up 
the machinery of warfare. A rapidly growing environmental movement worked to protect 
wilderness and confront corporate polluters.  Women, racial and ethnic minorities, gays 
and lesbians, and many others also organized to make claims against the powerful.3 
 By challenging societal norms and confronting American power structures, these 
movements created a significant cultural shift.  More importantly, they were also able to 
demand a number of substantial policy changes, new laws, and other concessions.  In the 
process, however, many activists were beaten, murdered, or imprisoned for their actions, 
and by the late 1960s, American elites had substantially slowed movement progress 
through a combination of co-optation and repression.  They had also begun organizing a 
massive, well-funded offensive to regain lost terrain.  But while the movements of the 
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New Left were forced to shift to a largely defensive position after the mid-1970s, they did 
so with an increasingly sophisticated analysis of American power structures and 
oppression, as well as a number of successful organizing models. 
  
CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM 
 The movements of the 1960s had many predecessors.  One significant thread was 
the Black Freedom struggle, which was over three centuries old by the time of the sit-ins 
and marches of the Civil Rights period.  For 200 years, African slaves resisted American 
chattel slavery using whatever means they could, ranging from liberation via the 
Underground Railroad, to open slave revolts, to the “everyday” resistance of foot-
dragging, sabotage, and false compliance.  And while the slave system itself remained 
intact, many of its components were more fluid, as slaveholding elites were forced to 
respond to these constant challenges in order to maintain control.  In the decades leading 
up to the US Civil War, the abolitionist struggle expanded to include increasing numbers 
of former slaves, free blacks, and white allies.  As the movement grew, these activists 
risked, and often lost, their lives in order to further their cause.  They expanded their base 
through anti-slavery speeches, pamphlets, and newspapers and, more importantly, they 
also applied political pressure, through third party elections, open rejection of slavery-
defending laws (refusing to return runaway slaves, for example), and armed clashes, 
notably in “Bleeding” Kansas and the raid at Harper’s Ferry, Virginia.  Eventually, this 
movement succeeded in politically isolating the Southern slaveholding elite and creating 
a crisis out of the moral compromises that stained the US Constitution.  This crisis then 
evolved into a war, with high casualties on both sides.  Ultimately, federal forces were 
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victorious, at least partially due to what W.E.B. Dubois describes as a “general strike” by 
perhaps half a million Southern slaves.4 
 Though the economic and political causes of the Civil War were complex, 
decades of abolitionist agitation played a substantial role in framing its moral character 
and in shaping its conclusion.  Among the anti-slavery movement’s clearest victories 
were three Constitutional amendments, which eliminated slavery (except as punishment 
for a crime), granted citizenship to former slaves, and removed racial barriers to voting.  
In rural areas, terrorist organizations like the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) used rape, torture, and 
murder to ensure that these reforms never took hold.  In Southern cities, however, white 
supremacist violence was somewhat tempered by an on-going federal military 
occupation, and black activists took advantage of the opportunity to elect sympathetic 
politicians, establish schools, and form organizations for re-uniting families.  On an 
individual level, African-American men and women also exercised new freedoms in the 
areas of employment and family life, including the right to legally recognized marriage.  
However, the reforms of the post-war period did not fundamentally alter the balance of 
power in the South, nor did they shift the worldview of many former Confederates.  
When federal troops abandoned the urban centers of the South in the late 1870s, they 
gave Southern elites carte blanche to piece together slavery’s remnants into a new system 
of white supremacist domination called “Jim Crow.”5 
 Though Jim Crow has become most well known for the segregation of schools 
and other facilities, it was, like chattel slavery, systematic.  It included overlapping 
economic, physical, political, and social means of control, and it penetrated nearly every 
aspect of African Americans’ lives.  With the restraints of the post-Civil War era lifted, 
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white supremacist power brokers quickly regained control of Southern state apparatuses, 
and they used them to maneuver around the Constitution.  While the Thirteenth 
Amendment made outright chattel slavery illegal, Southern elites could maintain a labor 
force of poor black (and white) farmers through the combination of a perpetually 
indebting sharecropping system and under-the-table debt peonage.  White elites also 
developed laws and other policies to bar African Americans from many occupations, and 
they readily took advantage of the amendment’s one exception, using the slave labor of 
prisoners to maximize profits throughout the region.  Likewise, though the Fourteenth 
Amendment trumped the Dred Scott case by making former slaves citizens by birthright, 
Southern elites ensured that African Americans would only be second-class citizens, 
forcing them to use separate, inferior facilities and display social deference.  The 
Fifteenth Amendment, too, provided room for outmaneuvering.  While black men (and, 
eventually, women) could not be denied the vote based on their race or previous status as 
slaves, they could be disenfranchised through poll taxes, literacy tests, and “whites only” 
primaries for the lone viable political party.  Among the most clever, though ultimately 
unsuccessful, attempts at disenfranchisement was the infamous “grandfather clause,” 
which, while not mentioning race or slavery, tied one’s right to vote to their ancestor’s.6   
Jim Crow laws gave an important semblance of legitimacy to the Southern caste 
system, but when any of these legal acrobatics failed, white supremacists could simply 
resort to terrorism and brute violence, ranging from beatings to assassinations to public 
lynchings.  In many cases, in fact, the vigilante shock troops of groups like the KKK 
were indistinguishable from law enforcement.  In a case of societal amnesia, lynching has 
since become synonymous with hanging, but the actual process as it occurred in the 
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American South was typically much more elaborate, involving several hours of torture, 
mutilation, humiliation, and burning before the eventual murder – all of which took place 
in front of a large, cheering crowd of white men, women, and children. Photographs of 
these events were often then turned into postcards, while the “teeth, ears, toes, fingers, 
nails, kneecaps, bits of charred skin and bones” of victims were turned into souvenirs and 
trophies.7  Estimates of the number of lynchings during this period vary, revealing the 
low value that was placed on specific human lives, but historians Stewart E. Tolnay and 
E.M. Beck estimate that “on the average, a black man, woman, or child was murdered 
once a week, every week, between 1882 and 1930 by a hate-driven white mob.”8  
Lynching and other forms of violence were used to punish those who dared to violate the 
racial hierarchy, but, perhaps more importantly, they also served to terrorize and 
traumatize the black population at large.  Yet despite these dangers, Jim Crow’s grip on 
African Americans, like chattel slavery’s, was often challenged, including by a mass 
exodus to the industrial centers of the North and West during the 20th century.9 
 Although individual resistance to Jim Crow was ever-present, the organized 
opposition that led to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s had many of its 
roots in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 
which was founded in 1909 by W.E.B. Dubois, anti-sweatshop crusader Florence Kelley, 
and anti-lynching activist Ida B. Wells-Barnett, among others.  Though the group’s 
efforts included political lobbying and public protest, the NAACP, on the national level, 
found its greatest successes in litigation against segregation and disenfranchisement, in 
both the North and the South.  Among the organization’s many legal victories were 1940s 
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rulings against white primaries and segregated interstate bus facilities, as well as the 
famous Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954.10 
 While the NAACP diligently chipped away at the legal pillars that propped up 
Jim Crow, other changes in the national and global political contexts provided additional 
opportunities for Civil Rights activists.  The social movements of the Great Depression 
era had compelled American elites to soften capitalism’s edges by providing a basic 
social safety net.  While negotiating the New Deal legislation, however, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt used Southern blacks as a bargaining chip to gain the support of 
Southern politicians – just as his predecessors had during the writing of the US 
Constitution in 1787 and during the electoral compromise that led to federal troop 
withdrawals in the 1870s.  But while Roosevelt’s appeasement of Southern Democrats 
specifically excluded African Americans from many of these reforms, the broader liberal 
political shift did open a few avenues of change.11   
These opportunities were then amplified by the onset of World War II and the 
subsequent Cold War, and activists pounced on them.  For example, on the eve of US 
involvement in WWII, activists led by A. Philip Randolph threatened to organize a 
“March on Washington” to expose American racism.  Though large protest marches often 
do very little to actually pressure policy makers, in this case, war propaganda depended 
on distinguishing the US from its Nazi counterpart, making the potential embarrassment 
of the march a political liability.  Roosevelt was thus forced to address protestors’ 
demands, issuing an executive order that banned racial discrimination in the wartime 
defense industry in exchange for canceling the march.  Similarly, activists, including 
Randolph and the NAACP, later pressured President Harry Truman to de-segregate the 
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US military, also through executive order, rather than risk the embarrassment of 
broadcasting the issue to a global audience during the early stages of the Cold War.  The 
activists’ tactics included a picket of the 1948 Democratic National Convention.12 
In addition to the organizing traditions of the NAACP and A. Philip Randolph, 
several other trajectories within African-American resistance also built toward the clashes 
of the 1950s and 1960s.  For example, under the leadership of Marcus Garvey, the 
Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) established dozens of chapters in the 
1910s an 1920s.  The group’s membership was in the tens of thousands, while the 
number of sympathizers was much higher.  The Nation of Islam (NOI), meanwhile, was 
founded in Detroit in the 1930s and steadily grew to include mosques in Chicago, 
Milwaukee, Washington, D.C., Baltimore, and Harlem, among others.  Cultural 
resistance also emanated from Blues musicians beginning in the 1890s as well as the 
artists, musicians, and writers of the Harlem Renaissance in the 1920s and 1930s.  Many 
prominent Black artists, including actor Paul Robeson and writers Richard Wright, Ralph 
Ellison, and James Baldwin were also politically active.13 
 
FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM  
 Although the widespread activism of the 1930s and 1940s created a variety of 
political opportunities, the Cold War also provided an excuse for elites to clamp down on 
labor agitators and anti-racist activists in the name of anti-communism.  Under this 
immense political pressure, many national Civil Rights organizations followed organized 
labor in purging known and suspected radicals.  So even as Civil Rights activists in 
dozens of American towns and cities were emboldened to challenge Jim Crow and its 
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Northern counterpart during the post-war period, they were also pressed to frame their 
struggle in strictly moral, not economic, terms, or else risk drawing the wrath of Red 
Scare headhunters.  During the 1950s, however, a series of public injustices, among them 
the brutal murder of Emmett Till, the year-long Montgomery bus boycott, and the 
integration of Little Rock Central High School, brought increased exposure to the 
movement on a national scale.  These events and campaigns built on the earlier victories 
of Randolph, the NAACP, and others, and subsequent movement activists, in turn, were 
able to use them to expand the cracks in Jim Crow.14 
 In 1955, white supremacists in Mississippi tortured and murdered fourteen-year-
old Emmett Till.  That August, the Chicago native had travelled to rural Money, 
Mississippi to visit relatives.  Unaccustomed to the peculiar social expectations of Jim 
Crow, Till made the mistake of flirting with a white, female clerk at the grocery store that 
she owned.  In response, her husband and his half-brother kidnapped Till, viciously beat 
him, and cut out one of his eyes, before finally killing him and dumping his body in a 
nearby river.  Though murders of this type were not uncommon, the details of Till’s death 
circulated nationwide, and his Chicago funeral drew thousands of infuriated mourners.  
His mother, Mamie Till Bradley, insisted on an open-casket funeral, and photographs of 
his body –badly disfigured and barely recognizable as human– ran in the Chicago 
Defender and nationally distributed Jet magazine.15   
Despite the fact that Roy Bryant and J.W. Milam had already confessed to Till’s 
kidnapping, an all-white Mississippi jury required very little deliberation before finding 
the two men not guilty.  The trial, as expected, was a farce, and the two murderers 
subsequently sold their story, complete with unapologetic confessions, to Look magazine 
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for several thousand dollars.  But while Bryant and Milam were legally protected from a 
new trial, a lesser justice did prevail.  Without the patronage of the local black 
community, the Bryants’ store eventually went bankrupt.  Bryant and Milam’s actions 
also helped electrify a movement to dismantle the system that had so unjustly privileged 
them.16   
 A few months after the trial, and with outrage at Till’s murder as a constant 
motivator, civil rights organizers in Montgomery, Alabama launched a year-long boycott 
of city buses.  Previous legal victories had already led to rulings against racial 
discrimination in interstate bus travel, and Montgomery provided an opportunity to 
challenge white supremacy at the local level.  After numerous activists’ attempts to 
provoke the Jim Crow power structure, Montgomery NAACP secretary Rosa Parks 
finally succeeded, by refusing to give her seat to a white passenger.  Her subsequent 
arrest led a group called the “Women’s Political Council” to call for a bus boycott, and 
local leaders, including E.D. Nixon of the NAACP and ministers Ralph Abernathy and 
26-year-old Martin Luther King, Jr., quickly established the Montgomery Improvement 
Association (MIA) to coordinate it.17   
In terms of actual mechanics, the boycott’s methods for transporting the city’s 
African-American population were as mundane as carpooling, bicycling, and walking.  
Attacks on pedestrians, numerous arrests, and the firebombing of churches and 
organizers’ homes, however, brought national attention to the campaign.  With this 
attention also came funds and organizational assistance, notably from civil disobedience 
expert Bayard Rustin of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE).  White supremacist 
support was also mobilized, but the boycott ultimately prevailed when the Supreme Court 
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rejected appeals to its Browder v. Gayle decision, in which it ruled that Montgomery’s 
bus policies violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  After 381 days, the boycott ended, and 
African Americans returned to newly de-segregated city buses.18 
 A third event drawing national attention occurred a year later when black high 
school students attempted to de-segregrate Little Rock Central High School, in Little 
Rock, Arkansas.  Though the Supreme Court had previously ruled against the de jure 
segregation of schools in the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education case, the political power 
of Southern whites made implementing integration nearly impossible.  As the 1957 
school year began, hostile white crowds arrived to block black students’ admission, and 
Arkansas governor Orval Faubus played to his base by ordering the Arkansas National 
Guard to keep the students out – at gunpoint.19 
As the Little Rock conflict became increasingly heated, President Dwight 
Eisenhower begrudgingly responded with Executive Order 10730, ordering 1,000 
paratroopers of the 101st Airborne to escort the black students to class.  Faubus and other 
white supremacists were not ready to relent, however, and they developed a long-term 
plan that eventually included cancelling the 1958 school year for Little Rock schools.    
The local struggle in Little Rock continued, though national media attention dissipated.  
Eisenhower’s response to the crisis, however, had clear implications on the national level.  
If sufficiently pressured, the federal government could be compelled to intervene and 
enforce the law, which had been established and clarified by decades of NAACP 
campaigns.20   
By the end of the 1950s, the Civil Rights Movement figured prominently in 
American politics, having drawn both national and international attention.  Activists in 
  
30	  
Alabama and Arkansas had built on previous movement victories, exploiting weaknesses 
in the Jim Crow system and pushing for the enforcement of civil rights laws.  In 
Mississippi, Illinois, and elsewhere, media activists used previously established networks 
and institutions, such as black newspapers, not only to spread news of Emmett Till’s 
murder, but also to involve Northern politicians in the outrage over his killers’ trial.  In 
the 1960s, a new generation of activists challenged Jim Crow laws directly, with non-
violent civil disobedience. 
 
CLASHES AND REFORMS 
 In 1960, the Civil Rights Movement became a truly mass uprising, as direct action 
campaigns spread throughout the South.  In February, four black college students in 
Greensboro, North Carolina occupied the whites-only lunch counter at Woolworth’s 
department store, where they were refused service.  The students returned for the next 
several days, bringing ever-larger crowds of supporters and counter-demonstrators, 
eventually forcing store managers to respond.  Activists in other cities quickly followed 
suit, occupying lunch counters in their own cities and spreading boycotts of the targeted 
businesses.  Though “sit-in” demonstrators were harassed, beaten, and spit upon in the 
meantime, Woolworth’s agreed to de-segregate its lunch counters within six months; 
other businesses soon gave in as well.21 
 As a tactic, the “sit-in” was not new, even within the Civil Rights Movement.  
CORE members, for example, had been disrupting segregated facilities since the 1940s.  
However, direct action confrontation – direct in the sense that activists were literally 
doing the de-segregating through their own actions – offered new possibilities within the 
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context of an already focused mass media.  Furthermore, those who engaged in the lunch 
counter sit-ins were able to force their opponents’ hands by creating what George Lakey, 
among others, calls a “decision dilemma,” a win-win situation.  In this case, the 
gatekeepers of white supremacy were forced to either ignore activists, thus passively 
allowing Jim Crow standards to be violated, or forcefully remove them, providing media 
observers with images and stories that clearly displayed the dynamics of aggression.  
Crowds of white supremacists were often more than willing to play their own foil by 
harassing and assaulting peaceful activists – all within plain view of attentive 
journalists.22 
 In response to this outpouring of civil disobedience –much of it by young people–  
students and other activists formed the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC).  SNCC embraced CORE’s direct action approach, and unlike the NAACP, 
Martin Luther King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and many other 
groups of the older generation, SNCC rejected top-down organization.  Recognizing the 
danger and risks of their tactics, SNCC instead adopted a model that fostered mutual trust 
among members and democratized the group’s knowledge and tasks – a crucial 
component given the likelihood that leaders would be jailed, hospitalized, or killed.  
Building on Quaker organizing traditions and most directly influenced by long-time 
organizer Ella Baker, SNCC adopted consensus decision-making, horizontal leadership, 
and a decentralized structure.  Consensus, a process in which a group’s decisions are 
discussed at length until unanimously agreed upon, forced activists to consider their plans 
in great depth and address as many concerns as possible.  Members not only developed 
an understanding of what they were doing and why, they were also empowered, knowing 
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that their input was highly valued.  Likewise, horizontal leadership, rather than making 
the most charismatic or experienced members serve as president and vice president, 
instead allowed for a large number of SNCC members to become actively involved.  
Lastly, by operating as a decentralized network, SNCC encouraged local initiative, 
assuming that activists in, say, rural Mississippi knew more about the context of their 
struggle than leaders in some far away headquarters.23   
 In 1961, on the heels of the sit-in movement, CORE activists organized the 
Freedom Rides – interracial, interstate bus rides through the South. The Freedom Rides 
were intended not only to draw attention, but also, specifically, to challenge the federal 
government to enforce its laws.  Victories in earlier court cases had already established 
the illegality of segregation in interstate buses and accommodations.  But while the 
Kennedy Administration kept a close eye on the rides, they refused to intervene to stop 
the brutal mob and police violence that greeted activists throughout the South.  In the face 
of severe beatings, arrests, and the firebombing of buses, CORE withdrew from the 
Freedom Rides, and SNCC led the remainder of the tour in their place.  Eventually, with 
national and international coverage of the violence becoming an embarrassment to the 
administration, the Kennedys finally intervened.  In exchange for protection from mob 
violence, the administration allowed Southern police to arrest Freedom Riders at will, on 
illegitimate charges.24   
 Over the next few years, major desegregation campaigns by SNCC and the SCLC 
in Georgia, Maryland, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, and elsewhere, as well as the 1963 
March on Washington, focused additional media attention on the federal government.  
Feeling this pressure, the Kennedy Administration reached out to SNCC and other 
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organizations working in the South, encouraging them to move away from direct action 
and instead focus on the equally dangerous task of voter registration.  This shift risked 
blunting the movement’s disruptive successes by limiting activism to formal, “legitimate” 
channels.  However, it also more firmly established the political, and not merely social, 
aspects of the civil rights struggle.  From the perspective of national politics, it also 
served another important function.25   
At least some of the federal government’s hesitancy to intervene against Jim 
Crow was driven by the fear of electoral repercussions.  Liberal Democratic leaders 
predicted, accurately, that the white supremacists of the essentially one-party Democratic 
South would retaliate against civil rights legislation by switching parties, giving the 
Republicans a nearly unbeatable majority for the foreseeable future.  Successful voter 
registration campaigns, particularly given the numerical advantages of black would-be 
voters in many areas of the South, held the hope of at least softening the blows of such a 
shift.  Theoretically then, the promise of African-American votes to replace white 
supremacist votes could embolden liberal elements of the Democratic Party to take 
action. 
 The voter registration strategy culminated in the 1964 Mississippi Freedom 
Summer, organized by a coalition that included SNCC and CORE.  On SNCC’s 
invitation, hundreds of Northern college students, many of them white, came South to 
assist Southern activists with movement-oriented Freedom Schools and registration for 
the alternative Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP).  Planners had hoped that 
the inclusion of the racially and economically more privileged Northern youth would 
have the strategic effect of bringing more Northern attention, and thus provide some 
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cover against violence.  Even with outside interest, however, in just over two months, 
over a thousand activists were arrested, dozens more were beaten, and over fifty black 
churches and homes were bombed.  Perhaps most notoriously, activists Michael 
Schwerner (age 24), James Chaney (age 21), and Andrew Goodman (age 20) disappeared 
that June, casting a pall over the rest of the summer.  The forty-four day search for the 
three activists turned up the bodies of several other murdered black men and women.  
Eventually, the bodies of Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman were found, as well.  They 
had been murdered in Philadelphia, Mississippi, by members of the KKK, in coordination 
with local police. Chaney, an African American, had also been chain whipped and 
mutilated before he was killed.26 
 At the end of the summer, delegates from the MFDP arrived at the Democratic 
Party’s national convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, to challenge the legitimacy of 
state’s white representatives.  President Lyndon Johnson, however, balked at the 
opportunity to take a stand against the Mississippi Democrats.  Instead of recognizing the 
MFDP, Johnson and other party liberals offered a compromise.  They would allow two of 
the sixty-eight MFDP delegates to participate in at-large roles, but not as official 
representatives of their state.  Though even this arrangement alienated Southern 
Democrats, it offered too little for the sacrifices of the Freedom Summer.  Instead of 
continuing to pressure the federal government directly, SNCC activists had risked their 
lives to play by the establishment’s rules and give the Democratic Party an opportunity to 
do the right thing.  SNCC left the convention disillusioned with Democratic leaders and 
with movement elders who continued to support them.  As violence against the 
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movement continued unabated, many young activists vowed not to make the same 
mistake again.27 
 By the mid-1960s, the Civil Rights Movement had reached a crossroads.  Despite 
the rejection of the Atlantic City convention, pressure from the movement had forced a 
number of other reforms, including federal laws against poll taxes, literacy tests, and 
discrimination in employment.  However, disappointment with the Democratic Party, the 
general absence of economic reforms, and the residual effects of disparities between 
white and black activists eventually led SNCC to abandon its organizing model for 
autonomous Black Power.  More broadly, many young black activists began to turn away 
from the Gandhian approach of Dr. King, instead finding inspiration in the self-defense 
advocacy of Robert F. Williams and Malcolm X and the revolutionary anti-colonialism of 
figures like Frantz Fanon, Mao Zedong, and Ahmed Sékou Touré.  Although the struggle 
in the South continued, much of the movement’s momentum shifted to the urban centers 
of the North, where groups like the Black Panther Party confronted a different system of 
white supremacy.28 
   
MOVEMENTS BEGET MOVEMENTS 
 The Civil Rights strategists of the mid-1950s to mid-1960s were particularly 
adept at framing their actions.  Through extensive training in the tactics of non-violent 
civil disobedience and non-retaliation, emphasis on a conventional and formal uniform, 
and the selection of predictably reactionary targets, activists ensured that photographs and 
newsreel footage of their dangerous activities clearly displayed the oppressive nature of 
the Jim Crow system.  This was particularly significant, as the number of American 
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households with a television rose from around ten percent in 1950 to nearly ninety 
percent by 1959.  Instead of showing a two-sided battle, which could potentially invoke 
racial loyalties, the movement’s imagery instead exposed the unmistakable dynamics of 
violent, angry, white supremacists attacking peaceful, well-dressed, humble activists.  
The disjunction between popular understandings of American freedom and this obvious 
oppression was jolting, and outrage at the injustices of Jim Crow resonated nationally and 
around the globe.29   
Beyond disgust with American injustice, and inspiration from the resistance 
movement against it, the Southern Civil Rights Movement also had a more direct 
influence on subsequent movements of the era.  Among the many Northern activists who 
were both inspired and trained by groups like SNCC were Tom Hayden of Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS), who drafted the Port Huron Statement and was later a 
Chicago 8 defendant; political prankster Abbie Hoffman of the Yippies; and Mario Savio, 
one of the leaders of the Free Speech Movement at the University of California in 
Berkeley.  Additionally, many Northern groups, including SDS, adapted to their own 
struggles SNCC’s participatory organizing models and direct action tactics.30   
Though initially focused primarily on Civil Rights solidarity work and 
fundraising, SDS eventually became one of the major anti-war voices of the period.  The 
group’s decentralized structure encouraged local autonomy, and affiliates joined the 
network at a rapid pace.  By the late 1960s, however, SDS, like much of the New Left, 
had all but abandoned its democratic principles in favor of an organizing model that was 
more hierarchical, chauvanistic, and, supposedly, efficient.  The group’s rising 
prominence also made it a magnet for infiltration by both the FBI and dogmatic Leftists, 
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who were intent on controlling the SDS apparatus and proving their own ideological 
righteousness.  Under the weight of this power struggle, SDS imploded, with each faction 
blaming the others for the collapse.31   
The anti-war movement as a whole, however, continued to grow, particularly as 
participation and leadership by Vietnam War veterans increased.  In 1965, students and 
faculty at more than 100 US colleges organized the first “teach-ins” to raise awareness 
about the war.  Protests in Washington, D.C. in April and November of that year involved 
around 30,000 people each.  By April 1967, a New York City march drew as many 
400,000, and a protest at the Pentagon that October attracted perhaps 100,000.  But just 
as the Civil Rights struggle targeted the many components of the Jim Crow system, the 
anti-war movement also applied pressure at a number of points.  In addition to raising 
awareness through teach-ins and increasingly massive public protests, anti-war activists 
in groups like Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) and the National 
Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (MOBE) also targeted war 
profiteers, like napalm producer Dow Chemical, and attempted to disrupt the flow of 
troops by burning draft cards, destroying draft rolls, and sheltering AWOL soldiers.  By 
the late 1960s, the peace movement had fully entered American popular culture, having 
received the backing of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Muhammad Ali.  Ali, the most 
famous athlete in the world, refused to serve in Vietnam offering to critics, “I have 
nothing to lose by standing up for my beliefs. So I’ll go to jail, so what? We’ve been in 
jail for 400 years.”32  Discussion of the war had become so mainstream, in fact, that 
Ladies’ Home Journal famously included the following report from war correspondent 
Martha Gellhorn in 1967: 
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I had heard and read that napalm melts the flesh, and I thought that's nonsense,  
because I can put a roast in the oven and the fat will melt but the meat stays there.  
Well, I went and saw these children burned by napalm, and it's absolutely true.  
The chemical reaction of this napalm does melt the flesh, and the flesh runs right  
down their faces onto their chests…33 
 
By 1968, the anti-war movement gained enough strength to convince President Lyndon 
Johnson not to seek re-election.  However, even though movement moderates working 
“within the system” were able to garner roughly seventy percent of the 1968 primary vote 
for anti-war candidates, the Democratic Party instead selected Vice President Hubert 
Humphrey, who vowed to stay the course in Vietnam.  Humphrey subsequently lost to 
Republican Richard Nixon, another pro-war candidate.34 
But while SDS, SNCC, and their progeny had largely moved away from 
horizontal, consensus-based organizing by the late 1960s, the Women’s Liberation 
movement that emerged during the period widely embraced it.  In fact, this style of 
internal organizing is often called the “feminist” model.  Women’s Liberation borrowed 
heavily from the rhetoric and logic, though not the structure, of the Black Power 
movement.  Groups like SDS, SNCC, and the Black Panthers also played another role in 
“Second Wave” feminism.  Many feminist activists had prior experience in those 
organizations but had found male activists generally unreceptive to their attempts to 
combat sexism within the movement.  An open letter from women in SDS, for example, 
had been roundly ridiculed at the group’s convention.  However, though rarely 
recognized, women had actually done much of the significant organizing in these groups.  
It should have been of little surprise, then, that Women’s Liberation was ultimately one 
of the most concretely successful and dynamic movements of the period.  Second Wave 
activists not only shifted cultural mores, they also forced legal changes, including the 
  
39	  
elimination of marital rape exemptions in many states, and established service 
institutions, such as domestic violence shelters.  Although the Equal Rights Amendment 
(ERA), which would have outlawed discrimination based on sex, ultimately failed, the 
strength of the women’s movement can be partially gauged by the fact that it not only 
passed Congress in 1972, but was also ratified by thirty states within a year.35   
Just as sexism in the New Left drove a number of women to find new 
organizational homes, however, feminist groups developed schisms of their own.  The 
movement was ideologically diverse, ranging from moderate groups like the National 
Organization of Women (NOW) to the more radical Redstockings and New York Radical 
Women (NYRW).  In some sense, groups like NOW anchored the women’s movement 
by giving it mainstream legitimacy, while radical feminists pushed more moderate 
women to re-assess their understandings of patriarchy.  However, the movement’s rifts 
went beyond the dynamics of liberals versus radicals.  Ideas about patriarchy and 
different feminisms evolved quickly, and movement theorists struggled to overcome 
many of the biases and inequalities of broader American society, particularly across lines 
of race, class, and sexuality.  However imperfect, though, Second Wave feminists did add 
an additional layer of critical analysis to a broader New Left movement that was already 
making important connections between structural racism, imperialism, and capitalism.  
This lens of analysis was further expanded and critiqued during the 1970s and 1980s by 
Angela Y. Davis, bell hooks, and Audre Lorde, among others.  One prominent scholar 
suggests that feminism, rather than merely combating one form of oppression, has 
evolved into “a constantly developing, often contested, revolutionary conversation about 
how all of us might envision and remake the world.”36 
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Many other movements and organizations also emerged during the 1960s era, 
largely modeling themselves on other movement groups or responding to shortcomings 
within them.  The American Indian Movement (AIM), for example, created media events 
and disruptions through occupations of Mount Rushmore and a replica of the Mayflower 
as well as “The Longest Walk,” a coast-to-coast march that focused attention on 
legislation abridging indigenous rights.  The Chicano movement, the youth wing of the 
broader Mexican-American rights struggle, staged major student walk-outs in Los 
Angeles, Denver, and elsewhere, and organized within the Mexican-American 
community against the Vietnam War.  The counter-culture, meanwhile, perhaps the most 
over-represented movement of the 1960s, challenged conservative sexual mores and 
generally opposed capitalist consumerism.  Some elements of the counter-culture, 
including the Yippies, the Diggers, and a number of communal groups, also engaged in 
more directly political activities, though the distinction between the New Left and the 
counter-culture is an important one.  The Gay and Lesbian Liberation movements 
struggled against repression and persecution within broader society and against 
homophobic elements of the counter-culture, the Women’s Liberation movement, the 
Civil Rights Movement, the Communist Party, and others. Meanwhile, the United Farm 
Workers (UFW) launched a series of strikes and grape boycotts, eventually forcing grape 
growers to recognize their labor rights.  Many other groups also engaged in social and 
political struggles at various levels.37 
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REPRESSION 
 Though this “movement of movements” created significant cultural and social 
changes, its record for combating economic injustices and US foreign policy is 
considerably less clear.  Broadly speaking, as movement priorities expanded in the mid-
1960s to include bolder criticism of American capitalism and imperialism, elite resistance 
to movements increased, and state violence and repression became more public, if not 
more aggressive.  In the Jim Crow South, police, lynch mobs, and the KKK had served as 
an extralegal fail safe for white supremacist laws and policies, murdering Emmett Till, 
NAACP field secretary Medgar Evers, Birmingham bombing victims Addie Mae Collins, 
Denise McNair, Carole Robertson, and Cynthia Wesley, Freedom Summer activists 
Michael Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew Goodman, and many, many others.  
Likewise, in the late Sixties, the “Red Squads” of Northern police departments and the 
FBI, specifically through its counter-intelligence program (COINTELPRO), protected 
elite interests from perceived internal threats with an elaborate campaign of surveillance, 
infiltration, harassment, brutality, false imprisonment, and assassination.38  
 During the 1968 Democratic National Convention (DNC), in a year already 
marked by the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy, Chicago 
police viciously attacked protestors and several journalists, notably Dan Rather of CBS 
News.  In the lead up to the convention, city officials had ensured a confrontation by 
repeatedly denying permits to protest organizers, including the National Mobilization 
Committee to End the War in Vietnam (MOBE) and the Yippies.  Mayor Richard Daley 
had also set a precedent for police conduct several months earlier when he issued a 
“shoot to kill” order following King’s assassination.  Although a federal investigation 
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after the DNC found that violence surrounding the convention was the result of a police 
riot, the incoming administration of Richard Nixon chose to ignore those findings and, 
instead, to file conspiracy charges against several New Left leaders.  The “Chicago 8” 
defendants included Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin of the Yippies, pacifist Dave 
Dellinger, student anti-war leaders Tom Hayden and Rennie Davis, and Bobby Seale of 
the Black Panther Party.  The trial itself was a sham.  The defendants were not allowed to 
present the federal government’s previous findings, and Judge Julius Hoffman denied 
Seale legal counsel – and had him bound and gagged for demanding it.  The trial 
ultimately resulted in five-year prison sentences for five of the defendants, as well as stiff 
penalties for contempt – including sentences of four years for attorney William Kunstler 
and over a year for attorney Leonard Weinglass.  And while these convictions were 
eventually overturned on appeal, federal prosecutors had removed these activists, and 
their supporters, from movement work in the meantime.39 
 State repression of activists went far beyond one trial, however.  In the 1950s, the 
FBI developed COINTELPRO to harass and disrupt American communists, but the 
program expanded throughout the 1960s and 1970s to include attacks on Civil Rights 
organizations, peace groups, American Indian activists, and feminists, among others.  In 
fact, during the same period in which federal officials refused to intervene to stop racist 
violence in the South, FBI agents were wiretapping, stalking, and threatening leaders like 
Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, Jr.  By the end of the decade, the FBI’s tactics had 
become both more brazen and more sophisticated, as evidenced perhaps most notoriously 
in their widespread assault on the Black Panther Party.  According to Manning Marable, 
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“In 1969 alone, 27 Black Panthers were killed by police, and 749 were jailed or 
arrested.”40 
Two of those deaths occurred in December 1969, when Chicago police, in 
collusion with the FBI, assassinated Fred Hampton (age 21) and Mark Clark (age 22).  
After firing nearly one hundred bullets into Hampton’s apartment and then shooting him 
twice at close range, police claimed that they were in fact the victims, pointing to the 
party’s rhetoric of armed self-defense and revolutionary change as their justification.  The 
Panthers’ insistence that the raid was a deliberate hit on Hampton was only confirmed ten 
years later during a civil suit.  Among the details that emerged from the trial were the 
revelations that an FBI informant had provided police with a lay-out of Hampton’s 
apartment, that the FBI had been attempting for some time to provoke an attack on 
Hampton by rival organizations, and that the FBI had pressured the investigating attorney 
general to conceal their involvement by dropping charges against both the police and the 
Panthers who survived the raid.41 
In 1970, police arrested twenty-three-year-old Panther member and Vietnam 
veteran Geronimo Ji Jaga (Geronimo Pratt) on charges of murdering an elementary 
school teacher.  Ji Jaga spent twenty-seven years in prison, eight of which were in 
solitary confinement, before charges against him were vacated and the city of Los 
Angeles, along with the US Department of Justice, settled a $4.5 million civil suit for 
false imprisonment.  Ji Jaga had been a target of FBI counterintelligence efforts with the 
goal, in the words of the FBI, of “neutralizing Pratt as an effective BPP functionary.”42  
Though not revealed at the time, the key witness against him was a police and FBI 
informant.43   
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That same year, soldiers from the Ohio National Guard murdered Kent State 
University students Jeffrey Miller (age 20), Allison Krause (age 19), William Schroeder 
(age 19), and Sandra Scheuer (age 20), while injuring nine others.  Over one million 
college students went on strike, shutting down 500 campuses.  Fifty schools remained 
closed for the duration of the semester.  Ten days after the Kent State shootings, police in 
Jackson, Mississippi murdered Jackson State College students James Earl Green (age 17) 
and Phillip Gibbs (age 21), and wounded twelve others.44 
In 1971, guards at California’s San Quentin prison killed inmate and Black 
Panther leader George Jackson, purportedly during an escape attempt.  Jackson, twenty-
nine years old, had become a public figure after the publishing of his letters from prison, 
where he had been for ten years, despite an initial sentence of just one year.  A month 
after Jackson’s murder, inmates at Attica prison in New York seized the jail and took 
thirty-three staff members hostage.  Among their demands were minimum wage for 
prison labor, a healthy diet, and access to medical treatment.  As negotiations broke 
down, state police stormed the prison, killing twenty-nine people, including ten of the 
hostages.  Fabricated media accounts accused inmates of slitting hostages’ throats, but 
they were actually killed by police bullets.45 
While the violence against American activists during this period was not a 
departure from similar repression earlier in the decade, it did become increasingly public, 
paralleling the expansion of the Vietnam War into Laos and Cambodia.  In 1971, the FBI 
announced the end of COINTELPRO, after activists broke into an FBI office and 
released secret documents about the program’s activities to the public.  However, a 
second public exposé four years later showed that the program remained active for at 
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least another two years. Similarly, Daniel Ellsberg’s illegal release of the Pentagon 
Papers, also in 1971, exposed a history of government deception about the Vietnam War.  
The US eventually withdrew from Vietnam in 1975, but only after Watergate, yet another 
major scandal revealed by a federal whistle-blower, forced Nixon to resign.  In the 
meantime, American police forces, at many levels, had sabotaged a generation of 
activists through illegal surveillance, beatings, trauma, imprisonment, and murder.  In 
Vietnam, roughly 60,000 American soldiers were killed, and another 300,000 were 
wounded; Vietnamese casualties were much higher, including the deaths of perhaps one 
million combatants and four million civilians.46 
 
CONCLUSION 
 During the 1950s and 1960s, American activists created a series of national 
dilemmas by provoking local crises.  Campaigns in places like Montgomery, Little Rock, 
and Greensboro not only achieved tangible local victories, they also attracted national 
and international supporters and pressured federal officials.  And while repression was a 
constant, several factors, including the global dynamics of the Cold War and the liberal 
makeup of the US Supreme Court, allowed activists important opportunities to create 
change. 
 In addition to cultural shifts around race, gender, sexuality, and militarism, the 
movements of this period achieved a number of concrete political changes.  Civil Rights 
activists effectively dismantled the Jim Crow system, piece-by-piece, city-by-city.  In 
addition to a series of judicial victories, the movement also pressured government 
officials to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited racial discrimination in 
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public accommodations and employment; the 24th Amendment, which eliminated poll 
taxes; the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which eliminated voter literacy tests; and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968, which prohibited racial discrimination in the sale and rental of 
housing.   
Lobbying and agitation by the Women’s Liberation movement, meanwhile, led to 
the passage of Title X in 1970, which established federal funding for community health 
clinics and family planning services; Title IX in 1972, which eliminated gender-based 
discrimination in federally funded education; the Roe v. Wade decision in 1973, which 
legalized a woman’s right to control pregnancy; “no fault” divorce laws in many states; 
and the elimination of “marital rape” exemptions in many states.  Feminists also 
pressured Congress to pass the Equal Rights Amendment and established nearly one 
thousand rape crisis centers in the US by the end of the 1970s. 
Perhaps most successful of all, the environmental movement, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter, won the passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964, which 
protected over nine million acres of federal land; the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 
1964, which provided federal matching funds for large-scale rail projects; the 
establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970; the Clean Air Act of 
1970; the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972; the Endangered Species Act of 1973; 
the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974; the Soil and Water Resources Conservation Act of 
1977; and the Superfund Act of 1980. 
In addition to the intrinsic significance of these reforms, activists of this period 
also exposed some of the weaknesses of the American power structure and developed a 
number of important organizational and analytical tools.  Most notably, New Left groups 
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successfully combined decentralized, horizontal organizing with direct action disruptions.  
They also made many strategic, tactical, and personal blunders that, while hampering the 
movement at the time, have provided important cautionary lessons for later activists.  
However, the movement’s successes also attracted brutal repression.  Though terrorism 
by police and the FBI was only one contributing factor, by the mid-1970s, many effective 
organizations had been gutted of leadership or otherwise destroyed.  
Although these movements’ accomplishments had real effects on people’s lives, 
they fell well short of their ultimate goals.  The Civil Rights Movement did not end 
American white supremacy; Second Wave feminism did not end American patriarchy.  
New Left activists knocked down many of the pillars that held up these systems of 
oppression, but new pillars were developed to take their place.  Whereas Jim Crow had 
suppressed African-American voters through white primaries and poll taxes, a new 
system was developed to accomplish this task through mass incarceration, the 
disenfranchisement of felons, and racially discriminatory redistricting.  At the same time, 
“white flight” and anti-busing campaigns ensured the re-segregation, or continued 
segregation, of many American schools. Likewise, while the Women’s Liberation 
movement established a litany of reforms establishing women’s economic and 
educational rights as well as control over their reproductive functions, many of them were 
repealed during the massive backlash of the following decades.  The movements of the 
New Left presented a broad, offensive push for equality, democracy, and social justice.  
Eventually, though, these movements either de-mobilized, or were crushed, and the 
American elite, who had seen their power challenged and diminished, began mobilizing 
to re-take what they had lost.47 
  
48	  
 In many ways, the battles of the Sixties era are still being fought.  Because issues 
of discrimination, poverty, and imperialism remain unresolved in American society, the 
role of social justice movements in our historical memory is also nebulous.  Perhaps most 
notably, the memory of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., as a symbol of the Civil Rights 
Movement, has been hollowed out and watered down to the point of near 
meaninglessness.  King is no longer the champion of the poor, who called the United 
States “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world”48 and was hounded, threatened, 
spied upon, and arrested by local, state, and federal government officials.  Instead, his 
legacy has been co-opted, without irony or shame, by, among others, right-wing pundit 
Glenn Beck, who hosted a conservative rally at the Lincoln Memorial on the anniversary 
of King’s “I Have a Dream” speech, and conservative Arizona Attorney General Tom 
Horne, who cited King as his inspiration for banning social justice-oriented ethnic studies 
programs in his state.49   
This diluted version of King has become a useful tool for those who continue to 
oppose the goals for which he fought and died.  They have just as easily distorted the 
legacies of Malcolm X, the Black Panther Party, and others, presenting them as their 
opposites, as champions of racism and violence.  Similarly, the New Left and the hippie 
counter-culture have become not only interchangeable but also reviled for being so naïve 
and silly as to believe in sexual freedom and to oppose both mass consumption and 
genocidal warfare.  Importantly, these false narratives and historical distortions are not 
merely the passive result of time or cultural change.  They have been, and continue to be, 
deliberately communicated by the same forces that fought against these movements at the 
time.  They are, in fact, the latest battles in the struggle for public memory.50 
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CHAPTER 2: 
NEOLIBERALISM, PART 1: THE “REAGAN METHOD”  
AND DIRECT ACTION ACTIVISM    
 
 
 Reagan Administration 
 
ALEC 
Business Roundtable 
Heritage Foundation 
Moral Majority 
Eagle Forum 
 
 
1980s Direct Action Movements  
 
Sea Shepherd Conservation Society 
Anti-Nuke Movement 
Food Not Bombs 
Earth First! 
 
 
     
 
We are different from previous generations of conservatives. We are no longer 
working to preserve the status quo. We are radicals, working to overturn the 
present power structure of this country. 
 
                                      - Paul Weyrich, Heritage Foundation1 
 
 
Whenever we decide to go after a law, a regulation, or an agency, we must ask 
ourselves the following question:  If we win this battle, how will it feed on itself 
and lead to future victories that will weaken the coalition that opposes individual 
liberty and strengthen those forces and ideas that favor freedom? 
 
                       - Grover Norquist, Americans for Tax Reform2 
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While the movements of the 1960s era were largely defined by the pursuit of 
participatory democracy and social justice, the forces that opposed them had an 
altogether different understanding of freedom.  Building on the ideas of capitalist 
economists Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and others, they sought freedom for 
businesses and the super rich, not freedom for the marginalized and the oppressed.  
Specifically, they endorsed neoliberalism, an economic philosophy that redistributed 
public wealth to the elite through the de-regulation of industry, privatization of public 
resources, and cuts to public services.  In the late 1960s and 1970s, American elites began 
testing these methods, primarily at the state and local levels.  At the same time, however, 
they also began building an infrastructure for capturing national political power and 
developing the policies that they planned to implement.  These efforts culminated in the 
election of Ronald Reagan, who dutifully slashed away at Sixties era reforms.  More 
importantly, Reagan also established himself as essentially unlobbyable to the interests of 
US social movements.  As a result, American activists were not only put on the 
defensive, they were also denied even the minimal access to federal policymakers that 
they had previously enjoyed.   
The strategies of the powerful New Right were rooted in re-shaping the state in 
order to monopolize its resources for its own benefit.  The Heritage Foundation advised 
the incoming Reagan Administration to “use the appointment power wisely.  Act 
promptly to fill vacancies and find persons of high quality and friendly persuasion.”3  
Conservative activist Grover Norquist was even more blunt,  
First, we want to remove liberal personnel from the political process. Then we 
want to capture those positions of power and influence for conservatives.  Stalin 
taught the importance of this principle…He understood that personnel is policy.  
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With this principle in mind, conservatives must do all they can to make sure that 
they get jobs in Washington.4   
 
Social movement activists of the 1980s were thus forced to rely primarily on extra-
governmental methods to achieve their aims.  As the Reagan Administration and its allies 
moved to roll back the reforms of the 1960s era, groups like the radical environmentalists 
Earth First! turned to widespread, strategic civil disobedience in order to disrupt the New 
Right’s agenda and slow it down. 
 
THE NEW RIGHT COUNTERMOVEMENT 
In the early 1970s, America’s economic elites responded to the social changes of 
the previous decade by consolidating their power.  In 1972, corporate leaders formed the 
Business Roundtable, a conservative, pro-business organization with a membership 
consisting of over 150 CEOs of top American companies.  The group’s many activities 
included successfully lobbying against the creation of a federal Consumer Protection 
Agency.  In 1973, politicians and business leaders came together to found the American 
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), so that conservative government legislators could 
have, on hand, draft bills that had already been vetted by business interests.  The same 
year, Paul Weyrich, Edwin Feulner, and billionaire beer mogul Joseph Coors also 
launched the Heritage Foundation, which soon became one of the most influential 
conservative think tanks in the country.  In 1977, billionaire brothers Charles and David 
Koch launched the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank devoted to dissolving Social 
Security, among similar goals.  In 1979, Coors and others founded the Leadership 
Institute, a “boot camp for young conservatives,” which had trained 40,000 conservative 
activists by 2004. Together with the already established, and well-funded, US Chamber 
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of Commerce and American Enterprise Institute (AEI), these groups spent billions of 
dollars to finance elections, referenda, public relations campaigns, business-friendly 
studies, and other think tanks.  Most frighteningly of all, these organizations re-
appropriated much of the language that had defined the struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, 
including words like “freedom,” “work,” and “common sense.”5  
In his 1984 expose of the institutions of the American Right, political scientist 
John Saloma reported that the AEI boasted an $11.7 million per year budget, employed 
more than two hundred conservative scholars, and fed a constant stream of editorials to 
over one hundred daily newspapers across the country.  The upstart Heritage Foundation, 
meanwhile, already had a $10 million operating budget by the early 1980s.  As Heritage 
member Burton Pines described the relationship between the two organizations,  
AEI is like the big gun on an offshore battleship.  We are the landing party.  If 
they hadn’t softened it up, we wouldn’t have landed.6 
 
In other words, the AEI’s foundational work from the 1940s on, particularly in the areas 
of research and publishing, had created opportunities for the conservatives of the 1970s 
and 1980s.  Pines’ analogy is especially terrifying when one considers whom they are 
attacking, a point that the Heritage Foundation clarified in their 1980 publication 
Mandate for Leadership, a self-professed “blueprint for conservative government.”7 
As these organizations established their political footing over the course of the 
1970s, economic conservatives also made common cause with cultural reactionaries, such 
as Jerry Falwell, Anita Bryant, and Phyllis Schlafly.  In 1972, the anti-feminist Schlafly, 
who once equated sex education classes with “in-home sales parties for abortions,” 
founded the group STOP ERA (which later became the Eagle Forum).8  Anita Bryant 
meanwhile, with some assistance from Falwell, spent the late 1970s pushing anti-gay 
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initiatives in Florida, California, Minnesota, Kansas, and elsewhere. Bryant worried that 
“if gays are granted rights, next we’ll have to give rights to prostitutes and to people who 
sleep with St. Bernards.”9  In 1974, Gilburn Durand, who had previously worked with the 
conservative John Birch Society, launched “Operation Avalanche,” a campaign to 
organize Catholic clergy to “mobilize the [country’s] 43 million Catholics into an army 
of pro-life political activists.”10  
The religious Right’s reach was substantial, and early 1980s estimates of the 
weekly viewership for Falwell, Oral Roberts, and other conservative evangelists ranged 
from seven to ten million on the low end to as many as 115 to 130 million on the high 
end.  Falwell alone was broadcast on 300 radio stations and 373 television channels, and 
his Moral Majority claimed a membership of four million people by 1981.  And though 
Christian conservatism was not new, the anxieties that guided this particular push were 
based on the developments of the previous decade.  Reverend Falwell, for example, was 
driven by twin fears of homosexuality and feminism, which he described as a “satanic 
attack on the home.”11  Though abortion soon became the anchor in the conservative 
narrative about women, Falwell was clear about his broader agenda, professing, “With all 
my heart, I want to bury the Equal Rights Amendment once and for all in a deep, dark 
grave.”12  Other Christian conservatives expressed similar sentiments.  The Christian 
Right group Christian Voice, for example, offered that “America’s rapid decline as a 
world power is a direct result” of activism by feminists, who were “moral perverts” and 
“enemies of every decent society,” while one Evangelical minister counseled that “wife 
beating is on the rise because men are no longer leaders in their homes.  I tell women 
they must go back home and be more submissive.”13 
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 In truth, there was considerable overlap between economic and cultural 
conservatives.  In addition to promoting business-friendly economic policies, the 
Heritage Foundation was a fierce critic of women’s rights, and Heritage founder Paul 
Weyrich played a role in the establishment of ALEC, the Christian Voice, and Falwell’s 
Moral Majority. Weyrich was also a guest on Pat Robertson’s 700 Club and Reverend 
James Baker’s Praise the Lord.  Additionally, leaders such as televangelist Falwell, 
former Disney pop star Bryant, and Christian Broadcasting Network mogul Pat 
Robertson were hardly strapped for cash.14 
These groups coalesced around the neoliberal worldview.  Though in many ways 
just a renewed belief in Social Darwinism, neoliberal capitalism as it appeared in the 
1970s and 1980s was particularly noteworthy for its callousness.  Neoliberals despised 
the New Deal safety net and the more recent Civil Rights reforms, and they began rolling 
them back, piece-by-piece.  Neoliberal narratives further demonized the social 
movements of the 1930s and the 1960s eras, blaming them for American de-
industrialization, inflation, and unemployment during the 1970s.  The anti-feminist 
backlash, spreading homophobia, and “color-blind” racism that came to define 1970s and 
1980s America were not merely organic cultural responses – they were developed and 
nurtured by well-funded conservative think tanks.15   
The Right’s influence at the federal level also increased substantially during this 
period.  According to political scientists James S. Hacker and Paul Pierson,  
The number of corporations with public affairs offices in Washington grew from 
100 in 1968 to over 500 in 1978.  In 1971, only 175 firms had registered lobbyists 
in Washington, but by 1982, nearly 2,500 did.  The number of corporate PACs 
[political action committees] increased from under 300 in 1976 to over 1,200 by 
the middle of 1980.16 
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The effects of this influence were already being felt in the late 1970s, during the 
administration of Jimmy Carter.  With the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, however, the 
New Right found its true champion.  Reagan not only adopted more than sixty percent of 
the 1,270 recommendations laid out in the Heritage Foundation’s Mandate for 
Leadership, he also effectively changed the rules of the political game.  For unlike his 
predecessors, Reagan was deliberately unlobbyable, even to the most moderate of 
progressive voices.17   
During the 1950s and 1960s, Civil Rights strategists in groups like SNCC, CORE, 
and Martin Luther King’s SCLC operated with a clear understanding of their Cold War 
context.  Their use of civil disobedience was not intended to change the hearts of the Bull 
Connors of the Jim Crow South, nor even to attract the attention of the federal 
government – the Kennedys were well aware of the racist violence occurring on their 
watch.  The sit-ins, freedom rides, and marches were deliberately and strategically 
packaged for media consumption, intended to embarrass the United States government on 
a global level, giving pause to potential US allies and providing fodder for US critics.  
Only this pressure, not moral concerns, drove the federal government to intervene on 
behalf of Southern blacks.  Ronald Reagan, however, made starkly clear that he would 
not be embarrassed by American racism, going so far as to kick off his Presidential 
campaign with a states’ rights speech in Philadelphia, Mississippi, a town known only for 
the brutal 1964 murders of Civil Rights activists Michael Schwerner, James Chaney, and 
Andrew Goodman.  Reagan aide and conservative strategist Lee Atwater later explained 
the Republican Party’s approach: 
You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968 you can’t say 
“nigger”—that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, 
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states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re 
talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally 
economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites.… 
“We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a 
hell of a lot more abstract than “Nigger, nigger.”18 
 
On Civil Rights, Reagan was as good as his word.  To head the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), he appointed a fierce Affirmative Action 
critic, Clarence Thomas.  Predictably, from 1980 to 1986, the percentage of cases that the 
EEOC found no cause to pursue effectively doubled, from 28.5 percent to 56.6 percent.  
Despite criticism from his own party, Reagan also maintained a firm commitment to the 
Jim Crow-like apartheid regime in South Africa, vetoing bipartisan sanctions (which 
were subsequently over-ridden by Congress).  Reagan also promoted William Rehnquist 
to Supreme Court Chief Justice. Rehnquist had been a defender of the segregationist 
principle of “separate but equal” and had voted against eighty-two cases (out of the 
eighty-three he had seen) concerning the rights of women, the elderly, the disabled, and 
racial minorities.19 
The Reagan Administration’s approach to women’s rights followed a similar 
pattern.  At the urging of the Heritage Foundation, Reagan specifically targeted the 
Women’s Educational Equity Act (WEEA), a program intended to promote equal 
education for girls.  Reagan proposed a twenty-five percent budget cut his first year and 
complete defunding the next, though Congressional pressures eventually limited the cuts 
to around forty percent.  In response, Reagan simply replaced WEEA field agents with 
anti-feminists with ties to Phyllis Schlafly’s Eagle Forum.  Under the Carter 
Administration, women had constituted just fifteen percent of federal judicial 
appointments; under Reagan, they made up eight percent.  Reagan further discontinued 
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the Coalition on Women’s Appointments, the Working Group on Women and the brand 
new Office of Domestic Violence.  Reagan was also the first president to take a public 
position against the Equal Rights Amendment since its Congressional approval in 1972, 
and it failed during his first term.20 
Workers also suffered under the new regime.  In addition to Reagan’s famous 
dismissal of striking air controllers, whose union, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers 
Organization (PATCO), had actually endorsed him, the new president also set to work 
turning workers’ government safeguards against them.  Reagan’s National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) quickly reversed forty percent of the 1970s decisions that had 
benefited workers.  His Labor Secretary, Raymond Donovan, proposed weakening child 
labor restrictions by opening up dangerous jobs to fourteen and fifteen year olds, raising 
the number of hours children could work each week, and exempting them from minimum 
wage restrictions.  Reagan also appointed millionaire construction owner Thorne Auchter 
to head the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).  Auchter’s own 
company had been cited with forty-eight OSHA violations.21   
With many of the institutional gains of the 1960s movements in check, Reagan 
slashed away at social services.  One attempt at savings included classifying ketchup and 
pickle relish as vegetable servings in food programs for twenty-six million school 
children.  Reagan also cut federal housing spending from $30 billion in 1981 to $8 billion 
in 1986, during a decade in which between one and three million Americans became 
homeless.  In 1982 alone, 1.25 million industrial workers were laid off, and 
unemployment reached eleven percent.  Nonetheless, the Reagan Administration was 
able to find sufficient funds for the largest peace-time military spending in history – 
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roughly a trillion dollars in his first four years—and a massive tax cut, from seventy 
percent to twenty-eight percent, for the highest bracket.  The after-tax profits of U.S. 
corporations rose during the decade from $82.3 billion to $229 billion, while minimum 
wage remained at $3.35 per hour, a decrease given inflation.22 
The Reagan Administration’s approach was soberingly straightforward.  In the 
words of Paul Weyrich, the New Right had indeed succeeded in their effort “to overturn 
the…power structure of this country.”  When politically feasible, Reagan simply 
eliminated or de-funded the federal agencies and programs with which he disagreed.  
When he could not control their funding, he ensured control of their agendas by 
appointing leaders who were their agencies’ fiercest critics.  Though charged with 
enforcing the nation’s laws, Reagan instead chose not to implement those that went 
against his agenda.  His administration not only gutted the social safety net, however, it 
also drastically narrowed the possibilities for social change.   
For lack of a better term, I call this approach of eliminating, defunding, and 
appointing saboteur executives “the Reagan Method.”  However, the practice had deep 
roots in the conservative movements of the early 20th century and was notably used by 
Richard Nixon to debilitate the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO).  The genius of 
the Reagan Method was that it eliminated the possibility of compromise through 
lobbying, and thus limited opposition movements to two options:  they could remove 
Reagan and his ilk through electoral means or they could use direct action to confront 
Reagan’s policies at the point of their impact.  For a variety of reasons, the former proved 
nearly impossible.  For although opinion polls throughout the 1980s showed, for 
example, that nearly sixty percent of Americans thought the government spent too little to 
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protect the environment (compared to between six and twelve percent who thought 
spending was too high), these views had little electoral impact.  Perhaps some of this 
discontinuity can be explained by a 1982 study by political scientist Everett Carll Ladd, 
in which he concluded that while thirty-two percent of US voters were primarily 
influenced by a candidate’s position on abortion rights, less than half as many were as 
driven by positions on pollution (fifteen percent) or affirmative action programs (fourteen 
percent).  Public opinion was not the only barrier in electoral politics, however.  To 
ensure their victories, power brokers also eliminated huge numbers of potential minority 
voters through systematic mass incarceration and deliberately neutralized minority votes 
through methods such as re-districting.23 
With little hope for either effective lobbying or electoral influence, many activists 
opted for the last remaining viable means: confrontation through direct action. During the 
1930s and 1960s, labor and civil rights activists had often used direct action disruptions 
to gain public sympathy and attract outside intervention.  For activists opposing Reagan’s 
policies, however, public opinion was often much less significant than the outcome of 
localized clashes.  But just as they had in the streets of Birmingham and Chicago in the 
Sixties, local elites often responded to civil disobedience with the brute force.  Businesses 
targeted by activists also developed a number of clever chilling methods, such as the 
strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), which threatened to charge 
activists for the costs of their campaigns, such as the cost of security or loss of profit from 
bad press – a potentially devastating proposition for those advocating, say, a boycott of a 
major company. This shift, from national politics to intense, local clashes was perhaps 
most clear in the area of environmental policy.24 
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THE MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 
Although as many as 20 million people participated in the first Earth Day in 1970, 
a major rift within the American environmental movement was already developing.  On 
the radical end, New Left activists had long since linked environmental destruction with 
industry, notably through the horrors of chemical warfare.  They viewed corporations 
(such as Dow Chemical) as the problem and thus the target for political action.  The 
larger, more moderate environmental organizations, meanwhile, had learned different 
lessons over the previous decade. For one, membership in America’s mainstream 
environmental groups had grown exponentially in a very short period.  The Audobon 
Society, for example, nearly doubled its membership between 1962 and 1970, growing 
from 41,000 to 81,500.  Likewise, the National Wildlife Federation grew from 271,900 in 
1966 to 540,000 in 1970, while the Sierra Club’s membership ballooned from a modest 
20,000 in 1959 to 113,000 in 1970.  More importantly, these organizations had been able 
to translate their increased support into political gains and were thus much more eager to 
work hand-in-hand with major polluters, even recruiting them to participate in Earth Day 
activities.25   
Despite this tension, however, concern for the environment was neither 
controversial nor particularly partisan.  In effect, administrations from Kennedy through 
Carter shared at least a passing concern for the environment, or, more accurately, were at 
least open to the growing environmental lobby.  Even Richard Nixon had responded to 
the movement by urging and supporting a number of green policies, including the 
creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, the Endangered Species 
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Act in 1973, and regulations for clean air and drinking water.  Ronald Reagan, however, 
shattered this consensus, and not just by removing the solar panels that Jimmy Carter had 
had installed on the White House.26   
Reagan represented a major departure from US environmental policy.  Much in 
the same way that he deliberately appointed anti-feminists and white supremacists to civil 
rights posts, Reagan called upon major industrialists to lead and gut federal 
environmental agencies.  To head the EPA, Reagan appointed Anne Gorsuch (later 
Burford), a lawyer whose clients included a number of mining and agricultural interests.  
Gorsuch gave polluters a free pass by eliminating the agency’s Office of Enforcement, 
and of the fifteen people she named to EPA positions, eleven had ties to the industries 
they were intended to regulate.  As Secretary of Interior, Reagan appointed James Watt, 
who, along with Joseph Coors, had founded the Mountain States Legal Foundation, an 
organization through which corporate interests could fight environmental regulations.  To 
head the government’s surface-mining regulatory agency, Reagan selected Robert Harris, 
who had previously been the agency’s chief opponent and the instigator of a lawsuit 
against it.27  
Reagan’s appointees quickly handcuffed the EPA, slowing to a crawl its pursuit 
of corporate polluters, and urged their own agencies’ defunding.  The budget for the EPA 
was cut by thirty percent, the Council on Environmental Quality’s by half, and, in 1982, 
Reagan insisted that the United States be the only country not to sign a UN statement 
declaring a respect for nature.  Instead, the Reagan Administration moved to “privatize” 
public land, offering its use to lumber, mining, and agricultural interests.  In 1982, Watt 
announced the administration’s intention to sell thirty-seven million acres of federal land, 
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an area roughly the size of Michigan.  By September 1983, Watt had also released 1.7 
million acres of wilderness from federal protection, without the required Congressional 
approval.  The administration further proposed to double timber production from 
National Forests within the decade.  In most cases, this deforestation amounted to a 
massive subsidy for lumber corporations.  For example, a study of National Forests in 
Colorado found that timber purchases returned only thirty-five cents for every taxpayer 
dollar spent on its production.  Furthermore, the subsidies translated to minimal consumer 
savings, amounting to “a discount of about $100 on the cost of a $75,000 wood frame 
house.”28 
 These policies were drastic, but they were as important for what they represented 
as for what they actually accomplished.  For nearly two decades, environmental 
organizations had learned a particular formula for success.  Rather than focus on 
grassroots activism, they had “professionalized” their efforts by setting up Washington, 
D.C. offices and focusing their funds on lobbying.  Under Reagan, this strategy became a 
dead end, as their lobbying cries were not only drowned out by the sheer volume of 
corporate lobbyists, but they also now fell on deliberately deaf ears.  Even pragmatists 
began to realize that indirect methods were reaching a dead end, and movement energy 
began to shift toward direct action-oriented groups like Earth First!, which formed in 
1980.   
 With the avenues of formal politics blocked, disruptive direct action became the 
paradigmatic form of protest in the 1980s.  For example, the Clamshell Alliance and 
other anti-nuclear organizations broke into testing sites and protested the building of new 
nuclear plants.  This movement notably included a campaign against the Seabrook 
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Nuclear Power Plant in New Hampshire, in which as many as 4,000 people engaged in 
civil disobedience between 1976 to 1989.  In response to Reagan’s military interventions 
in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, the religiously rooted Sanctuary movement 
openly violated federal immigration law to provide asylum to refugees.  On the oceans, 
meanwhile, Greenpeace and the more militant Sea Shepherd Conservation Society 
patrolled and disrupted whale hunts, in addition to intervening in nuclear weapons tests.  
In 1985, the French government responded to these protests by sinking Greenpeace’s 
flagship, the Rainbow Warrior, while it was docked in New Zealand, murdering one 
member of the crew.   Another outgrowth of the anti-nuke movement, Food Not Bombs, 
distributed free food – to protestors, at first, but eventually to the general public.  By the 
late 1980s, Food Not Bombs activities in San Francisco were being met with severe 
police repression, including beatings and dozens of arrests, eventually leading the United 
Nations to open an investigation into possible human rights violations.  The 
quintessential organization of the period, however, was Earth First!29 
 
EARTH FIRST! AND DIRECT ACTION 
 Earth First! is most well-known for its direct action tactics:  tree-sits, road 
blockades, and the sabotaging of logging equipment.  These methods – direct in the sense 
that they literally stopped activities such as the clear-cutting of old growth forests – were 
adopted as a last line of defense.  In fact, paralleling the posture of the Reagan 
Administration, Earth First! adopted the slogan “No Compromise in Defense of Mother 
Earth.”  One prominent activist, acknowledging the implications of this defensive 
position for the environment, has lamented that the movement’s victories are all 
  
68	  
temporary, while its failures are permanent.  In other words, when ancient forests are 
destroyed or animals are driven to extinction, they are gone forever, yet their defense 
requires constant vigilance against new threats.  Success then, can only be defined as a 
delay, not a permanent and decisive victory. 
 While perhaps bleak, this analysis reflects the political context in which these 
groups operated.  In the early 1980s, the environmental movement served a defensive 
role, as the US government was unsympathetic and its agencies served as corporate 
proxies.  This dynamic was not entirely new to the American Left.  In many ways, it was 
simply a return to the unrestrained capitalism of the pre-New Deal era.  Earth First! 
activists were acutely aware of this shift, and their literature reflected a greater influence 
by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) of the early 20th century than by any 
specific 1960s era organization.  For example, in addition to adopting the tactic of spiking 
trees, Earth First! also adapted the IWW’s Little Red Songbook into a Little Green 
Songbook.  Recognizing that lumber companies excelled at pitting environmentalists 
against loggers, Judi Bari’s Humboldt County Earth First! organized as a joint IWW 
chapter to link the two groups.  Earth First! also utilized several key New Left methods, 
however.30   
Most clearly, on a tactical level, Earth First! was heavily anchored in non-violent 
civil disobedience.  Tree sits, in which activists camped out in trees to prevent their 
cutting, and road blockades, in which activists often locked their arms and necks to heavy 
equipment, were essentially just sit-ins, adapted to the outdoors.  On a conceptual level, 
there was a parallel as well.  Urban scholars such as David Harvey frame capitalism itself 
as a battle over space, whether via global imperialism, struggles for market share, or land 
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speculation.  For the Civil Rights Movement, these spaces of conflict included lunch 
counters, city buses, and streets, while for Earth First!, the space in question was often an 
old growth forest.  And while segregated lunch counters were clearly racialized spaces, 
they were also economic spaces.  The question was not just whether blacks and whites 
could sit together, but also whether the rights of businesses (in this case to deny service) 
would trump the rights of people (to be served).  Earth First! and other radical 
environmentalists raised a similar question:  do the rights of businesses (say, to poison 
local water supplies during production) trump the rights of people (to clean water)?   
The more clearly Earth First! questioned the free reign of business, the easier it 
became for federal and local police forces to answer them.  Using tactics strikingly 
similar to its Counter-Intelligence Program in the 1950s and 1960s, the FBI routinely 
targeted Earth First! activists. In the Sixties, COINTELPRO had been used to spy on, 
infiltrate, disrupt, and harass New Left activists – most notoriously including the false 
imprisonment and assassination of Black Panther leaders like Fred Hampton and 
Geronimo Ji Jaga (Pratt).  In the mid-1970s, public outcry about COINTELPRO and the 
Watergate scandal led federal legislators to launch investigations into the actions of the 
FBI, CIA, and National Security Agency (NSA).  These investigative committees, the 
Church Committee in the Senate and the Pike Committee in the House of 
Representatives, exposed a number of misdeeds, including massive CIA and FBI mail-
opening programs, FBI death threats against Martin Luther King, Jr., and a CIA database 
of 1.5 million potentially “subversive” Americans.  However, the investigators were 
ultimately stonewalled by the Ford Administration, including Chief of Staff Donald 
Rumsfeld and the new CIA Director, George H. W. Bush.  Though President Jimmy 
  
70	  
Carter implemented tighter controls on security agencies through an executive order, 
these regulations were then loosened under Reagan.31 
By the late 1980s, FBI infiltrators and informers were rampant within Earth First!, 
numbering at least fifty.  In 1989, following more than two years of encouragement and 
prodding by undercover agents, EF! founder Dave Foreman and four others were accused 
of conspiring to sabotage Arizona power lines.  In their own tape-recorded conversations, 
FBI agents admitted that Foreman was not “an actual perpetrator” but that his 
imprisonment would “send a message.”  The following year, a car carrying Northern 
California Earth First!ers Judi Bari and Darryl Cherney was blown up, shattering Bari’s 
pelvis.  In what became a major news story, Oakland police and FBI investigators 
reported that Bari and Cherney had made the bomb themselves, effectively linking Earth 
First! with terrorism in the popular conscience.  Twelve years later, and five years after 
Bari’s death of cancer, a federal jury exonerated Bari and Cherney and ruled that federal 
agents and Oakland police officers had violated their civil rights.  The special agent in 
charge of the San Francisco FBI office during the Bari bombing was Richard W. Held, 
who had played a key role in the false imprisonment of Geronimo Pratt.32 
 
STRUCTURE AND CAMPAIGNS 
 Partially because activists were concerned about police provocateurs and 
informants, Earth First! was highly decentralized – more of a network than a formal 
organization.  In 1982, Earth First!’s national directory included fifty-one contacts in 
twenty-eight states.  By the end of 1988, the group boasted seventy-five local contacts 
and thirteen national working groups, as well as groups in thirteen other countries.  Local 
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Earth First! affiliates communicated through updates in the Earth First! Journal and a 
variety of traveling “roadshows.”  Activists also met annually at the Round River 
Rendezvous, a week-long retreat, skill share, and strategy session, which often 
culminated with protest actions in support of the regional host’s campaigns.33   
Earth First!’s actions were varied.  Affiliates primarily focused on issues of local 
importance, but they also cooperated on campaigns across geographical boundaries.  For 
example, from 1984 to 1987, the group led a national boycott of Burger King, whose 
cattle imports at the time were fed on clear-cut rainforests.  They also teamed with the 
anti-nuclear movement and the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, later featured on the 
television program Whale Wars.  Many of Earth First!’s opponents were corporations 
(notably Maxxam and related timber companies), but the group’s main targets were often 
government agencies, such as the US Forest Service and the US Bureau of Land 
Management, that were being used to further corporate ends.  For while Reagan was 
creating the racist, sexist myth of the American welfare queen, his administration was 
illegally selling public land to private interests below market value and allowing cattle 
interests to use public land for grazing.  This was not merely bad environmental policy; 
that might imply that ecology was of any concern.  This was economic policy – 
“privatization” – and the irony of these corporate welfare programs was not lost on 
activists.34 
Earth First!’s most famous campaigns involved protecting America’s few 
remaining old growth forests from the encroachment of real estate developers, mining 
companies, and timber interests.  Prominent such stands included the defense of the 
Kalmiopsis Wilderness area in Southwestern Oregon; the Cathedral Forest, also in 
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Oregon; the Cabinet Mountains of Western Montana; the Rocky Mountain Front, in 
Montana’s Glacier National Park; the Fishing Bridge area in Yellowstone National Park, 
Montana; the Grand Canyon in Arizona; Okanogan National Forest in Northern 
Washington; the Jemez Mountains in New Mexico; and the Redwood Forests of Northern 
California.  Because they were defensive, these exhausting campaigns often lasted for 
several years, with periods of intense action, stalemate, and long lulls.  They also 
frequently changed both form and venue, as the acts of clear-cutting and building logging 
roads were weather dependent, forcing annual winter breaks for loggers and activists 
alike.  So while summer might be spent clashing with developers in the forest, winters 
provided opportunities to raise funds, reflect on failures, and strategize.  One particularly 
illustrative campaign was the nearly twenty-year struggle to prevent the University of 
Arizona from building a telescope complex on the ecologically sensitive 10,700-foot 
peak of Mount Graham, in Arizona’s Coronado National Forest. 
 
“THE MOUNT GRAHAM ROLLER-COASTER” 
In July 1994, after a decade-long series of protests, arrests, temporary victories, 
and subsequent setbacks, environmental activists won a permanent injunction against the 
University of Arizona until it complied with the requirements of the Endangered Species 
Act and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  If the University wanted to 
finish construction of its $100 million telescope, it would have to do so in accordance 
with US law.  University officials already knew that their development plans could not 
meet those standards, however; in fact, their own scientists had advised a less vulnerable 
location.  But rather than conceding, University officials opted to bypass environmental 
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law altogether.  In 1996, when President Bill Clinton signed into law a $160 billion 
omnibus spending bill, he also approved a “rider,” added by Arizona Congressman Jim 
Kolbe, allowing the University to build its new telescope without concern for its 
environmental impact.35 
For over ten years, Earth First! agitators and their allies had worked to prevent the 
University of Arizona’s Steward Observatory from building the complex through a 
combination of legal challenges, direct action disruptions, and pressure campaigns 
against the observatory’s financial backers.  Earth First! in particular used whatever 
means were available, including putting their bodies on the line, to “wrench the system” 
and delay construction.  In the end, however, the University and its financial partners, 
notably the Catholic Church, were able to trump activists through their connections with 
federal legislators.  Environmental activists were able to slow the assault on Mount 
Graham, providing an opportunity for a more amenable regime to emerge, but they could 
not stop it indefinitely. 
Earth First!’s campaign against the Mt. Graham Observatory began in the Fall of 
1985 with a demonstration at a public hearing regarding the University’s proposal.  A 
second, more theatrical protest followed in October, during which (activists dressed as) 
three bears, a raccoon, a mountain lion, and a spotted owl marched on the Forest 
Supervisor’s office to deliver their list of demands.  Mt. Graham itself was already on the 
agenda of Arizona Earth First!, who had publicly called for its protection in a “National 
Forest Wilderness” proposal a year earlier.  As the University of Arizona’s plan 
proceeded, Earth First! and a growing coalition of over thirty other organizations began 
publicizing the significance and fragility of the Mt. Graham ecosystem.36   
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A spruce fir forest in the middle of a desert, Mt. Graham is a “sky island,” a 
mountain with a radically different environment than the surrounding lowlands.  As a 
result of this isolation, the area historically hosted fifteen unique species of insects, “eight 
plants found nowhere else, two unique snails, Peregrine Falcons (an Endangered 
Species), Spotted Owls,”37 and, perhaps most dramatically, the Mt. Graham Red Squirrel, 
an Endangered Species with an estimated population between 150 and 300.  Biologist 
Peter Warshall, one of over 200 members of Scientists for the Preservation of Mt. 
Graham, likened the area to only a small handful of others in the world, such as the 
Galapagos Islands, the Celbes of Southeast Asia, and the highlands of East Africa.  In a 
1990 Washington Post article, Arizona Game and Fish Department biologist Tom 
Waddell called Mt. Graham “an isolated museum of what was here 11,000 years ago.”38  
For these reasons, as well as the mountains’ spiritual significance for the San Carlos 
Apache Nation, Mt. Graham was a controversial location for the school’s telescope 
complex.  The university itself had also identified nearly 40 other locations that could 
meet their needs.39   
Nonetheless, school administrators continued the project as planned and hired the 
high-profile Washington lobbying firm Patton, Boggs, and Blow to plead their case on 
Capitol Hill. In 1988, initial legislative attempts by Arizona Senators John McCain and 
Dennis DeConcini to create an astrophysical preserve for the telescopes failed.  After the 
Congressional recess, however, the University’s $1 million lobbying push paid off when 
McCain, DeConcini, and Congressman Jim Kolbe inserted a rider to that year’s Arizona-
Idaho Conservation Act, allowing the University to by-pass much of the Endangered 
Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act.  In response, while other 
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environmental activists began mounting a legal challenge, Arizona Earth First! members 
Nancy Morton, Nancy Zierenberg, and Lynn Bohi occupied the Tucson office of Arizona 
Congressman Mo Udall, a self-professed conservationist and University of Arizona 
alumnus, who had refused to intervene against the rider.40 
In February 1990, members of Earth First! and Greenpeace turned their focus to 
one of the telescope’s principle backers, the Smithsonian Institute.  Protestors hung a 
twenty-five foot banner on the front of the Museum of Natural History, displayed 
squirrel-sized coffins, and carried signs that read, “Extinction on Mount Graham 
Courtesy of the Smithsonian.”  A national conference on environmental law was also 
targeted, and its attendees returned from lunch to find Earth First! pamphlets on Mt. 
Graham at their place settings.  All references to the Smithsonian had been circled in red.  
Unaccustomed to public protest, the museum withdrew from the Mt. Graham project 
altogether the next year, choosing instead to invest in a telescope based in Hawaii.41 
At the same time that Earth First! activists were pressuring the Smithsonian, a 
legal challenge to the observatory led by the Sierra Club uncovered a series of 
government misdeeds.  The complex’s exemptions from environmental law were 
contingent on an official Biological Opinion from the US Fish and Wildlife Service 
(USFWS), which oversaw the Endangered Species Program.  But while the opinion’s 
authors, including agency biologist Sam Spiller, had personally concluded that the project 
would threaten the area’s wildlife, Regional Director Michael Spear had pressured them 
to give the project a positive endorsement.42   
This embarrassing revelation led the USFWS to order a new Biological Opinion, 
but it did not convince the Forest Service to revoke the University’s permit.  A 
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subsequent investigation by the Congressional General Accounting Office (GAO), 
however, found that the development “posed an unacceptable risk to the red squirrel’s 
survival,”43 a conclusion amplified by new data showing that the squirrel population had 
dropped from 215 in 1988 to as few as 132 by May 1990.  This finding led to a 30-day 
halt to the project, but the committee in charge of reviewing biological data was headed 
by Michael Spear, the very person who sabotaged the first assessment.  The GAO 
investigation also unearthed allegations that Senator John McCain had pressured 
Coronado National Forest Service Supervisor Jim Abbott to ensure the project’s success 
or else have “the shortest tenure of any Forest Service Supervisor on record.”44 
But while the GAO investigation prompted widespread outcry in Congress, with 
McCain, DeConcini, and Arizona Congressman Jon Kyl awkwardly joining the chorus, 
other federal officials showed less concern.  George H.W. Bush had expressed a desire to 
be known as the “environmental President,” but his Interior Secretary, Manuel Lujan, Jr., 
announced in a May 1990 interview with the Denver Post that the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA) was “too tough.”  As “the best example,” Lujan cited the Mt. Graham red 
squirrel, and he questioned why “we have to save every subspecies,” since “nobody’s 
told me the difference between a red squirrel, a black one or a brown one.”  In a 
subsequent New York Times editorial, Donald Falk, Executive Director for the Center for 
Plant Conservation, described Lujan’s statement as showing “an alarming ignorance of 
basic biology” for the “highest public official entrusted with the stewardship of our 
natural resources.”  President Bush distanced himself from Lujan’s comments, but he 
threatened to block the ESA’s renewal just two years later.45 
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That September, with the review process complete and a temporary injunction 
lifted, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed construction to begin anew.  With legal 
options exhausted, Earth First! activists turned to more direct methods:  civil 
disobedience and monkey wrenching.  On October 2, logging and construction crews 
arrived to find the first two forest gates chained shut, and the crews had to use 
blowtorches to open them.  They then found the next gate blocked by an activist, attached 
to it with a bicycle lock, thus requiring slow, careful removal.  After clearing this hurdle, 
the convoy encountered an additional seven roadblocks before finally reaching the site.  
There, they found even more Earth First! activists chained to trees.  By the time they 
were all cleared, the work had been delayed by eight hours.  The next day, a funeral 
march through the forest and a tree sit prevented cutting for two hours.  The third day, yet 
another march, followed by mass civil disobedience, resulted in a three and a half hour 
delay and 23 arrests.46 
In the following weeks, activists mounted another gate blockade and blocked 
roads with logs almost daily, but they could not stop the clearing of two of the three 
designated areas.  The third cut, however, was delayed by a weeklong tree-sit, which 
compelled the University to opt for an alternate location with less environmental impact.  
In November 1990, activists closed the Mt. Graham Preservation camp for winter, well 
aware that their efforts may have added up to little more than “the equivalent of hubcap 
theft in the face of a project which threatens a species extinction.”47 
In 1991, Mt. Graham defenders focused their efforts on the telescopes’ sponsors 
outside of Arizona.  In addition to the withdrawal of the Smithsonian Institute, the year 
also saw Ohio State University’s support for the project collapse.  A year of student 
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protests had forced the Astronomy Department to hire its own PR firm, and two days 
after a mock funeral for Mt. Graham, the school’s Board of Trustees eliminated the 
telescope from their agenda.  By doing so, the board required the Astronomy program to 
seek its own funding for the telescope.  Building on this victory, Ohio State actions 
escalated with the disruption of an on-campus speech by University of Arizona President 
Manual Pacheco, including a banner drop, the flyering of car windshields, and a post-
speech airplane banner reading, “OSU, U of A save Apache rights and Mt. Graham.”  A 
few weeks later, multiple banner drops and 10,000 flyers greeted the arrival of the 
University of Arizona football team as they kicked off their season, with a 38-14 loss in 
Columbus.  After activists, including “Ruth the Red Squirrel,” began talking to media 
surrounding the nationally televised game, OSU officials announced that the school 
would not be participating in the Mt. Graham project.48 
With funding from the Smithsonian and Ohio State cut off, activists focused their 
efforts on another major co-sponsor, the Catholic Church.  In 1992, the Vatican 
Observatory officially responded to Apache opposition to the Mt. Graham project, which 
included two unanimous Tribal Council Resolutions in 1990 as well as a 1991 resolution 
endorsed by fifteen American Indian Nations and eleven US environmental groups.  In 
the response, Father George Coyne, the Vatican astronomer at the University of Arizona, 
noted that while Apache oral traditions linked them to Mt. Graham much earlier, “there 
are no clear written records of any group of Apaches using Mt. Graham until the mid 
1600s.”49  In effect, Coyne argued that violating even 400 years of tradition was 
insignificant compared to the interests of the Catholic Church.  Indeed, Coyne later called 
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the native view “a kind of religiosity to which I cannot subscribe, and which must be 
suppressed with all the force we can muster.”50   
While Father Coyne held the paternalistic view that Apache claims stemmed from 
environmentalists attempting to “manipulate the American Indians,”51 Father Charles 
Polzer, another Jesuit priest and Arizona faculty member, identified a different source of 
opposition to the telescopes.  According to Polzer, the effort to protect Mt. Graham was a 
conspiracy of the “Jewish lawyers of the ACLU to undermine and destroy the Catholic 
Church.”52  But while the Vatican was unmoved by Apache concerns, environmental 
activists built alliances with native groups and planned solidarity actions, including a 
protest at the Vatican Embassy in London by Earth First! and a group calling itself 
“Catholics Against Vatican Exploitation of Apache Traditional Sites” in October 1992.53  
In 1993 and 1994, Earth First! and its allies escalated their campaign.  During the 
summer of 1993, the group held its annual Round River Rendezvous at Mt. Graham.  
Following the retreat, activists occupied the office of the University of Arizona President 
and were violently removed.  According to the EF! version of the story, the twenty-five 
arrestees issued a plea of “no compromise.”  That same summer, acknowledging the 
public relations blunder of using the telescope project to honor another defiler of 
indigenous land, the University changed the name of the third proposed telescope from 
“Columbus” to the more generic, less offensive “Large Binocular Telescope” (LBT).54   
While continuing to condemn the original name, native activists refused to offer 
the University an opportunity for bolster its image.  Ola Cassadore Davis of the Apache 
Survival Coalition responded bluntly,  
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They can name it Sally or John or whatever name they want, but we still don’t 
want it.  That mountain is our church, it’s a temple, so they should leave it alone, 
leave it the way it is. 
 
In September, Apache activists joined Earth First! in a protest action at the dedication of 
the first two telescopes.  The disruptions included bicycle-lock blockades, a tripod sit, 
and a loud drum circle by the Arizona American Indian Movement, leading to ten arrests 
and delaying the ceremony for three hours.  A month earlier, Colorado and Arizona EF! 
activists had converged on the Vatican-sponsored World Youth Day in Denver, which 
closed with an airplane flying over the crowd pulling a banner reading, “The Pope Sins 
on Mount Graham – Earth First!”  Though the Church’s seeming omnipresence made it 
very powerful, it also provided activists with many opportunities for confrontation.55 
In 1994, the campaign to stop the Large Binocular Telescope reached its peak, as 
the project’s North American backers began withdrawing one after the other.  In January, 
student activist Naomi Mudge addressed the University of Arizona faculty senate in order 
to debunk recent claims by the school’s Vice President.  The same month, the University 
of Toronto, the telescope’s only Canadian backer, dropped out, following a 
demonstration at the school’s astronomy department.  In February, an Earth First! climber 
occupied, and hung banners from, the University of Arizona’s clock tower for nearly a 
week.  Though police blew whistles and focused spotlights on the squatter to prevent him 
from sleeping at night, they stopped short of granting University of Arizona business 
major (and bigot) Greg Chapin’s request “to see him beat…to see Rodney King all 
over.”56  In response to the occupation, the University threatened to file a SLAPP suit to 
reimburse them for police expenses as well as the cost of installing surveillance cameras 
on the tower.57 
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In March, Michigan State University responded to student protests by removing 
its name from consideration for the telescope.  In April, Earth First!, the Student 
Environmental Action Coalition (SEAC), the Apache Survival Coalition, and other 
groups, conducted an international “Day of Action.”  Activists in more than forty cities 
participated, including occupations of Forest Service offices in Vermont, Minnesota, 
Georgia, and Oregon, as well as actions against the Archdiocese in San Francisco, 
California, and the Research Corporation, another telescope partner, in Tucson, Arizona.  
Fifty European astronomers also signed a petition against the LBT.  In response to an on-
campus demonstration related to the day of action, officials at the University of 
Pittsburgh, the last American school still considering the Mt. Graham project, also 
withdrew.  Activist pressure on Pitt’s administration had been building for years, 
including a visit by San Carlos Apache Raleigh Thompson in March 1993 and a student 
occupation of the Chancellor’s office that December.58 
On the heels of this string of victories, and after nearly ten years of legal appeals, 
the Ninth Circuit Court finally issued a permanent injunction against the building of the 
LBT, requiring the University of Arizona to comply with both the Endangered Species 
Act and the National Environmental Policy Act.  A year later, the Court officially denied 
the University’s appeal, seemingly dooming the expansion of the complex for the 
foreseeable future.  As Mark Hughes of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund had 
predicted, “as soon as someone really studies the impacts of the observatory on the 
squirrel – and no one has done this – the project will be dead.”59  Indeed, the Mt. Graham 
project could not proceed within the confines of the law.60    
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With so much money on the line, however, University of Arizona officials and 
their business partners refused to accept defeat.  In December of 1995, President Bill 
Clinton vetoed an appropriations bill full of environmental exemptions, including waivers 
for Alaskan old growth forests, roadless areas in Montana, and Mt. Graham – a provision 
added by Arizona Congressman Jon Kyl.  Six months later, however, the University 
finally succeeded in freeing itself from the responsibilities of US law.  In May, President 
Bill Clinton signed Congress’ Omnibus Budget Bill, which included a new rider 
exempting the University from environmental considerations.  The next month, the Court 
implemented the rider and lifted its ban, allowing construction to proceed unhindered.61   
With the legal hurdles removed, Ohio State University re-joined the project in 
February 1997.  Two years later, Notre Dame University also signed on.  In 2002, the 
University of Virginia and the University of Minnesota joined the project as well, despite 
intense protests from students, faculty, and indigenous groups.  Virginia’s participation 
was particularly biting as the Virginia Council on Indians, representing all eight of the 
state’s tribes, had joined the Apache plea against the telescope.  The faculty committee in 
charge of the decision recommended participation, with the condescending and 
contradictory caveats that the school encourage the University of Arizona to form a 
committee to improve relations with American Indians and that Virginia also attempt to 
improve its own relations with American Indian students and faculty.  At a cost of over 
$120 million, the Large Binocular Telescope was dedicated in 2004 and became fully 
operational in 2008, more than twenty years after the battle began.62 
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CONCLUSION 
 The defense of Mt. Graham was one of dozens of campaigns by Earth First! in the 
1980s and 1990s, many of them engaged simultaneously.  This feat is especially 
impressive, given not only the frustrating nature of their activism, but also that they 
conducted it in the face of considerable police repression.  And though its activities were 
widespread, Earth First! made up only a small portion of the US environmental 
movement.  While well-funded national organizations lobbied politicians with little hope 
for success, EF! activists shouldered the often-dangerous responsibility of blunting the 
efforts of polluters and clear-cutters on the front lines.  Their tactics, including civil 
disobedience and sabotage, were inherently defensive, however, and could only impede, 
not permanently stop, their opponents. 
Earth First! activists and their allies did not prevent the construction of the 
telescope complex at Mt. Graham.  However, by targeting the University of Arizona and 
its financial backers with a combination of legal challenges, public shaming, and direct 
action disruptions, they were able to slow construction dramatically.  The Mt. Graham 
campaign, then, was not a victory, but its ultimate failure had as much to do with the 
American political context as with the efforts of activists.  By putting their bodies on the 
line, radical environmentalists were largely able to preserve the forests of Mt. Graham 
through the destructive years of the Reagan Administration, the Bush Administration, and 
into the Clinton Administration.  Unfortunately, neither the broader environmental 
movement nor the American Left as a whole had been able to turn back the gains of the 
New Right.  They were unable to use the window that Earth First! provided in order to 
force a more ecologically friendly agenda at the federal level.  Environmental lobbyists 
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did compel Democrat Bill Clinton to reject the blatant assault of the 1995 Interior 
appropriations bill.  However, with both Congressional houses in Republican hands, there 
was not sufficient political pressure to make Clinton reject every bill that mentioned Mt. 
Graham. 
 While Earth First!, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, and EF! off-shoot the 
Rainforest Action Network (RAN) continue to operate, their most significant legacy has 
been at the tactical level, where they served as a bridge between 1960s guerilla theater 
groups and the carnival protestors of the 1990s.  Earth First!’s use of theatrics borrowed 
heavily from earlier groups like the Yippies and the Diggers.  The Yippies had been 
experts at using humor for political ends, reportedly dumping money onto the trading 
floor of the New York Stock Exchange and applying for a government permit to levitate 
the Pentagon to purge it of its Vietnam War demons.  During the conspiracy trial of the 
Chicago 8, Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin also appeared in court in costumes, dressed 
as judges and Chicago police officers.  Earth First!ers similarly protested in animal 
costumes and made appearances as Smokey the Bear in order to denounce the US Forest 
Service.   
Many of the forest-related tactics that Earth First! eventually perfected, including 
tree-sits, tripod sits, and burying one’s self waist deep during a road blockade, had 
originated in the Australian environmental movement and re-appeared in the actions of 
subsequent groups.  For example, in the early 1990s, Reclaim the Streets, which was 
originally an Earth First! UK spin-off, organized a number of illegal dance parties in busy 
intersections, and activists suspended on tripods were a frequent staple.  Earth First!’s 
taste for disruption and occupying space was also paralleled in the actions of the AIDS 
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Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) and the bicycle event Critical Mass.  ACT UP 
activists, for example, chained themselves to a balcony at the New York Stock Exchange 
in 1989 and interrupted the CBS Evening News in 1991.  Perhaps most importantly, many 
of these tactics for blocking roads and intersections were used during the World Trade 
Organization protests in Seattle in 1999.63  
 Earth First!’s use of “monkey wrenching” also maintained a legacy among 
activists.  In the early 1990s, after a series of organizational splits along personal and 
strategic lines, many Earth First!ers began distancing themselves from some forms of 
sabotage, particularly “tree-spiking,” the driving of long nails into trees to prevent their 
cutting.  This particular debate was rather complicated, as spiking’s unwarranted 
reputation for being dangerous made it unappealing for public relations reasons, though 
not necessarily for ethical reasons. Other burgeoning organizations of the period, 
however, notably the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Earth Liberation Front (ELF), 
continued to use property destruction as a both a tactic and a strategy.  The ALF, for 
example, conducted a series of raids on American animal testing laboratories and factory 
farms in the 1980s and 1990s, freeing animals, causing deliberate property damage, and 
successfully closing many of its targets. The ELF, meanwhile, has been implicated in a 
number of arsons, notably including, in 1996, $12 million in damages to a ski resort in 
Vail, Colorado, which had been seeking to expand, and $3.5 million in damages to 125 
Hummers and other SUVs at a Los Angeles-area dealership in 2003.  To date, neither 
group’s actions have cause physical harm to a human being.64 
 Most significantly, groups like Earth First! represented a re-evaluation of the 
American political landscape that acknowledged new constraints and began planning for 
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the long term.  During the 1980s, New Right activists began brainstorming ways to make 
the “Reagan Revolution” permanent, while also criticizing Reagan for being too 
moderate.  Groups like Earth First!, while not providing a serious challenge to neoliberal 
hegemony at the federal level, blunted the impact of Reagan’s policies.  By building 
coalitions with indigenous rights activists and other environmental groups, they also 
provided a foundation for a future push, under more receptive political conditions.65  
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CHAPTER 3: 
NEOLIBERALISM, PART 2:  RESISTANCE CULTURES AND COUNTER 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
 Reagan Administration 
 
ALEC 
Business Roundtable 
Heritage Foundation 
Moral Majority 
Eagle Forum 
 
 
1980s Resistance Cultures  
 
Graffiti Movement 
Hip Hop  
Punk Rock 
 
  
Somewhere between the distanced slogans and abstract calls to arms, we… 
discovered through Gilman a way to give our politics some application in our 
actual lives.  
 
       - Mike K., 924 Gilman Street1 
 
 
One of the ideas behind ABC is breaking down the barriers between bands and 
people and making everyone equal. There is no Us and Them. 
 
       -Chris(tine) Boarts Larson, ABC No Rio2 
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The radical environmental movement responded to the political climate of the 
1980s with direct action campaigns that they hoped would protect America’s remaining 
wilderness from destruction.  They used legal and extra-legal means, including 
blockading roads and sabotaging logging equipment, in order to slow the encroachment 
of timber, mining, and other corporate interests onto public, or formerly public, land.  In 
the country’s rapidly de-industrializing urban areas, meanwhile, youth movements, 
including punk rock, hip-hop, and graffiti, responded to these same political shifts with a 
different form of direct action.  While Earth First!’s activism was intended to halt the on-
going processes of privatization and the de-regulation of industry, these youth 
movements emerged from urban contexts already impacted by a decade or more of 
declining economic opportunities, cuts to public services, and the elimination and 
criminalization of public areas.  As a result, their resistance to neoliberalism was often 
much less pronounced.  In many cases, though, these young people were not only lashing 
out.  They were also attempting create alternative communities by carving out their own 
cultural and physical spaces. 
 
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF YOUTH CULTURE 
Graffiti art began as an accessible, if not quite democratic, artistic form.  While 
experienced artists might graduate to more complex tools, amateur tagging initially 
required little more than a permanent marker.  And while the movement’s popularity has 
since spread along a number of diverse trajectories, it initially developed in inner cities 
during the late 1960s and 1970s – areas that had been devastated by a combination of 
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economic strangulation and so-called “urban renewal” and “slum clearance” policies.  
During this period, the city of Cleveland closed some $50 million worth of its 
recreational facilities, while New York City cut $40 million from its city parks.  The era’s 
budget cuts also limited access to public schoolyards during after-school hours, a 
problem compounded by increasing teen unemployment, which, for African-American 
youths, hovered around 40 percent throughout the 1980s.3 
In New York City, which faced bankruptcy while watching much of its 
infrastructure fall into disrepair, graffiti writers became convenient scapegoats for the 
city’s politicians.  In fact, while the city government was using its budget shortfalls to 
justify slashing social programs  –and demanding some $150 million in loans from public 
school teachers– it found as much as $373 million to combat graffiti.  City leaders 
justified these expenditures by likening graffiti to rape and terrorism, rather than petty 
vandalism.  Graffiti, as it emerged during this period, was intricately linked to neoliberal 
policy; in some sense, writers were reclaiming urban space that was increasingly being 
privatized or that otherwise catered to a different “public.” This protest came at a great 
cost, however.  In the process of a decades-long campaign, New York City and transit 
police arrested and beat up countless youth, including twenty-five year-old writer 
Michael Stewart, whom they beat to death in 1983.  The city also poisoned more than two 
hundred city workers  (one of whom died) by exposing them to “the Buff,” a chemical 
compound used to keep subway cars graffiti free.4  
Other aspects of hip-hop paralleled many of these dynamics. Like graffiti, rap 
music also required relatively little initial investment in equipment; rappers deliberately 
recycled the underlying beats of already recorded songs and often distributed music on 
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bootleg tapes.  According to scholar Tricia Rose, the famous break-dancer Crazy Legs 
took up dancing in part “because his single mother couldn’t afford Little League baseball 
fees.”5  Break-dancers, DJs, and rappers also often used atypical venues for their 
performances, taking over public spaces such as intersections and abandoned lots.  
Occasionally, break-dancers were arrested for attracting undesirable crowds.6 
In addition to the political elements of its methods, some rap lyrics also carried 
political connotations.  While the genre was, and is, extremely broad, songs like 
Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five’s 1982 hit “The Message” reflected a 
consciousness about the urban context that produced them.  By the late 1980s and early 
1990s, this list also included N.W.A.’s “Fuck tha Police,” Public Enemy’s “Fight the 
Power,” and Body Count’s “Cop Killer,” which graphically condemned white 
supremacy, racial profiling, and police brutality.  During the 1980s, African Americans 
were twenty-two times more likely than their white counterparts to be killed by police 
officers.  Among many such cases, in 1980, Philadelphia police pistol-whipped a 17-
year-old black suspect to death.  In Detroit, a young black man was tortured to death with 
an electric cattle prod while in police custody; the city’s police were also widely accused 
of sexually assaulting black women while detaining them on minor charges, such as 
speeding.  In New York City, police famously murdered sixty-six-year-old Eleanor 
Bumpers, in 1984, after being called to evict her for falling behind on rent.  Additionally, 
mobs of white New Yorkers murdered Willie Turks (age 34) in 1982, Michael Griffith 
(age 23) in 1986, and Yusef Hawksins (age 16) in 1989.  The decade also saw the 
emergence of the “War on Drugs” and the resulting mass incarceration of youth of color.  
From 1983 to 2000, African-American prison admission for drug offenses rose twenty-
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six fold, while rising twenty-two fold for Latinos and just eight fold for whites – despite 
the fact that most drug users and dealers are, in fact, white.7 
The response to this injustice within American centers of power was minimal.  
For example, from 1986 to 1992, the FBI pursued only 128 of the 47,000 cases of police 
brutality that were reported to the US Department of Justice.  The reaction to rap music’s 
criticism of police violence, however, was immense. In 1988, N.W.A.’s Straight Outta 
Compton album became the first work of art, of any kind, on which the FBI took an 
official position – one of disapproval.  Police around the country also hampered the 
group’s ability to tour by denying security services for their concerts, and police in 
Detroit detained and harassed the group after storming the stage at their performance.  
Indeed, bolstering N.W.A.’s claims, police forces around the country proved that their 
legal obligations were easily suspended.  Body Count, a metal band fronted by rapper Ice 
T, received even more prominent backlash.  The group’s inflammatory 1992 song “Cop 
Killer” denounced police brutality and invoked the names of hard-line Los Angeles 
police chief Daryl Gates and Rodney King, who was viciously beaten by Gates’ forces.  
Sixty members of Congress signed a statement calling the song “vile and despicable,” 
and both President George H.W. Bush and Vice President Dan Quayle publicly 
denounced it.  Several police organizations launched a boycott of Time Warner, the 
record label that had released the album, though the National Association of Black Police 
declined, instead urging accountability for police brutality.  Congressional hearings were 
also called to address the negative influence of rap music on American youth.  Ironically, 
despite the great efforts taken to censor and silence so-called “gangsta rappers,” artists 
such as N.W.A.’s Ice Cube were aggressively sought for comment when riots engulfed 
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Los Angeles following the 1992 acquittal of the officers who had assaulted Rodney 
King.8   
 
DIY PUNK 
The punk rock movement also developed during this cultural moment, and many 
of its core impulses paralleled those of graffiti and hip-hop.  However, punk was more 
clearly rooted in anti-capitalist traditions, and its participants were predominantly, though 
not entirely, white.  Like hip-hop, punk developed in many different directions, but it 
generally was guided by a “do it yourself” (DIY) ethos that encouraged participants to 
move beyond the role of consumers and instead become actively involved, by distributing 
self-produced magazines (“zines”), organizing shows (often in alternative venues, such as 
union halls and the basements of houses), or playing music (a frequently cited excerpt 
from an early punk zine, for example, contains a diagram of three guitar chords and 
features the caption, “Now Form a Band”).9   
One specific outgrowth of the movement’s participatory emphasis was the 
reclamation and re-appropriation of space, such as the basements of rented homes and 
squatted warehouses.  In their least structured forms, these “free spaces” –areas separate 
from the watchful eyes of the state or the influence of the marketplace– allowed youth to 
exert a level of control over their immediate environment.  Like the empty lots occupied 
by DJs and the city walls temporarily claimed by graffiti writers, much of the punk world 
was ephemeral and limited to “pre-political”10 expression.  However, the movement also 
produced a huge number of more formal counter-institutions, including music venues, 
media, and record labels.  Punk rock took for granted that participants could shape the 
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world around them and that they could do so according to their own principles, not the 
dictums of the market. The movement’s structures, then, operated as cultural and 
economic alternatives to the corporate entertainment industry.  As such, they also served 
as sites of resistance to the privatizing agenda of neoliberalism, as punks rejected the 
notion that all interactions should be guided by economic self-interest. 
This type of activism had precedents in the New Left.  During the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, activists founded a huge number of counter-institutions. These spaces, such 
as cooperative bookstores, coffee shops, and organic grocery stores, were typically 
organized according to basic anarchist principles:  consensus-based decision-making, 
voluntary participation, and (relatively) horizontal leadership structures. They allowed 
people working to create a society based on participatory democracy the opportunity to 
actually experience it in the present.  Like Earth First!’s blockades, these institutions 
constituted a “prefigurative,”11 direct action approach to politics – “a congruence of 
means and ends.”12  Rather than protesting to gain access to dominant institutions, 
organizers instead built their own alternatives.   
DIY punk venues, zines, and record labels were an extension of this same 
prefigurative organizing model, and in many cases, punk activists even used similar 
methods.  So while some aspects of punk rock may have historical roots in the 
countercultural traditions of the Diggers and the Yippies, the politics of punk’s 
institutions also places the movement into a narrative of participatory democracy in 
American activism that spans from early 1960s groups like SNCC and SDS, to Women’s 
Liberation organizations in the late 1960s and 1970s, to the global justice movement of 
the 1990s and 2000s, and on to Occupy Wall Street in 2011.   The establishment of 
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participatory counter-institutions carried especially important connotations during the 
post-1960s period, as neoliberal policy makers attempted to eliminate the commons 
altogether by privatizing public services and spaces.  In this context, even mild efforts to 
counter private interests and assert community control became sights of major conflict.13  
Among many such examples were two collectively-run, all-ages punk rock 
venues:  Berkeley, California’s 924 Gilman Street and New York City’s ABC No Rio.  
During the 1980s and 1990s, these spaces nurtured a culture of resistance that opposed 
sexism, racism, and homophobia and rejected the financialization of human relationships. 
Through both their structural organization and their interactions with their respective 
communities, these collectives also gave their members opportunities to develop their 
political principles, and, more importantly, to learn the skills needed to apply them.  924 
Gilman and ABC No Rio encouraged active democratic participation, and, as a result, 
they cultivated skilled, empowered activists.14 
 
CLAIMING A SPACE 
The introduction of punk rock shows at the ABC No Rio art gallery, in 1989, and 
the establishment of 924 Gilman Street, in 1986, occurred within a repressive overall 
political context as well as during a transitional period in punk’s own history.  In the late 
1970s, the first wave of punk seemed to be in decline, as many of the most well-known 
bands of the era (the Sex Pistols, the Clash, and Blondie, for example) dissolved, signed 
to “major” record labels, or merged with the less political new wave genre.  Just as punk 
was being declared co-opted and dead, however, a new generation of punks emerged, 
jolting the movement back to life with two new sub-genres, anarcho-punk and hardcore, 
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which distanced themselves from the corporate music industry by emphasizing do-it-
yourself methods.  Anarcho-punk, typically associated with the English band/commune 
Crass, was overtly political. Its adherents embraced communal living, feminism, 
vegetarianism, and grassroots anarchism, while remaining cautiously skeptical of formal 
ideology.  Hardcore, meanwhile, was epitomized by American bands such as the Bad 
Brains, Black Flag, Reagan Youth, and Minor Threat, who distinguished themselves from 
their punk predecessors primarily by being physically and lyrically more aggressive.  For 
the purposes of this history, the subtle differences between the two genres are less 
significant than their common accomplishments.  By the early eighties, this generation of 
punks had developed a specific set of DIY values and practices and built an international 
network of bands, venues, and record labels.15  
However, hardcore’s pursuit of individual strength quickly spiraled out of control, 
and by the mid-1980s, American punk shows had become increasingly dominated by 
violence and other expressions of machismo and intolerance. This trend was exacerbated 
by the lax security standards of traditional music venues, whose owners sought to 
maximize the admission revenue of all-ages shows in order to make up for the loss in 
alcohol sales.  To make matters worse, club bouncers were often unpredictable, as likely 
to respond to non-violent situations with force as to confront actual fighting.  When some 
audience members began bringing guns to shows, New York City’s CBGB, which had 
played a foundational role in punk history the decade before, discontinued all-ages 
hardcore shows altogether.  The founding members of 924 Gilman and ABC No Rio had 
to confront not only an over-reliance on privately owned venues but also the out-of-
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control violence of their own punk community.  They did so by building volunteer-based, 
non-profit clubs and taking unequivocal responsibility for their patrons’ security.16  
ABC No Rio and 924 Gilman Street were both structured according to the same 
basic two-part mission:  to provide a safe atmosphere by confronting violence and 
oppressive behavior, and to involve each member of the punk community directly, 
through a process of consensus-based decision-making.  To accomplish the first task, 
each collective adopted explicit policies against fighting, drugs and alcohol, and the trio 
of racism, sexism, and homophobia.  These policies were clearly printed on their flyers, 
and they applied to the bands that they booked as well as audiences at their shows. 
 Though simply stating these principles ensured that each club would generally 
attract a less aggressive audience, collective members also experimented with a number 
of tactics for actually enforcing them.  For example, during various periods in each club’s 
history, collective members formed impromptu crowd-monitoring teams to identify 
potentially violent behavior, surround the offenders, and break into silly dances (such as 
conga lines) to de-escalate the situation.  At Gilman, bands stopped playing if fights 
broke out, so that the entire audience could address the problem together.  According to 
volunteer Kamala Parks, “the fighters would be brought out into the street and…the show 
wouldn’t go on unless something was resolved.”17  In one notable case, the singer of a 
performing band responded to an altercation by leaping into the crowd, microphone in 
hand, to interview the antagonists.  After hearing the absurdity of their grievances 
through the sound system, the two parties quickly made amends.  However, such light-
hearted antics were not sufficient for every threat.18 
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 While ABC No Rio was fairly successful at repelling the most violent elements of 
their scene by simply making them feel unwelcome, Gilman often attracted them.  During 
their early years of operation, 924 Gilman’s association with the well-known, 
outspokenly anti-racist zine Maximum RocknRoll, combined with its hosting of anti-racist 
bands and events, made it a favorite target for Bay Area neo-Nazi skinhead gangs.  After 
experimenting with the hiring of off-duty police officers and professional security 
services to combat the problem, Gilman eventually trained security personnel from 
among their own ranks, squarely placing responsibility for their safety on their own 
shoulders.  According to Gilman member Martin Sprouse, skinhead attacks often led to 
“huge confrontations” that involved “the entire crowd blocking the front door, keeping 
the bad guys out.”19  Kamala Parks recalls an incident when “a gang of about twenty 
skinheads showed up and…a huge fight, complete with baseball bats, chains, and chairs, 
erupted in front of Gilman.”20  In these cases, words alone were not enough to discourage 
bigotry; the collective had to back up their principles physically, with united action.21 
 Enforcing a policy against sexism was more difficult, however, as offenders were 
not all as brazen, or as identifiable, as the neo-Nazis.  In fact, they were often collective 
members themselves.  Gilman member Michael D., for example, says that while he never 
had to “think twice” about confronting racism, he “went through a real mind shift on 
[sexism] because of Gilman.”22  Although much of the responsibility for challenging 
sexist behavior ultimately fell to the women of the club, naming sex-based oppression as 
a collective problem helped create a negotiable, if not entirely “free,” space.  Volunteer 
Lauren L., for example, says that Gilman made her feel  
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comfortable enough to speak up when guys say stupid shit to me or other women.  
I don’t have to accept that kind of stuff.  I know that the other people there will 
back me up.23   
 
In addition to speaking out, women at Gilman also used several other methods to 
confront chauvinist attitudes.  At one point, women hung giant banners on the inner walls 
that read, “‘She plays really good for a girl’ (think about what you just said)” and “‘Hey, 
Baby, hold my jacket so I can go in the pit’ FUCK YOU!”24  Gilman women also 
organized events that celebrated women in punk, hosted touring punk-feminist Riot Grrrl 
bands, coordinated a regularly-meeting women’s caucus, and, perhaps most importantly, 
started bands of their own. Because of the collective’s horizontal structure, women also 
performed traditionally male tasks, serving as club security guards, sound engineers, and 
booking agents.  So while Gilman did not deliver a utopian model for gender equality, the 
club did provide a supportive environment where women could assert their own agency.  
Volunteer Athena K., for example, credits her experiences at Gilman for giving her “a 
sense of self-respect about being biracial and…a young woman,” and several other 
women offer similar accounts of empowerment.25 
Perhaps because Mike Bromberg, who booked the first ABC No Rio punk shows, 
had the reputation of being the first openly gay punk in New York’s notoriously 
intolerant hardcore scene, issues surrounding homophobia seemingly played a larger role 
there than at Gilman (though the neo-Nazis, of course, represented the antithesis of every 
plank in the club’s platform).  Most bands, and individuals, were specifically drawn to 
ABC No Rio because they supported the venue’s policies, but those who were excluded 
periodically lashed out, as in the case of a particularly inflammatory November 1990 
  
105	  
letter to the editors of Maximum RocknRoll.  In response to previous comments by ABC 
No Rio-associated bands, the author of the letter writes: 
I’ll tell you what’s wrong with girls…they’re…weak and it’s easy to kick their 
ass…I’ve talked to people who go to ABC NO RIO’s and it seems a new trend to 
be anti-homophobic because some faggot runs the club, yes faggot.  I was 
brought up to refer to those people as such, and I’m not going to change my 
whole vocabulary for the sake of some stupid trend…Fuck off and learn what 
‘HARD’core is all about and stop being brainwashed by [Maximum 
RockNRoll].26 
 
Underscoring the shift in punk that these venues represented, the author not only 
associates ABC No Rio and Maximum RocknRoll (which provided the initial funds for 
924 Gilman) with feminist and anti-homophobic ideas, he specifically identifies this 
“trend” as a departure from what he believes hardcore is “all about.”  In another case, a 
band wishing to play at ABC No Rio submitted a demo that featured a song entitled, 
“The Faggot Stomp.” When confronted by Bromberg, however, the band apologized and 
said that they no longer espoused such beliefs.  Satisfied with their response, Bromberg 
eventually let them play at the club.  Attempts by the 924 Gilman and ABC No Rio punks 
to create relatively safe spaces were not unchallenged or without missteps.  However, 
they were fairly successful overall, primarily because the collectives’ members were 
persistent and quick to try creative approaches to solving their problems.  This tenacity 
and flexibility stemmed directly from the democratic structures that each adopted.27 
Like many of their New Left predecessors, 924 Gilman and ABC No Rio operated 
on a system of modified consensus.  Day-to-day decisions were made by elected officers, 
but the clubs’ major decisions required unanimous approval at monthly meetings, and 
every member’s vote was equal.  As ABC No Rio member Tucker explains, 
Anyone is welcome to come to our meetings and have input on what we do, 
though only collective members have voting rights (which are obtained by 
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volunteering regularly).  Also, in an effort to increase the openness of the 
collective and what we’re doing, each of the bookers hold booking hours which 
are open to anyone to attend…. If we have a problem with any person or band 
then we give them the opportunity to speak at a collective meeting before any 
decisions are made about them (bannings, etc.)…Any decision we make is open 
for discussion and not made by some ultimate authority.28 
 
924 Gilman employed similar practices, but the collective also required that patrons pay 
an annual membership fee with admission to their events.  Doing so made all audience 
members accountable to the club’s policies and gave them an equal stake in the club’s 
future.  Volunteer Mike Goodbar explains the significance of the access that Gilman 
provided its members: 
At meetings, 14-year-olds have an opportunity to deal with issues sometimes as 
complex as those faced by 46-year-olds involved with big business corporations.  
In the regular world a person would have to have…access to the right job or [a 
privileged] situation that would provide the same experiences that Gilman does to 
anyone who’s interested.29 
 
The Gilman collective also experimented with a number of innovative methods to 
increase participation in the democratic process.  Early in the club’s history, for example, 
the collective installed a suggestion box and read its contents aloud over the microphone 
during shows; they also tried a short-lived policy of leaving the microphone on in 
between bands, allowing audience members the opportunity to question performers about 
their lyrical content.  Gilman’s inner walls likewise served as a canvass for free 
expression and on-going dialogue.  Though not all of these policies were successful, they 
illustrate the collective’s desire to involve as many people as possible in the maintenance 
of the club.30 
 Despite the clarity of their goals, however, both ABC No Rio and 924 Gilman 
experienced pitfalls and growing pains as they attempted to establish functioning 
democracies.  During Gilman’s early years, Tim Yohannon of Maximum RocknRoll often 
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held informal veto power over the collective’s decisions, due to the magazine’s large 
financial investment.  Yohannon eventually became frustrated with what he interpreted as 
a lack of initiative among the membership and withdrew from the project.  The remaining 
members opted to continue running the club, however, and Yohannon offered them the 
building’s lease and sound system.  During this transition, the collective decided to 
officially incorporate the venue as a non-profit, which limited their financial risk but also 
created an undesired de facto hierarchy by requiring the appointment of officers who 
were legal adults.31 
 ABC No Rio faced similar challenges.  Although the art gallery itself had been 
run collectively since 1980, the initial punk shows in the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
organized in a less formal manner typical of DIY punk.  Individuals like Mike Bromberg 
booked the shows, but band members and friends contributed by taking money at the 
door, preventing fights, and cleaning up afterward.  Within a few years, the ABC No Rio 
punks began organizing their efforts in a much more structured fashion, which 
subsequently allowed them to take a greater stake in the maintenance of the building.  
However, this transition presented the group with several obstacles.  Initial efforts to 
democratize booking practices, for example, resulted in a free-for-all that failed to 
establish a mechanism for ensuring that every show had the appropriate bands, 
volunteers, and promotion.  Eventually, the collective learned from these mistakes and 
developed practices that were both effective and in line with their democratic values.32 
Although 924 Gilman and ABC No Rio each benefited from the initial 
involvement of members with more extensive organizational backgrounds, most 
collective members had no previous experience with activism.  However, because they 
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encouraged active participation, the clubs attracted and involved new members.  They 
allowed room for democratic experimentation that not only empowered members 
individually but also taught them how to resolve conflict collectively – and sometimes 
creatively.  Specifically, the internal organizing models that Gilman and ABC No Rio 
adopted led their members to learn communication and problem-solving skills, which 
they used to confront external crises, as well.  
     
CONFLICTS AND CAMPAIGNS 
During the 1990s, altercations with neighbors and government officials nearly 
forced 924 Gilman to close on three separate occasions. The first major conflict began in 
1991, when the collective requested a change to their city permit.  At the behest of Tim 
Yohannon, the club’s original 1986 charter had contained a clause that prohibited 
advertising for Gilman events.  Yohannon had hoped that the punk community would 
support the club regardless of which bands were playing, but the policy had never been 
successful.  As part of the permit modification process, the Berkeley Zoning Board 
sought input from local police, who reported that Gilman’s control over its patrons was 
inadequate, leading to underage drinking, loitering, and vandalism.  After reviewing these 
complaints, the board not only rejected the collective’s request but also threatened to 
revoke the permit altogether.  They eventually granted the club six months in which to 
make the necessary improvements before facing a final judgment.33 
If the Gilman punks had previously taken their status in their community for 
granted, the permit crisis awakened them to their responsibilities.  In response to the 
board’s ruling, the collective quickly launched a petition drive and began acquiring letters 
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of support from former workers, patrons’ parents, and other members of the Berkeley 
community.  Volunteers also went door-to-door to solicit suggestions and support from 
the club’s neighbors.  Throughout the process, Gilman members worked closely with the 
police department and the city government.  In January 1992, for example, 
representatives of the club met with local police through the city’s dispute resolution 
service in order to build a more constructive working relationship.  When the venue’s 
permit again appeared on the Zoning Board’s agenda, more than one hundred Gilman 
supporters attended the meeting.  The overwhelming support for the club pressed the 
board to grant the requested permit changes, with stipulations that the collective provide 
additional outdoor trash cans and continue to improve their internal security.34 
 Gilman’s second major crisis began in 1995, when the Pyramid Brewing 
Company announced its intention to open a brewpub directly across the street from the 
club.  In addition to recognizing problems inherent to locating a drinking establishment 
near an all-ages venue, collective members were also worried that the arrival of an 
upscale establishment would drive up property costs and eventually force them out of the 
neighborhood.  To voice these concerns, Gilman representatives attended Pyramid’s 
preliminary permit hearing, and three collective members even visited the brewing 
company’s Seattle, Washington headquarters, at the company’s behest.  The collective 
also issued a series of successful press announcements, conducted an outreach campaign 
to their other neighbors, and filed a formal petition with the Berkeley Zoning Board.35 
When the brewpub’s permit came before the board, dozens of Gilman supporters 
spoke on the club’s behalf, and one zoning officer later described the presentation as “one 
of the most professional” he had seen.36  Although the board approved Pyramid’s permit, 
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they also addressed many of the collective’s concerns by requiring that the brewing 
company pay for a new traffic light, hire security guards to contain bar patrons, and meet 
regularly with Gilman members to resolve disputes.  Gilman’s interaction with Pyramid, 
while serious in its potential ramifications, was not entirely antagonistic.  Pyramid 
responded to the collective’s objections with seemingly genuine concern, and a 
representative of the brewpub even wrote a letter of support for Gilman during its next 
major conflict.37 
 Gilman’s third altercation of the decade was its most hostile.  In October 1998, 
DiCon Fiber Optics, a neighboring business, filed a grievance with the city that the club’s 
patrons were responsible for an increasing amount of vandalism, graffiti, and litter.  The 
company’s complaints, which included the sensational claim that Gilman patrons had 
attacked the company’s trees with machetes, were probably overblown.  Gilman cleanup 
crews already tended to neighborhood trash and vandalism, and, according to Gilman 
volunteer John H., “Eighth Street was a sort of no-man’s-land on which many users 
dumped trash.  Gilman [unfairly] received the blame for much of it.”38  Nonetheless, the 
company’s threat to re-locate 400 high-paying jobs was enough to persuade the city to 
intervene.  In December, Berkeley police set up video and still camera surveillance on the 
club in order to catch vandals in the act, though they were apparently unsuccessful.39 
During the ensuing months, Gilman members canvassed the neighborhood for 
support and gathered several thousand signatures on an online petition.  DiCon, however, 
continually refused the club’s offer to pursue mediation.  Eventually, at the city’s behest, 
representatives from both sides met with police and city planning officials to draft a 
memorandum of understanding. The collective agreed to increase its attention to 
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neighborhood graffiti, but DiCon quickly stopped meeting with the club’s representatives 
and moved out of the neighborhood soon afterward.  As in their two previous conflicts, 
Gilman was able to work through formal government channels from a position of relative 
strength, but this was only because of the collective’s ability to gain the support of their 
neighbors, rather than alienating them.  The default loyalties of city officials and the 
police were to the concerns of businesses.40 
ABC No Rio also faced major crises during this period, but their circumstances 
ultimately required a more aggressive response.  The ABC No Rio art gallery had been 
enmeshed in the housing politics of New York’s Lower East Side since its 1980 
founding.  In fact, its very lease was a concession from the city following a dispute over 
an illegal art exhibit that focused on gentrification in the neighborhood.  The punk 
contingent that took over the space a decade later inherited an institutional history of 
conflict with the city government and solidarity with the neighborhood’s homeless and 
squatter populations.  Throughout the nineties, these relationships continued to define 
ABC No Rio’s position in its community and played a central role in the collective’s 
development.41 
The punk contingent arrived at ABC No Rio during a period of escalation in the 
Lower East Side’s housing conflict.  In the summer of 1988, the city attempted to enforce 
a curfew on nearby Tompkins Square Park, which had become a residence for the 
neighborhood’s homeless community.  Over the next several months, a series of protests 
were held to contest the city’s actions, which also included the eviction of squatters in 
nearby buildings.  Police responded to the protests with force, resulting in arrests and 
injuries; one specific protest generated over one hundred complaints of police brutality.  
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The city pressed on, however, and by June 1991, the two hundred homeless residents of 
the park had been evicted, and the area was indefinitely cordoned off for renovations.  
Though ABC No Rio was not directly involved in this dispute, the gallery did host 
benefits for local evictees and screened raw footage from the Tompkins Square riots. 
Meanwhile, the collective’s relationship with the city government continued to be as 
adversarial as ever.  The city proved to be a negligent, and often hostile, landlord, and the 
collective responded by filing several lawsuits and engaging in a five year rent strike that 
was resolved, only unofficially, in 1993.  Two years later, the neighborhood’s housing 
conflict again intensified, this time with more intense effects for ABC No Rio.42 
 In May 1995, hundreds of New York City riot police, complete with an armored 
vehicle, arrived in the Lower East Side to evict squatters from buildings on East 13th 
Street.  The thirty-one squatters inside were expecting the eviction and had barricaded the 
doors and stairways of their buildings.  Although the squatters were forced out within a 
few hours, several of them re-occupied one of the buildings on the Fourth of July, while 
police forces were engaged with crowds at a nearby fireworks presentation.  Police again 
cleared the squat and arrested nearly twenty people.  The circumstances of these evictions 
were particularly controversial, as the New York State Supreme Court had previously 
ruled in the squatters’ favor.43 
In this context of overt hostility, overwhelming police force, and bad faith 
negotiations, the ABC No Rio collective became embroiled in their own eviction battle.  
In October 1994, the city stopped accepting the gallery’s rent checks, and over the next 
several months, officials moved to evict the collective and formally “dispose” of the 
building.  Despite the collective’s many offers to purchase it, the city instead made 
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arrangements to sell it to a non-profit housing organization, Asian Americans for 
Equality (AAFE).  Hesitant to battle another non-profit group, ABC No Rio members 
attempted to negotiate for partial use of the space, but AAFE’s proposal required that 
ABC No Rio pay double the market rate for rent, and the two parties were unable resolve 
a temporary re-location for the gallery during proposed renovations.44 
Talks between the groups quickly broke down, and the city moved to bypass 
normal public hearings by declaring the space an “Urban Development Action Area 
Project” (UDAAP).  ABC No Rio responded by taking their case to the media, publicly 
vowing to fight for the gallery through “the courts…outreach, protest…public support, 
and…physical defense of the building.”45  Squatters, meanwhile, moved in to provide a 
last line of defense against eviction.46 
 In November 1995, ABC No Rio representatives testified at a hearing of the city’s 
Permits, Dispositions, and Concessions Subcommittee. They explained the collective’s 
significance to New York’s alternative arts scene, their attempts to feed the 
neighborhood’s hungry each week through Food Not Bombs, and their efforts to host 
children’s arts classes. They also related their long history with the city, including the 
many offers to purchase the building.  The council nonetheless voted unanimously to 
expedite transfer of the building.  From late 1995 through 1996, the collective worked to 
publicize their struggle and prevent their ousting through legal channels.  In April 1996, 
they won an important, though temporary, victory when their eviction proceedings were 
dismissed – for the third time.  The collective also filed a lawsuit of their own, claiming 
that the city’s actions were politically-motivated.  In preparation for yet another eviction 
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hearing in October, ABC No Rio, along with several other threatened arts organizations, 
held a fundraising rally at the Metropolitan Museum of Art.47 
By December 1996, the collective’s situation had become desperate.  That month, 
a judge suspended eviction proceedings, but only until city officials restored utilities to 
the building, which they had illegally disconnected.  The stay was only expected to last 
for a few months, so the collective began 1997 by escalating their tactics.  In January, 
collective members organized two public actions that targeted AAFE.  In the first, ABC 
No Rio sympathizers plastered the group’s headquarters with posters reading “Greed,” 
“Profiteering,” and “Corruption.”  Two dozen protestors rang bells and played drums 
while others loudly decried the group’s role in eviction proceedings.  Later that month, 
collective members again targeted the AAFE office, chaining themselves to desks and 
windows and demanding that the eviction process be stopped; five of the protestors were 
arrested.   The collective then shifted their focus to the housing department with a sit-in at 
the agency’s office.  Following the demonstration, outgoing commissioner Liliam 
Barrios-Paoli invited ABC No Rio representatives to a meeting, at which she offered to 
sell the building to the collective for $1.  In exchange, the gallery was required to expel 
its squatters and acquire $100,000 for renovations.  The collective accepted the offer and 
began developing formal plans for building restoration and fundraising.48 
Over the next several years, city officials repeatedly changed the amount of 
money that they expected the group to raise. By October 2004, the collective had secured 
nearly $300,000 (primarily through small donations), and the long process of transferring 
ownership of the building began.  In June 2006, the sale was finalized, after more than 
twenty years of fighting the city for the building.  However, the collective soon realized 
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that simple renovations would be insufficient for the dilapidated space, and they instead 
began pursuing a more ambitious, $2 million “tear down and rebuild” plan.  Three years 
later, almost to the day, the collective announced an interesting twist to their historically 
volatile relationship with the city government:  In June 2009, city officials granted ABC 
No Rio $1,650,000 in municipal funding for their rebuilding project.49 
 During their eviction battle, the ABC No Rio collective used a variety of tactics to 
maintain control of the building.  Through official channels, the gallery engaged local 
officials and fought its eviction, ultimately extending its month-to-month lease for over 
two years.  As the conflict escalated, collective members also engaged in civil 
disobedience, in the form of sit-ins as well as the physical occupation of their building.  
According to volunteer Chris Boarts Larson, they also attempted to jam the city’s fax 
machines with messages reading “Save ABC No Rio.”50   ABC No Rio’s biggest asset, 
however, was its ability to gather public support through extensive, positive press 
coverage in both alternative and mainstream media.  Like their counterparts at 924 
Gilman, ABC No Rio members refused to be isolated in their struggles, and they used 
every tool available to them – not just those that seemed “punk.”  They were inherently 
radical cultural spaces, and their survival depended on effective, not just symbolic, 
strategies and tactics. 51   
 
CONCLUSION 
 924 Gilman Street and ABC No Rio were founded during a period of growing 
conservatism in the United States.  Membership in the Ku Klux Klan nearly tripled from 
1971 to 1980, while American neo-Nazi groups became increasingly prominent reached 
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during the subsequent decade.  Meanwhile, conservative activists like Anita Bryant, Jerry 
Falwell, and the Heritage Foundation worked to curtail the rights of women and 
homosexuals, as outlined in Chapter 2.  All of these sentiments were reflected concretely 
in government policy at the federal and local levels.  The punks who organized these 
venues did so to challenge parallel reactionary elements in their own communities and to 
reclaim the punk movement from a politically ambiguous trajectory. They responded to 
the machismo of 1980s hardcore with clear, outspoken positions against violence and 
oppression, and they worked collectively to find viable methods for enforcing them.  
Undoubtedly, the policies that they developed had limitations; the collectives’ definitions 
of racism, sexism, and homophobia, for example, struggled to address more than their 
most blatant forms.  Nonetheless, the principles that the Gilman and ABC No Rio punks 
outlined were not just lip service; they backed up their words with actions.  While right-
wing pundits in the 1980s and early 1990s were attempting to assuage white guilt and re-
define anti-racism as a case of political correctness run amuck, punks at 924 Gilman 
Street were fighting off neo-Nazi skinheads.  While New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani 
devoted his administration to a general assault on civil liberties, the arts, and social 
services, punks at ABC No Rio provided a space devoted to those very causes while 
openly challenging the legitimacy of the city’s housing department.52   
 This generation of punks, including not only Gilman and ABC No Rio, but also 
bands like Fugazi and the punk-feminist Riot Grrrl movement, ultimately had a 
significant impact on American popular culture, as well.  The “alternative” genre that 
emerged in the early 1990s initially revolved around bands like Nirvana, who, while no 
longer punk in the DIY sense, were outspoken opponents of racism, sexism, and 
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homophobia.  The punk movement’s cultural form, however, has often led many scholars 
(and punks) to assume that its politics are stylistic and of a purely symbolic nature. These 
surface-level, and ultimately condescending, interpretations may be appropriate when 
teenagers limit their rebellion to spiking their hair or listening to loud music, but they 
have very little to offer when youth respond to their environment with proactive 
organization.  Although Gilman and ABC No Rio were ostensibly punk rock venues, they 
also served as battlegrounds for a variety of broader struggles.  Like their counterparts in 
the cooperatives movement of the late 1960s and 1970s, the Gilman and ABC No Rio 
collectives confronted dominant institutions by organizing local alternatives that reflected 
their values.  The methods they used to build these institutions also borrowed heavily 
from the democratic movements of that period.   
Still in operation, 924 Gilman and ABC No Rio are the most well-known youth-
run, all ages punk rock venues in the United States, due to their longevity as well as their 
progeny.  Gilman helped launch the careers of bands such as Operation Ivy, Jawbreaker, 
Samiam, and Green Day, while ABC No Rio was a home base for Born Against, Ted 
Leo, and Chris Boarts Larson’s zine Slug + Lettuce.  They are not otherwise unique 
within U.S. punk, however.  Similarly-structured venues have been organized with 
varying degrees of success throughout the country, including the Vera Project in Seattle, 
Washington; 1919 Hemphill in Fort Worth, Texas; Solidarity Books in Indianapolis, 
Indiana; the BRYCC House in Louisville, Kentucky; and the Mr. Roboto Project in 
Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania.  Punk counter-insitutions have also included a number of 
cooperative record labels and zines, most notably Maximum RocknRoll and Profane 
Existence.  Members of any of these groups would have confronted organizational 
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challenges similar to those faced by the Gilman and ABC No Rio collectives, but even 
less structured DIY punk ventures necessitate the development of basic organizing skills, 
such as designing and distributing flyers, monitoring crowds, and negotiating with police 
and neighbors. 53 
Perhaps because these skills have been so essential to its development, the punk 
movement has played a prominent role in the global fight to maintain autonomous 
cultural spaces.  Just as ABC No Rio’s eviction battle represented only one portion of a 
much larger struggle over housing and public space in New York City, the conflicts faced 
by both of these collectives were also part of broader trends.  Police surveillance of 924 
Gilman Street in the late 1990s was relatively innocuous, but dozens of other alternative 
arts spaces have experienced similar, and often more repressive, challenges from state 
and private interests. For example, Indianapolis’ Solidarity Books was closed in 2003 for 
a fire code violation, following weeks of surveillance and a joint raid by the local police, 
the bomb squad, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives.  
Richmond, California’s Burnt Ramen and Buffalo, New York’s Hey Dude! suffered 
similar fates the same year.  Outside the U.S., police have clashed with youth over a host 
of autonomous spaces, including the Ungdomshuset in Copenhagen, Denmark; 
Metelkova in Ljubljana, Slovenia; Fabryka in Warsaw, Poland; and Köpi in Berlin, 
Germany –all of which have also served as punk rock venues.  Because punk has been an 
on-going struggle for the freedom to construct culture, it continues to be a sight of 
constant conflict with authority.54 
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CHAPTER 4: 
GLOBALIZATION, PART 2:  NEOLIBERAL GLOBALIZATION  
AND THE GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 
 
 
 Clinton Administration 
 
IMF/World Bank 
NAFTA 
WTO 
 
 
1990s Global Justice Movement  
 
The Zapatistas  
United Students Against Sweatshops 
Direct Action Network  
Coalition of Immokalee Workers 
 
 
Today, as I sign the North American Free Trade Agreement into law and call for 
further progress on GATT, I believe we have found our footing. And I ask all of 
you…to recognize that there is no turning back from the world of today and 
tomorrow. 
 
                          - William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States1 
 
 
Behind those images, the reality is that there are farm workers who contribute 
their sweat and blood so that enormous corporations can profit, all the while 
living in sub-poverty misery, without benefits, without the right to overtime or 
protection when we organize. Others are working by force, against their will, 
terrorized by violent employers, under the watch of armed guards, held in 
modern-day slavery. The right to a just wage, the right to work free of forced 
labor, the right to organize –three of the rights in the United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights– are routinely violated when it comes to farm 
workers in the United States. 
 
                         - Lucas Benitez, Coalition of Immokalee Workers2 
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In December 1993, after more than six years of negotiations spanning three US 
administrations, President Bill Clinton signed the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) into law.  Among the treaty’s many supporters were the Business Roundtable, 
the National Association of Manufacturers, the US Chamber of Commerce, and the 
Heritage Foundation.  Mexican envoy Hermann von Bertrab recalls receiving additional 
letters of support from groups such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association, and Citizens for a Sound Economy.  And though 
NAFTA was opposed by US labor unions, environmental organizations, and elements of 
the libertarian Right, it received bipartisan support in both Congressional houses.  If the 
election of Ronald Reagan had signaled the political arrival of the New Right, the 
election of Bill Clinton announced their enduring legacy.  For after three consecutive 
Republican Presidential terms, the 1992 election offered a limited choice between two 
devotees of the neoliberal school.3 
By de-regulating the movement of manufacturing, investment capital, and goods, 
NAFTA increased the power and reach of American multinational corporations while 
limiting the impact of human rights, labor, and environmental activists.  At the same 
time, the Clinton Administration restricted the movement of people by tightening security 
along the US-Mexico border.  As border crossing became more difficult, it also became 
more dangerous.  Between 1994 and 2001, more than 1,700 people died attempting to 
enter the US from Mexico.  The criminalization of migrant labor also made already 
marginalized workers even more vulnerable.  In the fifteen years following the 
implementation of NAFTA, Florida law enforcement freed more than one thousand 
enslaved farmworkers who had been “held in chains, pistol whipped, locked at night into 
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shacks in chain-link enclosures patrolled by armed guards” and threatened with beatings 
or death if they attempted to escape.4   
 
NEOLIBERAL GLOBALIZATION 
In the aftermath of World War II, the Allied powers began constructing a new 
global governing system to guide international relationships.  It included financial 
institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which 
were negotiated at the Bretton Woods conference and went into effect in 1945, as well as 
the General Agreement on Treaties and Tariffs (GATT), which went into effect two years 
later.  It also included political organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), also 
established in 1945.  As the Cold War escalated –including the expansion of US and 
Soviet involvement into wars of independence in European colonies such as Vietnam– 
global elites formed additional institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), in 1949, and the Group of 6 (G6), in 1975. 
 Paralleling shifts in domestic policy during the 1970s and 1980s, US-led global 
organizations increasingly stressed the implementation of aggressive neoliberal policies 
as conditions for developmental loans.  They included the privatization of state-owned 
resources, the removal of protective tariffs, and the widespread gutting of social services 
and safety nets.  In some cases, these loans were also coupled with CIA-backed coups, 
such as the overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1973.  While the benefits 
of World Bank/IMF loans are heavily debated, the residual effects are nonetheless 
striking.  According to one analysis, because of their incredibly high interest, “from 1982 
to 1998, indebted countries paid four times their original debts, and at the same time their 
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debt increased four times.”5  BBC News reached a similar conclusion, noting that the 
nations of Africa had paid back more than their original debts by 2002, but still owed 
about half the original sum, around $300 billion.  In other words, these countries, even 
when they re-paid their initial loans, remained perpetually vulnerable to additional forced 
concessions.  In effect, the IMF and World Bank allowed Western elites to financially 
colonize (or re-colonize, in many cases) much of the world.  According to former World 
Bank chief economist and Senior Vice President Joseph Stiglitz,  
When the IMF arrives in a country, they are interested in only one thing. How do 
we make sure the banks and financial institutions are paid?...It is the IMF that 
keeps the [financial] speculators in business.  They’re not interested in 
development or what helps a country get out of poverty.6 
 
During the last quarter of the 20th century, this speculation accelerated.  While the 
world’s poorest countries were $25 billion in debt in 1970, that number had grown to 
$523 billion by 2002.7 
 In late 1991, the Soviet Union disbanded, ending the Cold War and once again 
shifting the balance of global power.  With new markets now easier to access, economic 
elites quickly moved to extend their reach and consolidate their power, most notably 
through the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which replaced the 
GATT in 1995, and the implementation of treaties such as NAFTA, which went into 
effect on January 1, 1994.  Absent the global competition between the Soviet and 
Western blocs, these new agreements allowed business interests to pursue their own 
imperialistic agendas virtually unchecked by, and often with assistance from, national 
governments.  NAFTA attempted to eliminate all barriers to corporate expansion within 
the “free trade zone” of Canada, Mexico, and the United States.  The WTO pursued 
similar ends on a global scale.  By the mid-1990s, these institutions, together with already 
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existing organizations, comprised a global power structure that facilitated the free 
movement of capital (including investments and the re-location of factories), compelled 
neoliberal concessions from less powerful nations by maintaining perpetual debt, and 
allowed corporations to trump national, state, and local laws.  
 
THE IMPACTS OF GLOBALIZATION 
 Though largely negotiated by the administration of President George H. W. Bush, 
NAFTA is among the most significant legacies of the Clinton Administration.  As a 
prominent member of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), a coalition established 
to push the Democratic Party to the right, Bill Clinton pursued an aggressive neoliberal 
platform, just as Reagan and Bush had before him.  Clinton cut public services, including 
a massive reform of welfare benefits through the spitefully-named Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.  He pursued the 
further privatization of government services, including the Federal Activities Inventory 
Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998, which required that federal agencies regularly produce lists 
of their services that could be handed to the private sector.  Clinton also approved of 
massive de-regulation of industry.  He signed the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which 
essentially removed barriers to US media monopolies, resulting in huge conglomerates 
such as Clear Channel Communications.  He also signed the 1999 Financial Services 
Modernization Act, which “modernized” financial services by repealing key components 
of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act.  Aided by huge growth bubbles in the housing and “dot 
com” industries, the combined results of Clinton’s policies allowed U.S. corporate profits 
to rise by some eighty-eight percent during the 1990s, while the pay of American CEOs 
  
128	  
rose by a staggering 463%.  However, roughly sixty percent of American corporations 
reported no tax liability between 1996 and 2000.  The benefits of the economic boom 
were primarily limited to those at the top, as evidenced most clearly by the impact of 
NAFTA.8 
 Despite its name, the North American Free Trade Agreement was less about 
actual trade than investment.  In effect, the agreement provided corporate elites with 
contractual guarantees that companies would enjoy certain privileges in all three nations.  
To that end, NAFTA lived up to its promises.  By accelerating processes already 
underway since the 1970s, NAFTA helped increase foreign investment in Mexico from 
$3.46 billion in 1993 to some $24.73 billion in 2001.9   
 The returns on that investment were not shared evenly, however.  In the ten years 
following NAFTA’s implementation, minimum wage in Mexico dropped twenty percent, 
impacting forty million workers.  Economic opportunities were also limited.  For 
example, after the widespread purchasing of Mexican banks by US banks, loans to 
Mexican businesses shrunk from ten percent of GDP to just 0.3% by 2000.  Additionally, 
NAFTA-related environmental damage to the Mexican border region (including the 
addition of 2,700 new factories) is estimated at $47 billion – for the year 1999 alone.  
Perhaps most notoriously, Mexican markets were flooded with cheap US corn (cheap 
largely due to US government subsidies).  As a result, income for Mexican farmers 
dropped by seventy percent, and as many as 1.5 million Mexican farmers were put out of 
work altogether.10 
 Mexican workers responding to these changes suffered greatly.  Many sought 
work in maquiladoras, mega-factories along the US-Mexico border.  For companies like 
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Hasbro, Fisher Price, and General Motors, these areas became the neoliberal endgame – 
factory towns without labor, environmental, or human rights protections.  The constant 
influx of desperate workers provided no incentive for factory owners to treat them as 
anything more than disposable.  For workers, seventy percent of them young women 
between the ages of 16 and 24, this translated to dangerous conditions and poverty wages 
(minimum wages of $3.40 per day, compared to $5.15 per hour in the US).  Outside of 
the factories, this lawlessness had other effects.  In Ciudad Juarez, just across the border 
from El Paso, Texas, the bodies of hundreds of women have been found raped, 
dismembered, and mutilated since the early 1990s.  Hundreds more women have gone 
missing.  At the same time, fleeing to the United States has also become increasingly 
difficult.  For while NAFTA eased the cross-border movement of capital, new border 
policies restricted the movement of human beings. The budget for the US Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) tripled between 1993 and 2002, while the number of 
border patrol agents doubled – making the INS the second largest federal law 
enforcement agency at the time, just shy of the FBI.  Between 1994 and 2001, at least 
1,700 people died attempting to cross the Mexican border into the US.  According to 
Wayne Cornelius, the death toll “rose in tandem with the intensification of border 
enforcement,” as increased patrols forced migrants to attempt more dangerous border 
crossings.  Additionally, as of 2008, the United Nations estimated that as many as 
seventy percent of women attempting to cross the border had been raped by “coyotes” or 
US border agents.11 
Inside the United States, though corporate profits sky-rocketed, many workers 
faired poorly.  Adding to the millions lost in the 1970s and 1980s, the US lost another 1/6 
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of its manufacturing jobs in the first decade of NAFTA.  Of these three million jobs, at 
least one million can be traced directly to the “free trade” agreement.  Additionally, US 
workers without a college degree, who make up roughly seventy-five percent of the 
workforce, suffered a twelve percent wage decline during the period.  Thirty-eight 
thousand small farms also went bankrupt, while agri-business corporations, such as 
Cargill and Con-Agra, grew rapidly.12 
 
CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION 
In addition to its economic and physical impacts on the populations of all three 
countries, NAFTA also presented an assault on the very foundations of their democracies.  
As explored in Chapter 2, during the 1980s, Ronald Reagan gutted federal budgets and 
appointed saboteurs to head federal agencies in order to ensure that federal legislation 
protecting the environment, workers, and marginalized groups would not be 
implemented.  By doing so, Reagan severely limited the impact that activists could have, 
especially at the federal level.  However, environmental, civil rights, and labor activists 
were still able to make some changes at the state and local level, and they were also able 
to defend some of their movements’ previous gains.   
NAFTA trumped many of those achievements.  Among the contractual 
obligations of the treaty was a secret appeals process called “Chapter 11,” which allowed 
multi-national corporations exemptions from national, state, and local laws.  While the 
extent of these appeals remains deliberately unclear, many noteworthy cases have been 
brought to light.  Canadian corporations, for example, sued the State of California over its 
mining regulations and its ban on a gasoline additive, and suspected carcinogen, called 
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MTBE.  US corporations, meanwhile, sued the Canadian government for banning another 
gasoline additive, MMT, which is a suspected neurotoxin; US companies also opposed 
Canada’s ban on exporting toxic waste.  Perhaps most famously, the U.S.-based 
corporation Metelclad sued the Mexican city of Guadalcazar for refusing to allow it to 
install a toxic waste site near the city. In effect, NAFTA provided a “lowest common 
denominator” approach to environmental, public health, and labor regulations by 
allowing corporations the freedom to comply only with the weakest of them.13   
Like NAFTA, the World Trade Organization also provided a mechanism for 
corporations to over-rule the laws of nations, and, thus far, the WTO has ruled in favor of 
corporations in 100% of these appeals.  The legislation that they have trumped includes a 
US law that banned a tuna fishing net responsible for killing hundreds of thousands of 
dolphins each year; a Massachusetts law that denied state contracts to companies doing 
business with the military dictatorship in Burma; gasoline standards in the US Clean Air 
Act; a provision of the Endangered Species Act that required shrimp nets to include a 
device to allow endangered sea turtles to escape; and a European Union ban on beef from 
hormone-treated cattle.14 
The expansion of free trade initiatives like NAFTA and the WTO led to massive 
movement of raw materials, consumer goods, capital investments, factories, and workers. 
In order to maximize their profits, companies moved their manufacturing facilities to the 
countries with the lowest wages and fewest government regulations.  In many cases, this 
race to the bottom was facilitated by IMF/World Bank loans, which demanded the 
erosion of workers’ rights, social services, and environmental protections. At the same 
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time, free trade agreements allowed cheap imports to undercut local industries and 
displaced huge numbers of workers.15   
The globalization of neoliberal policies expedited the exploitation of the already 
oppressed, while also complicating the global power structure and making resistance 
considerably more difficult.  Power itself became concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, 
but the vulnerabilities of the power structure were decentralized, creating a complicated 
dilemma.  In this deliberately unregulated global economy, no individual in the supply 
chain had to claim responsibility for “sweatshop” working conditions in contracted, or 
“outsourced,” factories.  Factory owners could rightfully claim that they would not 
receive contracts if they raised wages, while parent corporations could argue that they 
contracted based on competitive prices, not their repercussions.  Consumers, likewise, 
made their purchasing decisions based on the limits of their own personal budgets.  
Meanwhile, the economic and political elites in charge of factories and parent companies, 
praised free trade’s triumphs and dismissed any negative effects as temporary growing 
pains.  
Part of the problem was that in organizations like the WTO (as in the US 
government during the 1980s), the distinction between state and corporate actors was 
minimal.  More importantly, much like the Wizard of Oz, the secretive but powerful 
façades of these global institutions also allowed elite power brokers to remain relatively 
anonymous and thus virtually untouchable.  This obscurity created a major problem for 
resistance movements, as activists must be able to identify the “man behind the curtain” 
in order to develop strategies that will pressure “him” – a prospect made even more 
difficult by the fact that “the man” is often several thousand miles behind the curtain.  
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The hypermobility of the global assembly line further complicated this task, as corporate 
proxies could move, or threaten to move, their operations if they felt pressured to 
improve working conditions.16 
 
THE GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 
 This evolution in global power required a parallel evolution in organizational 
strategy.  The most notable application of such a strategy was the Zapatista uprising in 
Chiapas, Mexico.  In response to the 1994 implementation of NAFTA, indigenous rebels 
took up arms and declared their independence from the Mexican state.  Although 
outmatched militarily, the Zapatistas (EZLN) were able to gather mass support, both 
throughout Mexico and internationally, via the internet.  As a result, the Mexican 
government refrained from an all-out assault.  Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink call 
this strategy the “boomerang pattern.”  By sending out information, the Zapatistas were 
able to apply pressure on their opposition from behind.  In this case, public outcry and 
media attention directed at the Mexican government limited its ability to use force.  And 
while this was not the first use of such a strategy, the Zapatistas’ application had some 
peculiar components.  Not only was it among the first notable examples of successful, 
internet-based organizing, the Zapatistas also represented a decidedly post-Cold War 
movement.  Rather than attempting to take over the Mexican state, the EZLN instead 
sought autonomy from it. They also explicitly rejected any notion of vanguardism or 
leadership in a worldwide revolutionary movement and instead called for a movement of 
movements that could cooperate horizontally, as equals.17 
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 While many organizations formed to provide direct assistance and solidarity to 
the Zapatista struggle, the more important legacy of Zapatismo has been its deliberately 
indirect influence on other movements.  The EZLN’s application of democratic 
principles, autonomy, and broad coalition-building resonated with many activists around 
the world.  Rather than take orders from Chiapas, they adapted these values and practices 
to their own struggles.  In many cases, activists may not have even been aware of the 
source of this influence.18  
 Perhaps the most famous example of Zapatismo’s resonance was a series of 
protests surrounding the 1999 meeting of the WTO in Seattle, Washington.  While the 
EZLN had responded to globalization by refusing to participate in a corporate-controlled 
Mexican nation-state, protestors in Seattle physically challenged the WTO’s ability to 
make governing decisions.  Under the organizational leadership of the Direct Action 
Network (DAN), environmental activists, students, fair trade advocates, labor unions, 
indigenous rights activists, anarchists, and others converged on Seattle, Washington, and 
effectively shut down a meeting of the WTO.  While often considered separate 
movements, these groups worked together to shut down intersections, block delegates’ 
access to meetings, and generally occupy the city’s streets with marches and rallies.  Like 
the Zapatistas, these groups attempted to work together in a democratic manner.  Rather 
than taking orders from a few leaders, the Seattle actions were organized in a way that 
respected participants’ autonomy and allowed for a diversity of tactics (within a general 
agreement of non-violence).  Much of the coordination was done via the internet, 
specifically through e-mail and Indymedia, a democratic online news bulletin board 
created for this purpose.  Additionally, many of the actual methods used to shut down the 
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convention borrowed heavily from those that had been perfected by groups like Earth 
First!, Reclaim the Streets, and ACT UP.  Like these earlier groups, DAN and others also 
attempted to create a light-hearted atmosphere and provide compelling visuals through 
the use of puppets and theatrics.19 
 A third significant example of global justice activism was that of United Students 
Against Sweatshops (USAS), particularly their campus-based, anti-sweatshop campaigns 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  USAS formed in 1998 as a student off-shoot of the 
labor union UNITE (which traces its own history back to the International Ladies’ 
Garment Workers’ Union, founded in 1900).  Contrary to typical union models, however, 
USAS served as a decentralized network of student anti-sweatshop groups, not as a 
monolithic entity.  Although the organization eventually established a national office with 
paid staff, the relationships between its member groups were horizontal; they shared 
successful organizing models and coordinated national actions, but they otherwise 
operated autonomously.   
While the EZLN seceded from the global capitalist system, and Seattle protestors 
disrupted the institutions that maintained it, USAS answered the globalization dilemma 
that I outlined earlier:  in a complex and decentralized supply chain, who can be held 
accountable for sweatshop conditions?  USAS activists responded to this question by 
being the second step in boomerang pattern.  Realizing that they could have little direct 
effect on distant factories, activists instead tackled the problem locally, on their own 
college campuses.  Specifically, they took advantage of what Naomi Klein calls 
“branding.”  As Klein argues in No Logo, in modern advertising, brand names and logos 
have become more important than the products they represent.  Through sponsorship of 
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“cool” events (like rock concerts), association with celebrities, and non-traditional, often 
subversive ad campaigns, these corporate brands seek to establish themselves as 
identities.  They represent lifestyles, not just consumer goods.20   
Particularly in relation to their athletics programs, American universities, too, 
have established themselves as “brand name” products.  Through considerable 
investments in their logos and related public imagery, universities used their “brand” to 
sell collegiate apparel, barter lucrative athletic contracts with companies like Nike and 
Reebok, and encourage donations from corporations and wealthy alumni.  By the late 
1990s, the estimated value of the collegiate apparel industry was $2.5 billion.21 
So although universities maintained virtually anonymous bureaucracies, allowing 
students little direct access to decision-making processes, their “brand” made them 
publicly vulnerable.  In the words of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance president 
David D’Alessandro, “It can take 100 years to build up a good brand and 30 days to 
knock it down.”22  Exploiting this vulnerability, USAS activists used protest, civil 
disobedience, and effective media campaigns to focus public attention on the working 
conditions that produced university apparel.  Like the lunch counter sit-ins of the early 
1960s, the attention from these actions created a decision dilemma for administrators.  
Because public embarrassment threatened to soil their universities’ brand names, many 
university administrators were compelled to establish labor standards for their apparel.  
As of 2012, USAS had convinced over 180 colleges and universities to affiliate with the 
Worker Rights Consortium, an organization that monitors apparel factories.23 
 USAS activists also played key roles in other solidarity struggles, including 
campaigns by the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW) in the early 2000s.  In March 
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2005, Florida farm workers and their allies ended a four-year boycott of Yum! Brands 
(the parent company of Taco Bell, Kentucky Fried Chicken, A&W, Pizza Hut, and Long 
John Silver’s).  In exchange, Yum!, the largest restaurant corporation in the world, 
granted the workers a roughly 75 percent raise and agreed to work with them directly to 
combat slavery in Florida fields.  During the campaign, which specifically targeted Taco 
Bell, the CIW adapted many of the organizing methods popularized by struggles in 
Chiapas and in Seattle, specifically the use of broad, horizontal coalitions.  However, the 
ideas that resonated within CIW campaigns were not limited to these immediate 
predecessors. 
 
THE COALITION OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS 
The David and Goliath nature of a group of perhaps 2,500 seasonally rotating 
workers –primarily Mexican and Guatemalan immigrants with no formally recognized 
bargaining rights– making demands of such a powerful corporation, particularly 
following decades of devastating defeats for organized labor, has earned the CIW 
international acclaim.  Very little about the CIW’s methods was new, however.  In fact, 
the group is notable for having built on so many precedents.  The CIW’s insistence on an 
autonomous, democratic, and relatively horizontal internal structure, for example, drew 
heavily from the EZLN uprising and paralleled a larger movement of similarly-structured 
worker centers throughout the U.S. during the same period.  The group’s use of hunger 
strikes and city-to-city marches, as well as their boycott strategy, harkened back to 
previous campaigns by the United Farm Workers (UFW) and the Farm Labor Organizing 
Committee (FLOC).  Even their alliances with student organizations built on more than 
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fifty years of solidarity work on U.S. college campuses, including USAS’ campaigns in 
the late 1990s.24 
The CIW began organizing in 1993, during what Janice Fine describes as the 
“second wave” of worker centers in the United States.  Somewhat akin to anarchist 
infoshops, worker centers served a variety of functions.  In addition to providing 
information and meeting spaces, they promoted leadership development, popular 
education, and coalition-building among community organizations.  Unlike labor unions, 
worker centers were typically locally based and operate independently “both from each 
other as well as from other national organizations [and] networks.”25  But though 
autonomous by design, and run democratically by the communities they serve, worker 
centers often maintained working relationships with labor unions and religious 
organizations.26 
Like SNCC, Earth First!, and 924 Gilman Street, the CIW drew on the horizontal 
organizing models of historical predecessors such as the Industrial Workers of the World 
(IWW), in addition to those of the EZLN.  The education-based approach to 
empowerment illustrated in their organizing mantra, “consciousness + commitment = 
change,” was vital to the group’s survival, as the seasonal rotation of farm workers meant 
a constant flux and turnover in membership.  CIW members also lacked a common 
language, so their efforts at popular education often depended on skits and drawings.27 
Before its “Fair Food” campaign in 2001, the CIW had focused primarily on 
immediate targets.  For example, the group confronted abusive crew bosses and launched 
undercover investigations that led to the prosecution of five agricultural slavery rings.  
The group also organized a 230-mile march from Ft. Meyers to Orlando and a month-
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long hunger strike by six of its members.  By the end of the 1990s, the group had 
compelled their employers, the Six L’s Packing Company, to raise long-falling wages 
back to pre-1980s levels.  In addition to these tangible gains, the CIW also built 
important alliances with more privileged groups, including religious congregations, 
student activists, and labor unions, which played a vital role in the campaign against Taco 
Bell.28 
 For just as the Zapatistas’ were unable to confront the Mexican army directly, by 
the late 1990s, the Coalition of Immokalee Workers exhausted their ability to make 
further demands of the Six L’s Packing Company directly.  Instead, the CIW developed a 
boomerang strategy that pressured Six L’s by targeting one of its main purchasers, Taco 
Bell, which was more vulnerable to public pressure.29   
This specific strategy, known as a secondary boycott because it targets someone 
other than an immediate employer, had successful historical precedents among American 
farmworkers, most notably the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA, which 
eventually became the United Farm Workers) in the 1960s and 1970s and FLOC a decade 
later.  In order to pressure vineyard owner Schenley Industries, the NFWA organized a 
boycott that eventually spread to companies including Cutty Sark liquor, Chiquita 
bananas, and Safeway grocery.  Schenley ultimately agreed to recognize the union, and 
several other grape growers and wine makers followed suit, in order to avoid similar 
campaigns.  Similarly, FLOC launched a successful campaign against Vlasic pickles’ 
cucumber growers through parent company Campbell’s Soup.  The victory gave FLOC 
the leverage to force an additional agreement with the H.J. Heinz Company.30   
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The CIW built on these models, but they adapted them to include some important 
basic principles.  Most notably, the group not only insisted on their own autonomy, and 
as a result rejected offers to become a subsidiary of UFW or FLOC, but they also insisted 
on the autonomy of their allies.  So while the CIW focused their efforts on coordinating 
annual awareness tours, protests at Yum! headquarters, and attention from national media 
outlets, their allies pursued their own independent strategies.  This insistence on freedom 
of action proved vitally important, as it allowed participating groups to frame the issue in 
their own way and adopt strategies that played to their strengths.  
Sympathetic unions, for example, framed the CIW struggle as a labor issue.  They 
encouraged their members to participate in the boycott and provided the CIW with 
important logistical assistance.  Allied church groups, meanwhile, focused their campaign 
around the moral issue of slavery.  They spread the boycott congregation to congregation 
and received important public endorsements from powerful national organizations.  
Student activists, meanwhile, recognizing their status as Taco Bell’s target market, 
launched a campaign called “Boot the Bell,” which sought to expel the restaurant from 
high school and college campuses.  By pressuring Yum! Brands from all of these angles, 
the CIW and their allies kept the company on the defensive.  Yum! could not respond to 
the variety of attacks with only one public relations campaign; however, responding to 
each individually eventually proved costly.31 
 
BOOTING THE BELL 
 Student solidarity movements have a long history in the United States.  During the 
1960s, Civil Rights groups such as SNCC and CORE pursued strategic alliances at 
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northern universities, leading to the establishment of SDS, among other groups, and 
culminating in the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer.  Many of the political 
developments at northern universities during this period, including the Berkeley Free 
Speech Movement and the 1968 Columbia University strike, were directly influenced by 
these relationships.  During the 1980s and 1990s, student activists compelled dozens of 
major universities to disinvest from apartheid South Africa and sever ties with the 
University of Arizona’s telescope project at Mt. Graham (as outlined in Chapter 2) .   
The CIW’s allied student wing, the Student/Farmworker Alliance (SFA), 
however, was most intimately influenced by USAS, who had so excelled at finding 
pressure points in university bureaucracies. The SFA adopted an organizational structure 
very similar to USAS, and indeed the two groups overlapped both in membership and 
with shared campaigns.  Following USAS’ horizontal network approach, student groups 
on campuses throughout the United States worked on the SFA Taco Bell campaign, 
adopting successful methods from one another and coordinating national protests.  SFA 
groups also followed USAS’ model for confronting the power structures at their 
respective universities.  They dissected complicated university bureaucracies in order to 
apply direct pressure on key decision-makers, and they targeted schools publicly, as 
brands.  During the “Boot the Bell” campaign, some SFA activists also built on past 
USAS victories directly, using membership in the Worker Rights Consortium as a policy 
reference point to which they could hold their universities accountable. 
 When Yum! Brands reached agreement with the Coalition of Immokalee Workers 
in March 2005, SFA groups at twenty-two schools, including UCLA, Portland State 
University, and the University of Chicago, had succeeded at either cutting or preventing 
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contracts with Taco Bell.  SFA campaigns were active at roughly 300 colleges and fifty 
high schools, and, importantly, that number had been steadily growing.  This mounting 
pressure eventually compelled Taco Bell to agree to CIW demands rather than risk 
spoiling its brand reputation among its most important target audience.  The “Boot the 
Bell” campaigns at the University of Texas and the University of Notre Dame show how 
students attempted to expel Taco Bell from their schools as well as how corporate and 
university officials responded to their efforts. While student activists at the University of 
Texas were ultimately unable to remove Taco Bell from their student union, the Notre 
Dame campaign resulted in the university severing Taco Bell’s sponsorship of their 
football post-game show.  Both campaigns put Taco Bell on the defensive, but students at 
Notre Dame were more successful at forcing the hands of administrative officials.32 
 The University of Texas (UT) campaign against Taco Bell started in 2001.  In 
December, members of the campus Green Party protested and distributed literature about 
the CIW in front of the campus restaurant, in conjunction with actions in thirty other 
states.  The following October, Green Party members held another demonstration, 
complete with tomato costumes, which also coincided with similar activities elsewhere.  
Over the course of the next year, students began meeting with representatives of 
Aramark, the company contracted by UT to oversee all campus food outlets.  By 
November 2003, the student coalition had broadened to include not only the campus 
Green Party but also global justice groups like Accion Zapatista and Resist FTAA!  In 
conjunction with a campus visit by CIW members, students held another rally and 
introduced a resolution to the student government that, if passed, would have encouraged 
the administration to cut ties with Taco Bell.  The resolution failed without debate, 
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however, and student government representatives were seen “working on papers [and] 
picking their finger nails” during its presentation. 33 Although activists at UT were able to 
attract publicity, they reached dead ends with both their representatives and the company 
that held the campus Taco Bell contract.34 
 The following school year, the SFA campaign at UT reached its peak.  Under the 
leadership of the Student Labor Action Project (SLAP), the campaign grew to include the 
support of thirty-five other student organizations.  Inspired by a recent SFA victory at 
UCLA, student activists presented the Texas Union Board of Directors, the 
administrative body responsible for contracting with Aramark, with a petition of over 
1,000 signatories.  Unmoved, board chairwoman Nada Antoun responded that removing 
Taco Bell would be a “disservice to the students.”35  CIW members again visited the 
campus, and activists began flooding the school newspaper with letters of support for the 
campaign.  In addition to opinion pieces by students, Austin-area ministers also submitted 
a letter, noting support for the boycott by religious groups and quoting former UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson’s condemnation of Taco Bell’s role in 
“profiting by exploitation.”36 
 In response, Dirk Dozier and Don Barton, respectively CEO and Vice President of 
Human Resources for Austaco, the company that directly owned the Union Taco Bell and 
several others in Central Texas, began their own media campaign.  In February, as the 
Union Board was gearing up to vote on the issue, Dozier published an opinion piece in 
the school newspaper defending Six L’s as “a very good organization,” condemning 
student and community activists, and asking, “Where is the concern for the tax-paying, 
wage-earning U.S. citizens – employees of our company – who potentially will lose their 
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jobs for the sake of Florida Immokalee farm workers?”  But while Dozier, like Antoun, 
saw the benefits in exploiting farm workers, he did not explain why a one cent per pound 
raise for tomato pickers would cause other workers to lose their jobs.  Don Barton, 
meanwhile, maintained that by representing only 68 of the 6,000 Taco Bell restaurants in 
the US, Austaco was in no position to influence the company.  More importantly, Barton 
also argued that the UT Taco Bell franchise did not buy tomatoes from Six L’s and thus 
was “far removed from what [the CIW was] trying to do.”  Unswayed, SLAP activists 
responded that they had never used Six L’s in their literature or demands and that the 
franchise nonetheless benefited from its connection to Taco Bell, a company whose 
success had come on the backs of CIW laborers.  Barton admitted that representing and 
benefiting from the parent company was “why you become a franchise,” and he further 
acknowledged that he had no information on the conditions of the workers who did pick 
the franchise’s tomatoes.  Despite these contradictions, the Union Board moved to vote 
on Taco Bell’s future at the end of February, and Antoun continued to cite the 
restaurant’s potential removal as a disservice to students who were “strapped due to 
tuition increases.”37 
 Before the vote, SLAP published additional opinion pieces in the newspaper, and 
a local church held a public forum on the topic.  When the group’s members realized that 
the board would rule against them, they attempted to withdraw their resolution.  The 
Union Board opted to vote anyway, however, and during the debate, SLAP activists held 
up 36 signs, each with the name of a supporting student organization.  The board voted 
unanimously to keep Taco Bell but stipulated that Six L’s would be banned from 
operating at UT – a non-issue given that Six L’s already did not.  Though the board ended 
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the students’ campaign anticlimactically, their decision ultimately did not matter, as 
Yum! Brands reached an agreement with the CIW the next week.  SLAP and their allies 
ultimately could not sway either their administration or their own government 
representatives, but their actions exposed some of the bigger issues confronted by the 
campaign.38   
Despite Taco Bell’s name recognition and seemingly singular identity, the 
structure of the company was actually quite complicated.  Its distribution and licensing 
network included other powerful corporations such as Aramark and Austaco.  Similarly, 
the hierarchy of the university also included a variety of powerful decision-making 
bodies.  The problems that the University of Texas students faced were not all structural, 
however; their campaign also revealed the nature of their opponents’ positions.  When 
put on the defensive, Union Board chairwoman Antoun effectively admitted that the 
exploitation of farm workers was a service to students, who themselves were being 
squeezed by the rising costs of college tuition.  Austaco representatives provided a 
similar response, arguing that the conditions of workers who were not “tax-paying, wage-
earning U.S. citizens” were of no concern to their company.  Taco Bell apologists 
initially claimed either ignorance of farm workers’ struggles or impotence to affect the 
situation.  When pushed, however, they effectively admitted that their own financial gain 
was more important than the human costs.  The more successful campaign at Notre Dame 
forced a similarly raw response from Taco Bell headquarters. 
 The SFA campaign at Notre Dame University, like its Texas counterpart, started 
in 2001.  However, it reached its peak during the 2003-2004 school year.  In September, 
members of the Progressive Student Alliance (PSA) met with Notre Dame General 
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Counsel Carol Kaesebier to discuss the university’s affiliation with Taco Bell through a 
local franchisee’s sponsorship of an official football post-game show.  In March, after 
traveling to Kentucky for a protest at Yum! Brand’s headquarters and visiting Immokalee 
over spring break, two PSA members, Melody Gonzales and Tony Rivas, participated in 
a Cesar Chavez day forum where they discussed their involvement in the campaign and 
their own fathers’ experiences as migrant farm laborers.  Rivas began a week-long hunger 
strike as a lead-up to a protest of Taco Bell.39   
Importantly, PSA members also identified an additional leverage point with the 
university:  Board of Trustees member Matt Gallo was the director of Gallo of Sonoma 
Winery, a company accused of unfair labor practices by the United Farm Workers.  The 
SFA campaign at Notre Dame relied on articulating the contradictions between the 
school’s mission and its relationship to Taco Bell.  By targeting Gallo, student activists 
presented a pattern of worker exploitation at the university, which allowed them to 
embarrass the university at very high levels and dismiss attempts to make the Taco Bell 
issue seem ambiguous.40 
 The publicity of Rivas’ hunger strike and the subsequent protest, which were part 
of a national week of student actions, prompted responses from Notre Dame officials and 
from Taco Bell.  University spokesperson Matthew Storin told the school newspaper that 
the fact that Rivas learned about migrant labor issues from a university seminar “should 
count as University awareness on some level.”41  Speaking on behalf of Taco Bell, Laurie 
Schalow claimed that the free market was to blame for produce prices, not the restaurant 
company.  She also noted that Taco Bell’s Supplier Code of Conduct specified a $9 per 
hour minimum wage, though student activists quickly pointed out that tomato pickers 
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were paid by the bucket, not the hour.  Undeterred by this dismissal, PSA members began 
a letter-writing campaign to University President Father Edward Malloy and launched a 
forty person hunger strike.  After two weeks of sending letters, dozens of PSA members 
went to Malloy’s office to hand-deliver more and to ask the administration for a public 
statement on the university’s relationship with Taco Bell.  Though the president’s 
assistant told them that it was “not [Malloy’s] style” to meet with students, Counselor to 
the President Father Peter Jarret did agree to discuss the PSA’s conditions for ending 
their hunger strike.42 
 The administration agreed to investigate the students’ concerns, but only after 
receiving an official response from Taco Bell.  PSA members, identifying the university’s 
delay tactics, expanded their hunger strike to include 126 students and published 
editorials that related their campaign to Notre Dame’s membership with the USAS 
Workers Rights Consortium and accused the university of involvement in “a financial 
chain that exploits workers.”43  As the hunger strike escalated, Notre Dame officials 
demanded an immediate response from Taco Bell representatives, who had been using 
delay tactics of their own.  A week later, Notre Dame announced that it would postpone 
negotiations for the renewal of its Taco Bell contract until the company provided its 
official explanation.  Though President Malloy publicly thanked the students for bringing 
the issue to his attention, he stipulated that “it remains to be seen whether all their 
concerns were justified.”44  Anxious to maintain a business-friendly appearance, he said 
the university would not rush to judge Taco Bell before hearing their side of the 
argument.45 
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In August 2004, the deadline for renewing the annual sponsorship contract passed 
without the university receiving a sufficient response from Taco Bell. As PSA declared 
victory, university spokesperson Matt Storin, cautious not to reveal that students had 
pressured the administration into making a decision, thanked students for bringing up the 
issue “in a very responsible and studied way.”46 
  
CONCLUSION 
The Notre Dame campaign to boot Taco Bell succeeded for several reasons.  
Chief among them were the students’ abilities to articulate the contradiction between the 
school’s mission and their association with the company, connect that relationship to 
other labor issues at Notre Dame, and, perhaps most importantly, threaten the image of 
the school’s football program.  The Texas campaign, by contrast, failed because students 
were unable to identify or apply pressure on the necessary decision-making body.  
Student activists remained public and active for the full four-year campaign, but their 
attempts to influence various governing bodies never produced the desired results.  
However, the “pressure from all sides” strategy of the CIW’s conflict with Yum! allowed 
the group to benefit even from unsuccessful campaigns by their allies.  Even though UT’s 
Taco Bell remained open, the public reactions of franchisees demonstrated the pressure 
they felt from student activists.  
These campaigns demonstrate the difficulties activists faced while confronting 
elaborate bureaucracies, such as those of American universities.  Just as they had during 
the defense of Mt. Graham campaign and in various USAS campaigns, student activists 
were tasked with determining who the key decision-makers were and then developing 
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strategies to pressure them.  This process was complicated by the corporatization of 
American campuses, which included both an increased corporate presence and the 
adoption of corporate models of organization. Outside of the university, the Coalition of 
Immokalee Workers similarly faced a production chain which included an elaborate web 
of farms, distributors, and subcontractors, as well as Taco Bell’s own labyrinth of 
franchisees, subcontractors, and the like.  In order to identify and exploit the right 
pressure points, the CIW and their allies looked to historical examples and built on the 
models of more recently successful campaigns.  The combination of all of these efforts 
eventually forced Yum! to grant the desired concessions, and the CIW has since reached 
similar agreements with several other companies, including McDonald’s, Burger King, 
Whole Foods, Subway, Trader Joe’s, and Chipotle. 
The CIW, like the EZLN, USAS, DAN, and other global justice organizations, 
offered an important step beyond the defensive direct action of the 1980s era groups.  
Though still largely reactive in nature, these groups formed broad, transnational 
coalitions that united environmental, labor, and human rights activists in opposition to 
specific, undemocratic policies.  The CIW, from a position of relative powerlessness, 
confronted an employer, Six L’s Packing Company, which was effectively immune to the 
public protest.  The group responded by selecting a more vulnerable, albeit also more 
powerful, target in Yum! Brands.  By developing relationships with more privileged 
allies and allowing those allies to operate autonomously, the CIW was able to pressure 
Yum! from several different directions.  This was key, as university bureaucracies and 
national corporate supply chains had been organized in a way that minimized their 
exposure to outside pressure.  Larger global networks in the era of NAFTA and the WTO 
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functioned in much the same way; the vulnerabilities of global capitalism became 
increasingly decentralized.  However, as the CIW’s campaigns illustrated, even powerful, 
decentralized opponents have vulnerabilities that can be engaged from multiple angles; 
activists must think globally and take action everywhere.   
Importantly, while backlash and repression from elites were constants, the global 
justice organizations of the 1990s generally operated within a cultural context in which 
most Americans were receptive (or at least not openly hostile) to human rights concerns.  
After all, even “free trade” was typically framed as benefit for the world’s poor. As a 
result, associating corporations with human right abuses applied pressure by threatening 
to tarnish their brand names.  In contrast, the peace movement that followed during the 
“War on Terror” of the 2000s, faced a culture of widespread fear and unquestioning 
obedience in which appeals to humanity fell flat. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
GLOBALIZATION, PART 2:  THE “WAR ON TERROR”  
AND THE GLOBAL PEACE MOVEMENT 
 
 
 Bush Administration 
 
Project for the New American Century 
Halliburton 
Blackwater 
Clear Channel 
 
 
2000s Anti-War Movement  
 
ANSWER 
United for Peace and Justice 
Code Pink 
Gold Star Families for Peace 
Iraq Veterans Against the War 
 
 
I can't tell you if the use of force in Iraq today would last five days, or five weeks, 
or five months, but it certainly isn't going to last any longer than that. 
 
                                                     - Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense1  
 
 
And that's why the thugs in Iraq still resist us, because they can't stand the thought 
of free societies. They understand what freedom means. See, free nations are 
peaceful nations. Free nations don't attack each other. Free nations don't develop 
weapons of mass destruction.   
   
         - George W. Bush, President of the United States2 
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In September 2000, a conservative think tank called the Project for the New 
American Century (PNAC) released a report entitled, “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: 
Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century.”  In it, PNAC calls for a broad re-
tooling of the US military and identifies potential targets, namely Iran, Iraq, and North 
Korea –the countries President George W. Bush later called the “Axis of Evil” in his 
2002 State of the Union Address.  Unfortunately, PNAC lamented, the massive funding 
that would be required to pursue such military expansion was unlikely to be provided 
“absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor.”3 A year later, 
however, just such an event occurred, when hijacked airplanes crashed in New York 
City; Shanksville, Pennsylvania; and Washington, D.C., killing nearly 3,000 people.  
PNAC had been advocating for the overthrow of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein since 
the late 1990s, and the September 11 attacks provided an excuse to renew its call, even 
though there was no known connection between Hussein and the hijackers.4   
Following an invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, the Bush Administration, 
which included PNAC members Donald Rumsfeld, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, and Paul 
Wolfowitz, shifted its focus to attacking Iraq.  Over the eight years of formal occupation, 
from March 2003 to December 2011, at least 66,000 Iraqi civilians were killed; most 
estimates are much higher.  Over two million Iraqis were displaced inside the country, 
while another two million sought refuge in Syria and Jordan.  More than 4,000 US 
soldiers were also killed, in addition to 30,000 wounded and a rapidly growing number of 
suicides.  An estimated one third of veterans suffer from psychological injuries, such as 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and severe depression.  The on-going occupation 
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of Afghanistan, meanwhile, has produced an additional 10,000-50,000 civilian casualties, 
2,000 US soldiers killed, and 10,000 wounded.5 
 
NEOLIBERALISM IN THE 21st CENTURY 
 George W. Bush became the 43rd President of the United States in 2001, despite 
having received half a million fewer votes than his opponent.  The election was highly 
contentious, and it was ultimately decided by Bush’s 537 vote victory in Florida, where 
his brother Jeb was governor.  During the Florida elections, tens of thousands of African 
Americans were denied their voting rights, and the state’s voting machines also failed to 
read nearly 200,000 ballots – disproportionately within areas with large African-
American populations. Despite these inconsistencies, however, the US Supreme Court 
rejected requests for hand recounts and upheld Bush’s victory.  Though lacking a 
mandate from American voters, and having campaigned as a “compassionate 
conservative,” Bush aggressively pursued the neoliberal project, slashing taxes and 
government services, privatizing public assets, and further de-regulating industry.6   
 In his first year in office, Bush signed the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act, cutting roughly $1 trillion in tax revenue over the following decade.  
Two years later, he signed the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, cutting an 
additional $800 billion over ten years.  As the first of these cuts was being debated in 
April 2001, the Heritage Foundation issued a report arguing that “even with increased 
spending,” Bush’s tax cuts would “effectively pay off the federal debt” in the following 
decade.7  In other words, these massive tax cuts would so stimulate the economy that 
trillions of dollars in additional revenue could be expected.  Instead, however, the 
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combination of tax cuts and increased spending actually doubled the debt during that 
period. And despite the names given to the Bush tax cuts, much of the benefit went to the 
richest Americans, while Bush’s job creation numbers were the worst of any US 
president since World War II.8   
Bush’s tax cuts were an example of the conservative strategy of “starving the 
beast,” or deliberately cutting revenue in order to justify subsequent cuts to public 
services. Indeed, Bush admitted in 2001 that he hoped his tax cuts would be a “fiscal 
straightjacket for Congress.”9  Bush ultimately did not commit himself to the same 
asylum, however, instead greatly expanding government expenses in areas such as the 
military and the domestic surveillance apparatus.10   
In addition to providing massive tax cuts, the Bush Administration also pursued 
an expansive agenda of de-regulation and corporatization.  For example, Bush’s 
landmark education bill, No Child Left Behind (NCLB), funneled federal education 
dollars from schools to tutoring corporations.  Most notoriously, in the first few months 
of Bush’s first term, Vice President Dick Cheney held a series of secretive meetings with 
lobbyists and other representatives of American coal, mining, and oil companies in order 
to construct the administration’s energy policies.  The Energy Task Force’s requests 
eventually became a proposal that Republican Senator John McCain called the “no 
lobbyist left behind bill.”11  Meanwhile, with lukewarm support in segments of both 
parties, environmental groups like Friends of the Earth and the Sierra Club mobilized 
their members to pressure their representatives.  They were able to defeat the bill on 
multiple occasions during Bush’s first term.  In 2005, however, the energy bill passed, 
allotting $6 billion in subsidies for oil and gas companies, $9 billion for coal companies, 
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and $12 billion for nuclear power.  The bill also allowed exemptions to the Clean Water 
Act and Safe Drinking Water Act for companies obtaining natural gas through hydraulic 
fracturing, or “fracking.”  The primary beneficiary of this exemption was Halliburton, 
Cheney’s former employer.12 
Among the key members of the Energy Task Force was Kenneth Lay, CEO of 
energy giant Enron.  As the largest donor to the Bush campaign, Lay enjoyed 
considerable access to the White House, and the administration continued to defend his 
company up until its collapse that Fall.  Enron’s ethical and financial bankruptcy reveals 
much about the philosophy of the Bush Administration, and it was, no doubt, a very 
public embarrassment to them.  However, it also revealed something deeper about the 
emptiness of America’s de-regulated economy.13   
When Enron folded in December 2001, its crashing stock took with it the savings 
of many of its workers, as well as the pensions of California and New York state 
employees.  As the seventh largest US multinational corporation, Enron had been 
presented as a safe investment.  In fact, for the previous six years in a row, Fortune 
magazine had declared Enron “America’s Most Innovative Company,” and indeed they 
were, though not likely in the way the writers at Fortune had thought.  Enron’s fraud was 
immense; while claiming over $100 billion in annual revenue, the company quarantined 
and hid its debts within its many, many subsidiaries.  Enron was also able to use its 
substantial clout to gain regulatory exemptions from the Clinton era Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in both 1993 and 1997, and the company took full 
advantage of the 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act.  Ultimately, despite constituting 
the largest bankruptcy in American history at the time, with $63 billion in assets, Enron’s 
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collapse was not treated as a “canary in the coalmine.”  American elites continued to urge 
corporate consolidation and de-regulation, and Enron has since been eclipsed by the even 
greater failures of Worldcom (in 2002), Lehman Brothers (2008), Washington Mutual 
(2008), General Motors (2009), and CIT Group (2009) – and was nearly rivaled by those 
of Conseco (2002), Chrysler (2009), and MF Global (2011).14 
In addition to taking direct advice from corporate heads, Bush also followed in the 
steps of Ronald Reagan, gutting federal agencies from within by appointing leaders who 
were openly hostile to their agency’s mission or tied to the industries they were expected 
to regulate.  As Secretary of the Interior, Bush appointed Gale Norton, a former protégé 
of Reagan Interior Secretary James Watt while at the Mountain States Legal Foundation.  
Norton also served on Reagan’s Council on Environmental Quality and was a fellow at 
Stanford University’s conservative Hoover Institution.  As expected, Norton used her 
position to cater to corporate interests.  According to environmental activist Robert F. 
Kennedy, Jr.,  
Norton signed off on a plan to open nearly 9 million acres of Alaska’s North 
Slope to oil and gas development, put the kibosh on a citizens’ panel to oversee 
the trans-Alaska pipeline, brushed aside a record 25,000 opposing comments to 
approve a Houston company’s request to embark on the largest oil and gas 
exploration project in Utah’s history, and pushed for oil and gas drilling in 
Wyoming’s Jack Morrow Hills.15 
 
As Deputy Secretary of the Interior, Bush appointed J. Steven Griles, another 
former member of the Reagan Administration. As a high-ranking employee at National 
Environmental Strategies, Inc. (a lobbying firm for energy interests) and the United 
Company (a coal and mining corporation), his knowledge of the energy industry was 
intimate, making him a natural fit for Cheney’s Energy Task Force.  Among his key 
contributions to the Bush Administration was to remove obstacles to mountaintop 
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removal mining for coal companies.  Griles was later forced to resign, however, when it 
became apparent that he had been meeting with former clients, who paid him over $1 
million.  Griles was also one of the many Republicans convicted in the scandal involving 
lobbyist Jack Abramoff; he was eventually sentenced to ten months in prison for offering 
to use his position to help Abramoff block construction of a casino.16 
Many other Bush appointees also had intimate ties to the energy industry.  
Rebecca W. Watson, Assistant Secretary of Land and Minerals Management, had been a 
lobbyist for the mining industry.  Bennett Raley, Assistant Secretary of Water and 
Science, had been a mining lawyer and an active opponent of reauthorizing the Clean 
Water Act.  Jeffrey D. Jarrett, Director of the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and 
Enforcement, had been a coal company executive.  President Bush himself had been the 
head of an oil exploration corporation, while Vice President Cheney was the former CEO 
of Halliburton and eventual Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was the former head of 
Chevron’s Committee on Public Policy.17 
Bush also recruited from prominent conservative think tanks.  At least twenty 
American Enterprise Institute (AEI) fellows served in his administration, and AEI also 
later hired Bush’s ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton.  Bolton, also affiliated 
with PNAC, had once suggested that the UN could lose ten stories’ worth of its New 
York offices without making “a bit of difference.”18  Bush also recruited heavily from the 
Heritage Foundation, including Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao (wife of Senator Mitch 
McConnell), Angela Antonelli, Mark Wilson, Kay Coles James, Alvin Felzenberg, and 
Gale Norton.  From the Federalist Society, an organization of conservative lawyers and 
judges, Bush appointed Attorney General John Ashcroft, Ted Olson, and Spencer Abram, 
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among others.  Appointees affiliated with the anti-feminist Independent Women’s Forum 
included Chao, Diana Furchgott-Roth, Anita Blair, and Jessica Gavora.  These think 
tanks, in addition to developing policy, essentially trained and vetted an entire 
administration of ready to rule conservative officials.19  
In the event that his appointments did not effectively debilitate the government’s 
charter, however, Bush also maintained a veto.  On his inauguration day, Bush put a 
freeze on all pending Clinton regulations and clamped down on regulatory approval 
through his Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).  Congress had 
established the OIRA in 1980 in order to streamline paperwork and regulations, 
effectively allowing the President to overrule federal agencies’ proposals if they were 
deemed detrimental to business.  As a baseline figure, in the last two years of the Clinton 
Administration, an average of 20.5 proposed regulations were rejected by the OIRA.  
During Bush’s first year, his OIRA rejected 172.  And while that number tapered off in 
subsequent years, Bush’s OIRA officials have been clear that they did not become more 
accommodating; rather, representatives of federal agencies merely stopped submitting 
new regulations, realizing that they had little chance of being implemented.  Bush’s EPA 
issued just three regulations during the first three years of his term.  By comparison, 
Clinton’s first three years produced thirty EPA regulations, and George H.W. Bush’s first 
three years yielded twenty-one.20 
In addition to Bush’s neoliberal economic policies, his administration also 
promoted a number of conservative social policies.  Perhaps most famously, Bush 
pressed for a massive increase in funding for “abstinence only” sexual education.  As a 
part of his push for welfare reform, Bill Clinton had authorized $50 million per year for 
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this censored curriculum; Bush tripled funding to $176 million per year by 2006.  But 
despite the more than $1 billion of federal funding spent on abstinence only programs 
since 1982, a 2007 study for the Department of Health and Human Services found no 
statistical impact on the sexual behavior of American youth.  However, several such 
curricula have been shown to include factually inaccurate information about pregnancy, 
birth control, sexually transmitted infections, and abortion.21 
In 2001, Bush also established the White House Office of Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives (OFBCI) to transfer the government’s social service obligations to 
religious organizations.  By 2006, more than $2 billion per year in federal funds were 
being funneled to such groups.  During the 2004 presidential campaign, Bush also 
publicly advocated a constitutional amendment to ban “same sex” marriage, though the 
1996 Defense of Marriage Act already established that same sex couples could not 
receive federal benefits and that US states were not required to recognize same sex 
marriages from other states.22 
In many areas, whether de-regulation, public services, tax cuts, or privatization, 
the Bush Administration did not represent a departure from the practices of the Reagan 
and Clinton eras.  Ronald Reagan had appointed industry insiders to undermine 
regulations and remake the government as a tool for business.  Bill Clinton had approved 
“faith-based” initiatives, funded “abstinence only” sexual education, and signed the 
Defense of Marriage Act.  His administration also helped Enron hide its fraud.  Even 
more significantly, Clinton approved the media de-regulation that allowed Fox News and 
Clear Channel, Inc. to saturate US markets and endorsed the Wall Street de-regulation 
that played a key role in the global recession of 2008.  But just as George H.W. Bush and 
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Bill Clinton had added free trade globalization to Reagan’s model of rule, George W. 
Bush also added an additional layer to the neoliberal project.  The Bush Administration’s 
major neoliberal contribution was the “War on Terror,” which greatly expanded the 
privatization of military services, forced business-friendly laws onto the Iraqi people, 
suspended civil liberties in the US, abandoned the accepted rules of armed conflict, and 
embraced a state of perpetual warfare.  In the words of Vice President Dick Cheney, the 
War on Terror “may never end…at least not in our lifetime.”23 
 
THE WAR 
 As early as January 2001, the Bush cabinet began discussing the invasion of Iraq.  
Eight months later, the tragedy of September 11 provided a relatively clear mandate for 
war on Afghanistan, but Saddam Hussein had not been involved.  Though Dick Cheney 
told Sixty Minutes and Meet the Press viewers that 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta had met 
with Iraqi officials in Prague, US intelligence reports had already stated otherwise.  Atta, 
in fact, was in the US when the Prague meeting allegedly occurred, and investigations 
have exposed the meeting as a likely hoax.  Without a link between Hussein and 9/11, 
however, the administration was forced to find a different pretext for war – the imminent 
threat of an Iraqi attack.24     
On the surface, presenting Iraq as a danger to the American people was absurd.  
During the first Iraq War, in 1991, US forces repelled the Iraqi military from Kuwait in a 
number of weeks.  The UN, following the US’ “Food for Oil” plan, then controlled Iraq’s 
imports and its oil exports for more than a decade.  The US, UK, and France also 
maintained “no fly zones” over much of the country.  Iraq was contained in nearly every 
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sense.  Saddam Hussein also made an awkward villain, as the United States had not only 
played a role in his rise to power but had also provided financial and military assistance, 
notably during the bloody 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, in which the US provided arms to 
both sides.  Moreover, US military and financial support for Hussein continued even after 
the genocidal Al-Anfal campaign and the Halabja poison gas attacks against the Kurdish 
populations of Northern Iraq.25 
 Furthermore, while the 9/11 hijackers, as non-state actors, had targeted US 
civilians, the role of the US military in the world made state-sponsored attacks on the US 
extremely unlikely.  According to the Department of Defense’s own 2002 figures, the US 
operated at least 700 military bases in foreign countries, in addition to the thousands of 
bases on US territory.  Author Chalmers Johnson, among others, notes that US forces are 
active in more than 130 countries.  And while Saddam Hussein had indeed been a hostile 
neighbor and a violent head of state, the US had a far more extensive record of toppling 
democratically elected governments and supporting genocidal regimes, while engaged in 
non-stop military action since World War II.  In addition to arming both the Hussein 
regime and the Mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan, the US’ list of military and CIA 
interventions since 1945 includes China, Italy, Greece, the Philippines, Korea, Albania, 
Iran, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Syria, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Haiti, Ecuador, 
the Congo, Brazil, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Indonesia, East Timor, Ghana, 
Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia, Australia, Angola, Zaire, Jamaica, Grenada, Morocco, Libya, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Bulgaria, and El Salvador, among others.26  
 But while 9/11 did not provide the excuse for invading Iraq that PNAC desired, 
the culture of fear surrounding the attacks did provide the necessary context for 
  
166	  
presenting Iraq, devastated by two decades of war and economic sanctions, as a threat to 
the world’s only superpower.  Claiming that the Hussein regime possessed weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), and thus constituted a terrorist threat, the Bush Administration 
began ramping up support for an invasion under the banner of a worldwide “War on 
Terror.”   
 In August 2002, Vice President Cheney announced, “We now know that Saddam 
has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons…Simply stated, there is no doubt that 
Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.”27  A few months later, on the 
eve of the invasion in March 2003, President Bush used similar language, stating 
“Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime 
continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.”28  But 
while Bush and Cheney each used the phrase “no doubt,” communicating absolute 
certainty, no such weapons were recovered. 
 Other Bush Administration officials were less concerned with guarantees than 
with perpetuating American fears of terrorist attacks.  National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice, for example, told CNN that while there would always be uncertainty 
about Hussein’s abilities to develop nuclear weapons, “we don't want the smoking gun to 
be a mushroom cloud.”29  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, meanwhile, advised 
CBS’ Face the Nation viewers to “Imagine a September 11 with weapons of mass 
destruction. It's not 3,000 [dead]. It's tens of thousands of innocent men, women and 
children.”30  For those still unconvinced, Cheney, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz, and Senator John McCain assured Americans that “like the people of France 
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in the 1940s,” Iraqis would greet the US military as liberators, while Rumsfeld assured 
that the use of force “certainly” would not last longer than five months.31 
 Though the Bush Administration’s campaign for American public support was 
based on deception, misinformation, and fearmongering, they did deliver on their 
promises to American corporations.  In addition to routine defense contracts, the War on 
Terror took war profiteering to new levels through a privatization scheme that assigned 
military tasks to American businesses.  According to the Department of Defense, military 
contracts for 2003 alone totaled over $200 billion, nearly $30 billion more than the year 
before.  That year, Lockheed Martin, which makes about $1 million per year in campaign 
contributions, received $21.9 billion in defense contracts.  Another $17.3 billion went to 
Boeing, whose Chief Financial Officer was later imprisoned for bribing the Air Force’s 
chief weapons buyer for $5 billion in preferential contracts.  The Northrop Grumman 
Corporation, whose former Vice President James G. Roche served as Bush’s Secretary of 
the Air Force, received $11.1 billion in contracts.  Two years later, the company settled a 
$62 million lawsuit with the US government for overcharging for its services.  In addition 
to these giants of the American military-industrial complex, other defense contractors 
also made key contributions to the War on Terror.  Among the most noteworthy were 
Halliburton, Blackwater, CACI International, and Titan.32 
Halliburton, the top US contractor in Iraq, received $3.9 billion in military 
contracts in 2003 to perform a variety of tasks, such as supplying oil for the military, 
building barracks, and providing meals. In 2004, the Wall Street Journal reported that 
Halliburton had overcharged taxpayers by more than $16 million by claiming to have 
served as many as 25,000 more meals per day than it actually had. A subsequent 2004 
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Pentagon audit found that the company’s unsupported charges were as high as $1.8 
billion.  Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) was also implicated in 
the deaths of more than a dozen soldiers who were electrocuted while showering or 
swimming at KBR-built facilities.  In 2009, prompted by allegations from KBR employee 
Jamie Leigh Jones that she was gang-raped by her co-workers, the US Senate passed the 
“Franken Amendment.” The amendment barred defense contracts from companies, like 
KBR/Halliburton, that prevented workers from taking legal action on sexual crimes.  All 
thirty of the Senators who voted against it were Republicans.  By 2009, KBR’s contracts 
for Afghanistan and Iraq totaled more than $31 billion.33 
Blackwater, meanwhile, received nearly $1 billion from the US government to 
maintain a mercenary army of roughly 1,000 in Iraq.  Like Halliburton, Blackwater 
fulfilled a number of duties that previously would have been performed by the US 
military itself, specifically the guarding and escort of key occupation officials.  However, 
Blackwater was not accountable for its actions, as official US policy – specifically 
Coalition Provisional Authority Order #17– made contractors exempt from Iraqi law.  In 
2006, a drunken Blackwater operative killed the bodyguard of Iraqi Vice President Adil 
Abdul-Mahdi; rather than face murder charges, however, he was simply returned to the 
United States.  A few months later, Blackwater snipers shot to death three guards at the 
Iraqi Media Network.  Blackwater mercenaries were also linked to several other incidents 
involving the killing of Iraqi civilians, including a September 9, 2007 incident in which 
five Iraqis were killed and the infamous Nisour Square shootings a week later, in which 
seventeen civilians were killed.  In an attempt to distance itself from the negative 
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publicity surrounding Nisour Square, the company has since changed its name, first to Xe 
Services in 2009, then to Academi in 2011.34 
 In many ways, Blackwater epitomized neoliberal warfare –privatized and without 
government regulation.  Similarly, CACI International, with over $1 billion in annual 
revenue, and the Titan Corporation, with more than $2 billion per year, offered the 
privatization of human rights abuses.  CACI and Titan provided interrogation and 
translation services for the US military at Abu Ghraib prison, where detainees were 
tortured, beaten, and raped.  According to Major General Antonio Taguba, abuses by US 
soldiers and interrogators included: 
Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; pouring 
cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; 
threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police guard to stitch the 
wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his 
cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick, and 
using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of 
attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee.35  
 
In 2005, CACI announced plans to abandon interrogation work.  The same year, Titan, 
which had just settled a $28.5 million corruption case for bribing foreign officials, was 
purchased by L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc. for just under $2 billion. In 2010, a US 
federal appeals court, citing the immunity of government contractors, dismissed a 2004 
lawsuit against the two companies, which had been filed on behalf of Abu Ghraib torture 
victims.36   
In 2007, the Los Angeles Times reported that while US troops in Iraq totaled 
160,000, there were more than 180,000 contractors, not counting security companies like 
Blackwater.  This privatized occupation, with its massive profits and zero accountability 
for corporations, in many ways mirrored the dynamics of Free Trade Zones and Mexican 
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maquiladoras under NAFTA.  In this sense, the War on Terror was the extension of 
neoliberal globalization via military force.  But the neoliberal model was not only integral 
to the US invasion and occupation, it was also forced upon the Iraqi people.37   
Two months after the invasion, L. Paul Bremer III, head of the US Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA), announced that Iraq was “open for business.”38 Bremer’s 
statement was not merely a colloquialism, however.  That September, Bremer 
implemented Order #39, which  
announced that 200 Iraqi state companies would be privatized; decreed that 
foreign firms can retain 100 percent ownership of Iraqi banks, mines and 
factories; and allowed these firms to move 100 percent of their profits out of 
Iraq.39 
 
This announcement defied Iraq’s constitution, which outlawed the privatization of state 
resources and the foreign ownership of Iraqi firms.  As a result, US occupation policy 
also clearly violated long-standing international laws on warfare that had been ratified by 
the US government.  Other executive edicts from the American “dictator of Iraq”40 
included Order #12, which suspended “all tariffs, customs duties, import taxes, licensing 
fees and similar surcharges for goods entering or leaving Iraq.”41  Order #17, as 
mentioned earlier, granted immunity from Iraqi law to Coalition military personnel and 
private contractors.  Orders #37 and #49 cut corporate taxes.  Orders #80, #81, and #83 
re-wrote Iraq’s copyright laws in order to meet the World Trade Organization’s standards 
for protecting corporations.  Through the CPA, the US forced open Iraqi markets and 
made the nation beholden to the global capitalist system.  Indeed, the transformation was 
so complete that the WTO granted Iraq observer status as early as 2004.42 
 Under the banner of fighting terrorism, the US invasion of Iraq provided a huge 
financial windfall for defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, Halliburton, and 
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Blackwater.  The subsequent occupation established additional long-term investment 
opportunities for US banks and oil companies, by American decree.  Meanwhile, the fear 
of another September 11 also provided a justification for expansive repression and 
surveillance within the United States. 
 
 
THE WAR, AT HOME 
 Addressing a joint session of Congress in the days following 9/11, President 
George W. Bush boldly announced that other nations had to choose a side, warning 
“either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”43 This rhetorical dichotomy, 
between unquestioning obedience to the Bush plan and support for terrorism, proved a 
powerful and threatening tool, and it was readily applied not just to foreign governments, 
but to US subjects, as well.  
One month after the attacks, at the behest of the Bush Administration, Congress 
passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act.  Among its more than 1,000 
provisions, the PATRIOT Act greatly expanded the Justice Department’s ability to 
administer wiretaps and searches, obtain personal records from third parties, freeze 
financial assets, define what constituted terrorist activity, and monitor immigration.  
According to Morton Halperin, a member of President Richard Nixon’s National Security 
Council, under the PATRIOT Act, 
If the [US] government thinks you're under the control of a foreign government, 
they can wiretap you and never tell you, search your house and never tell you, 
break into your home, copy your hard drive, and never tell you that they've done 
it…Historically, the government has often believed that anyone who is protesting 
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government policy is doing it at the behest of a foreign government and opened 
counterintelligence investigations of them.44 
 
Within a year, as many as 5,000 people in the US had been rounded up and detained in 
the investigation of September 11; none of them were charged in connection with the 
attacks.45 
In March 2002, the Bush Administration instituted the “Homeland Security 
Advisory System,” a color-coded guide intended to keep Americans informed of the risk 
of additional terrorist attacks.  The five levels, from highest risk of lowest, were: severe 
(red), high (orange), elevated/significant (yellow), guarded/general (blue), and low 
(green).  In the nine years before the system was discontinued in 2011, the threat never 
dipped below an “elevated, significant risk of terrorist attack.”46 
Taking advantage of this paranoia, in Summer 2002, the Bush Administration 
launched the Terrorism Information and Prevention System (Operation TIPS), a program 
designed to use citizen volunteers’ “unique position to serve as extra eyes and ears for 
law enforcement.”  In its pilot stage alone, TIPS was to involve one million “truckers, 
letter carriers, train conductors, ship captains, utility employees, and other” American 
citizens as spies and informants.47  However, as news reports about TIPS circulated, 
opposition to the program grew.  Despite support from Senator Joe Lieberman, among 
others, Congress voted to eliminate it. But while TIPS was abandoned, other domestic 
surveillance programs continued unabated.  For example, the “anti-terrorism” activities of 
law enforcement at a variety of levels included the surveillance, infiltration, and 
disruption of non-violent activist groups.  Strikingly reminiscent of COINTELPRO, 
publicly known incidents of police infiltrating peace organizations under the guise of 
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fighting terrorism occurred in Fresno and Oakland, California; Baltimore, Maryland; 
Iowa City, Iowa; Olympia, Washington; and Minneapolis, Minnesota.48 
Some of the coordination between police forces can be explained by the 
emergence of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  The Office of Homeland 
Security was established in the weeks after 9/11; a year later, the DHS merged customs, 
transportation security, the Secret Service, emergency management, the US Coast Guard, 
immigration, and border control into one cabinet department, with an annual budget of 
roughly $30 billion.  By 2010, DHS had given state and local police agencies $31 billion 
in grants, some of which was used to apply new military technologies, like facial 
recognition programs, Predator drones, and infrared cameras, to domestic populations.  
The Department of Defense also contributed to the militarization of domestic police 
forces, distributing more than $100 million worth of vehicles, aircraft, and weapons – in 
2006 alone.49 
 The domestic context of the War on Terror –heightened fear and paranoia, 
expanded and consolidated police powers, and widespread accusations that hesitation, let 
alone opposition, provided aid to terrorists– was extremely hostile.  And yet despite a 
campaign of disinformation and the overt threat of government repression, the Bush 
Administration’s imperial endeavors encountered considerable public opposition. 
 
THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT 
In the six months leading up to the invasion of Iraq, a massive, global peace 
movement emerged.  Worldwide protests on October 26, 2002 involved as many as 
250,000 people, including some 80,000 in San Francisco, California, and 100,000 in 
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Washington, D.C.  Attendance in Washington, D.C. was roughly equivalent to that of the 
famous 1967 Pentagon protests.  Two months later, on December 10, activists organized 
more than one hundred coordinated vigils, protests, and teach-ins in thirty-seven US 
states.  In January, hundreds of thousands again took to the streets of San Francisco and 
Washington, D.C., the latter in below-freezing temperatures.50 
 On February 15, between eight and twelve million people in more than 300 cities 
around the world demonstrated in hopes of preventing the war.  They included perhaps 
250,000 in New York City; more than 750,000 in London; at least 300,000 throughout 
France; 500,000 in Berlin; 1.3 million in Barcelona and 600,000 in Madrid; one to three 
million in Rome; and 500,000 in Australia.  Israel, Pakistan, India, Thailand, Japan, 
Canada, Syria, and South Africa were also among the sixty countries where protests drew 
large crowds.  Demonstrations of various sizes also occurred in Chicago, Illinois; 
Colorado Springs, Colorado; and Wausau, Wisconsin – roughly 150 US cities in all.  
Meanwhile, governments in more than ninety US city councils passed official resolutions 
against the war; they included Baltimore, Seattle, and Chicago.51 
 In March, with war preparations ramping up, peace activists also began engaging 
in non-violent disruptions, in addition to more traditional lobbying and protesting.  
Nearly 10,000 people in fifty cities signed the Iraq Pledge of Resistance, a promise to 
participate in civil disobedience in the event of a war on Iraq.  On March 14, less than 
one week before the invasion, 200 protestors blocked access to the Pacific Stock 
Exchange in San Francisco; among the eighty demonstrators arrested was retired Air 
Force Lieutenant Colonel Warren Langley, the former head of the exchange.  Three days 
later, 250 people marched on the US Capitol building in Washington, D.C.  Capitol 
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police arrested fifty-four people, including Robert McIlvaine, who carried a sign reading 
“Not in my son’s name,” in honor of his son, Bobby, who was killed in the 9/11 attacks.52  
 On March 20, 2003, the day after the invasion began, mass scale civil 
disobedience shut down intersections, highways, and business districts in San Francisco, 
Washington, D.C., Chicago, New York City, and elsewhere.  In San Francisco, in a 
coordinated action similar to the Seattle WTO protests, roving demonstrators shut down 
dozens of intersections and repeatedly challenged Bay Bridge on-ramps.  Thousands of 
people were arrested.  In Chicago, protestors were arrested “by the busload” after 
blocking traffic around Federal Plaza and shutting down north and south-bound lanes of 
Lake Shore Drive.  Over the next few days, additional protests erupted around the 
country.  In Chicopee, Massachusetts, fifty-three people were arrested for blocking the 
road to Westover Air Reserve Base.  In Johnston, Iowa, another sixteen people were 
arrested while occupying the state’s National Guard headquarters.  Around the world, 
major protests also occurred in South Korea, Brazil, Ireland, Germany, Taiwan, and 
elsewhere.  Protestors in Bahrain threw rocks at the British Embassy, while police in New 
Delhi, India were forced to defend the US Embassy.  Several US embassies in Middle 
Eastern countries were closed entirely, while in France, protestors targeted several 
McDonald’s fast food restaurants, as symbols of US imperialism.53 
In the US, protests were primarily coordinated by two activist networks:  Act 
Now to Stop War and End Racism (the ANSWER coalition) and United for Peace and 
Justice (UFPJ).  ANSWER organized the first major marches against the invasion of Iraq.  
The coalition was initially spearheaded by members of the Marxist-Leninist Workers 
World Party (WWP), though both the WWP and the American Right overestimated their 
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ideological influence on the larger movement.  UFPJ, meanwhile, served as the umbrella 
for large, mainstream organizations, such as the National Council of Churches, Peace 
Action, the Quaker-affiliated American Friends Service Committee, and Veterans for 
Peace.  Several of the WWP’s positions (support for North Korea’s Kim Jong-il, for 
example) provided easy fodder for red-baiters, who tried to use them to discredit the 
entire movement.  However, the more moderate UFPJ was also attacked along the same 
ideological lines.  In reality, ANSWER, UFPJ, and other anti-war coalitions were more 
significant as vessels than as organizations in themselves.  Rather than recruiting new 
members, they primarily provided a mechanism for other groups to pool their resources 
and focus their efforts on mass events.  By January 2003, three months after its founding, 
UFPJ represented 150 different organizations.54  
 Contrary to accusations that the movement was merely a communist front, groups 
from across the political spectrum participated in anti-war protests in the months before 
the invasion.  They included progressive stalwarts like the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the National Organization for Women 
(NOW), the American Indian Movement, and the Sierra Club.  They also included 
hundreds of other groups, many with revealing names, including:  Gulf War Veterans, 
Veterans for Common Sense, Veterans Against the Iraq War, September 11 Families for 
Peaceful Tomorrows, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Mormons for Equality and 
Social Justice, A Jewish Voice for Peace, the Catholic Worker, Pax Christi, the Catholic 
Diocese of Community and Justice, the International Women’s League for Peace and 
Freedom, Mothers Against War, Code Pink, Grandparents for Peace, Latinos Together 
Against the War, Black Voices for Peace, Not in Our Name, the Green Party, People for a 
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Just Peace in the Holy Land, the Gandhi Alliance for Peace, Students Against the War, 
the Campus Anti-War Network, the Direct Action to Stop the War Project, Positive 
Force, Moratorium to Stop the War, Standing United for Peace, Win Without War, the 
International Socialist Organization, Voices in the Wilderness, and the National Youth 
and Student Peace Coalition.  Other groups involved included MoveOn.Org, which 
doubled its membership in the months before the invasion, and Labor Against the War, 
which included sixty unions by January 2003.55 
Despite massive demonstrations, among the largest in world history, the war’s 
government champions publicly rejected and demonized the peace movement.  When 
asked about the February 15 protests, which involved perhaps ten million people, 
President Bush remarked, “You know, the size of protests is like deciding, ‘well, I'm 
going to decide policy based upon a focus group.’”56  Parroting Bush, Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard mused, “I don't know that you can measure public opinion just by 
the number of people who turn up at demonstrations.”57  In other words, the silent 
majority of non-protestors should be counted as war supporters.  Perhaps most cynically 
of all, British Prime Minister Tony Blair told protestors that if there were no war, they 
would have “blood on their hands” and be responsible for the future crimes of the 
Hussein regime.  Moreover, Blair remarked, no matter how many people marched in 
London, the number paled in comparison to those killed in the wars Hussein started.  
Blair did not mention the role of the British government in Hussein’s reign or in the past 
wars he referenced.  He also failed to discuss scenarios in which blood would be on his 
own hands.58 
Non-government forces on the Right echoed the statements of Bush, Blair, and 
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Howard.  In February 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had publicly rejected any 
links between Vietnam and the prospective war in Iraq, calling them “a real stretch. Any 
comparison to that period and that long, long, long conflict with enormous numbers of 
young people killed is not relevant.”59  But while Rumsfeld sought to distance Iraq from 
the negative legacy of Vietnam, other US war supporters deliberately equated modern 
protestors with those of the 1960s era.  Members of the group September 11 Families for 
Peaceful Tomorrows were told to “go back to the Sixties.”  Tens of thousands of anti-war 
marchers in Washington, D.C., were greeted by counter-protestors, sitting on their 
balcony, drinking champagne, and displaying a sign, reading “Hippies Go Home.”60  In 
New York City, a war supporter attempted to belittle a marching protestor by shouting, 
“Flower child, huh?...It didn't work in the '60s. Why do you think it's going to work 
now?”61  That American reactionaries would use the movements of the 1960s, which they 
opposed, as default insults for modern movements is perhaps unsurprising.  In fact, this 
framework served an important function, simultaneously re-writing the history of the 
1960s while also, presumably, labeling 21st century protestors as naïve.  Other rightwing 
backlash was even more hostile. 
 When country music stars the Dixie Chicks expressed their opposition to the 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003, conservative pundit Pat Buchanan called them “the Dixie 
Twits…the dumbest bimbos…I have seen.”62  Clear Channel Communications, the mega-
media conglomerate that formed after Clinton era de-regulation, used its stations to 
organize a boycott of the group, as well as protests at several of their concerts.  Protesters 
at the poorly attended, but well documented, demonstrations referred to the group as 
“Saddam’s Angels,” among other sexist and jingoistic epithets.  The group also received 
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death threats.  Less prominent dissidents also faced accusations of cowardice and treason.  
In 2006, long after Bush had secured a second term, rightwing pundit Ann Coulter 
denounced four women whose husbands died on 9/11 for demanding an investigation into 
the US intelligence failures surrounding the attacks.  Regarding the widows, Coulter 
claimed she had “never seen people enjoying their husbands’ deaths so much.”63  In the 
lead-up to the war, such vitriol was the rule, not the exception.64 
 When Yale history professor Glenda Gilmore published an op-ed against the war 
in the campus newspaper, she was targeted online by conservative blogger Andrew 
Sullivan, whose readers bombarded Gilmore with rape and death threats.  Nicholas de 
Genova, a professor at Columbia University, was forced to use a security escort on 
campus after receiving death threats for participating in a teach-in about the war.  At 
Wheaton College in Massachusetts, students who hung an upside-down “distress” flag at 
their home had rocks thrown through their windows, received death threats, and had a 
dead fish nailed to their front door.  At Yale, several men wielding a 2 by 4 attempted to 
break into a female student’s room late at night after she, too, hung an upside-down flag 
in her window.65 
 On the eve of the invasion, Rupert Murdoch’s New York Post encouraged the 
boycott of movies starring “appeasement-loving celebs,” such as Susan Sarandon, Martin 
Sheen, and Danny Glover.  These “Saddam lovers,” the paper argued, should be punished 
with box office flops.  On Fox News, also owned by Murdoch, Bill O’Reilly announced 
that any protests that continued after the invasion would be “un-American.”  A February 
editorial in the New York Daily News, meanwhile, referred to supporters of UN weapons 
inspections as “the surrender crowd” and likened the peace marches of October to “an Al 
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Qaeda meeting.”66  An editorial in the Lancaster, Pennsylvania Lancaster New Era the 
following month referred to protestors as the “terrorist tolerance movement” and the 
“hate-America crowd.”67  Others simply referred to activists as “reds” and 
“Trotskyists.”68  Signs carried by counter-protestors at demonstrations around the country 
included “Protester Equals Terrorist,” “Anti-War = Pro-Saddam,” and “Bomb Iraq.”69  
But although they received disproportionately high news coverage (given their tiny 
numbers), pro-war demonstrations were not as “grassroots” as they appeared.  Some of 
them, including demonstrations in Fort Wayne, Indiana; Charleston, South Carolina; and 
Sacramento, California were actually organized by Clear Channel, via the largest network 
of radio stations in the country.70 
 During the 1960s, the American peace movement only reached a critical mass 
after several years of warfare.  In the 2000s, a mass movement emerged less than a year 
into the occupation of Afghanistan and several months before the invasion of Iraq.  
However, months of consistent, disruptive protests could not pressure the Bush 
Administration or its allies to abandon the path to war.  President Bush’s statements that 
protest had no impact on him may have been as much an attempt to disempower the 
movement as a statement of fact (treatment of demonstrators during his 2004 re-election 
campaign seemed to reveal a drastic change of heart).  In the short-term, however, protest 
was not sufficient to prevent the war.  Disinformation about Iraq and the demonization of 
the opposition, perpetuated both by the Bush Administration and the corporate media, 
successfully challenged the credibility of the anti-war movement.  As a result, even with 
large numbers and mainstream participation, the movement’s short-term impact on public 
opinion was marginal.71 
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 As the war raged on, mass protests continued, though much less frequently.  Civil 
disobedience continued as well, including numerous sit-ins at government offices and 
blockades of ports shipping military vehicles, notably in Olympia and Tacoma, 
Washington.  The movement also began challenging the pillars, beyond public opinion, 
that propped up the war machine.  For example, in order to combat misinformation about 
military service and to limit the administration’s capacity for warfare, activists 
disseminated counter-recruitment information, held sit-ins at recruitment offices, and 
disrupted recruiters at public events.  In order to challenge the deceptions of Fox News 
and Clear Channel, activist journalists developed alternative media networks and 
bolstered support for programs such as Democracy Now! To challenge official narratives 
about the morality of American intervention, activists also publicized the US’ pro-torture 
policies as well as Iraqi opinion polls that refuted Bush Administration claims about the 
democratic aims of the war.  As the occupation continued, many new activist 
organizations sprouted up.  Among them were Gold Star Families for Peace, Iraq 
Veterans Against the War (IVAW), and Code Pink.  In addition to the creativity of their 
actions, these organizations were especially significant for their ability to reclaim from 
conservative pundits a level of credibility when discussing the war. 
 
GOLD STAR FAMILIES FOR PEACE 
 Gold Star Families for Peace (GSFP) was founded in early 2005, as an offshoot of 
the larger group Military Families Speak Out.  The organization consisted of family 
members of soldiers killed in Iraq, and its name referenced the gold star displayed in the 
homes of fallen soldiers. In August 2005, a dozen GSFP members –most famously Cindy 
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Sheehan– set up an encampment outside of President Bush’s Crawford, Texas ranch.  
“Camp Casey,” named for Sheehan’s son who had been killed in Iraq a year earlier, 
quickly became a hub for anti-war activists.  Over the course of the month, several 
thousand supporters visited the camp, including actors Martin Sheen and Viggo 
Mortensen, singer Joan Baez, American Indian activist Russell Means, and Reverend Al 
Sharpton.  In addition to support from Texas-based churches and peace organizations, 
Camp Casey received organizational support from Veterans for Peace, IVAW, and Code 
Pink, among others.  Sheehan became an overnight media sensation, in part because 
journalists were already in the area to cover Bush’s five-week vacation.  On August 17, 
more than 1,500 candlelight vigils were held around the world in solidarity with Camp 
Casey.72 
 But while Camp Casey served as a catalyst for the anti-war movement, it also 
attracted Bush supporters.  Within the encampment’s first few days, the conservative 
organization Move America Forward sent a bus of self-proclaimed “flag waving citizens” 
to Crawford to demonstrate against the encampment.  Over the next few weeks, tensions 
steadily escalated.  In mid-August, a pro-war demonstrator pulled up in a pickup truck, 
blaring country music, waving an American flag, and displaying a sign reading “Texas is 
Bush Country.”  A few days later, an angry neighbor fired a shotgun in the air, causing 
panic among protestors and members of the Secret Service.  Next, a man drove a pickup 
truck toward the encampment, dragging chains and a pipe in order to destroy a display of 
wooden crosses representing fallen soldiers.  Counter demonstrators accused Sheehan of 
“working for the devil” and carried signs reading, “Cindy Supports Osama,” “Bin Laden 
Says Keep Up the Good Work, Cindy,” and “You Are Aiding Terrorism.”  An open letter 
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in the local newspaper was addressed “to the woman complaining about her son’s 
death.”73 
As the month went on, and Camp Casey grew, public pressure on Bush mounted.  
Though he maintained his refusal to meet Sheehan’s demand for a private meeting, on 
August 24, he went on the offensive, meeting privately with the families of nineteen other 
fallen soldiers – all of them hand-selected war supporters.  At the end of the month, the 
camp closed.  Three separate buses, carrying members of GSFP, Gold Star Families for 
Peace, Military Families Speak Out, IVAW, and Veterans for Peace, then set out on 
informational tours through the North, South, and Midwest, before re-connecting in 
Washington, D.C.  Sheehan’s tour covered fifty-one cities in twenty-eight states.74   
 
IRAQ VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR 
 Like GSFP, IVAW, too, was an outgrowth of a larger coalition.  IVAW was 
launched in 2004 at a Veterans for Peace conference.  For its first few years, the group 
primarily provided support for other movement events, as it had at Camp Casey.  IVAW 
members served as speakers for anti-war protests, gave talks at universities, and made 
appearances on Fox News’ O’Reilly Factor and National Public Radio’s Tavis Smiley 
Show.  In 2007, the group ramped up its efforts.75 
 In May and June 2007, IVAW members launched “Operation First Casualty” on 
the streets of New York City, Washington, D.C., and Chicago.  A reference to the first 
casualty of war being truth, the IVAW actions consisted of re-enactments of war 
scenarios – taking sniper fire, confronting protests, arresting suspected insurgents– in full 
uniform and at full volume, though without weapons.  Despite being disruptive and 
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visually stunning political theater, however, Operation First Casualty was largely ignored 
by corporate media until the US Marine Corps began pursuing (ultimately unsuccessful) 
charges against participants for wearing their uniforms.  In August, members of IVAW 
protested military recruiters’ use of video games at the St. Louis Black Expo, under the 
banner “War is Not a Game.”  In September, IVAW members participated in a 5,000 
person “die-in” in Washington, D.C., as part of a larger 100,000 person protest.  That 
same month, IVAW launched “Befriend a Recruiter,” a campaign in which veterans and 
youth with no intention of enlisting booked appointments in order to clog recruiters’ 
calendars.76   
 In March 2008, IVAW marked the fifth anniversary of the Iraq invasion with a 
four-day event called “Winter Soldier.”  Based on similar hearings held by Vietnam 
veterans in 1971, Winter Soldier provided a venue for more than 200 veterans to share 
their experiences in the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan.  Some veterans described 
the constantly shifting Rules of Engagement.  Others testified about aspects of military 
culture, such as the Marine Corps greeting “kill babies” and the ubiquitous use of racist 
terms for Iraqis, like “towel-head,” “camel jockey,” “haji,” and “sand nigger.”  Specialist 
Jeffrey Smith of Orlando, Florida described seeing a pickup truck full of decapitated 
bodies, torn apart by US weapons: “These ‘insurgents’ didn’t appear to me to look like 
the hardened terrorists that everyone says they are.  These were mostly teenage boys and 
young men who looked like they were from the local community.”77  Private First Class 
Vincent Emanuele of Chesterton, Indiana described shooting an insurgent in the head at 
close range.  Two weeks after the shooting, Emanuele’s convoy encountered the body 
where he had left it; a fellow marine took a picture of the mutilated head to use as a 
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screen saver for his laptop.  Though largely ignored by the corporate media, Winter 
Soldier did yield an invitation from the Congressional Progressive Caucus to testify in 
Washington, D.C.  IVAW’s membership nationwide also increased by twenty-five 
percent in the two months after the hearings.78 
In August 2008, IVAW performed Operation First Casualty on the streets of 
Denver, Colorado – cite of the Democratic National Convention.  The group also 
delivered their demands – for immediate withdrawal of US troops, reparations payments 
to the Iraqi people, and full healthcare for all veterans– to Barrack Obama’s campaign 
headquarters.79 
 But despite the nation-wide mantra of “support the troops,” backlash against anti-
war veterans was substantial.  At a 2005 protest at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, IVAW 
members were called “traitors,” while a passer-by in Chicago called Operation First 
Casualty “pathetic.”  In October 2007, Young Republicans in Seattle called protests 
featuring IVAW members “sedition” and “a disgrace” while holding signs reading “Give 
War a Chance,” “Stop Global Whining,” and “Stop Smoking Marijuana.”  The next 
month, spectators at a Veteran’s Day parade in Denver turned their back on an IVAW 
contingent.  In 2006, Army Lieutenant Ehren Watada (not affiliated with IVAW) refused 
to deploy to Iraq, stating,  
My moral and legal obligation is to the Constitution and not those who would 
issue unlawful orders…it is my job to serve and protect those soldiers, the 
American people, and innocent Iraqis with no voice…It is my conclusion as an 
officer of the Armed Forces that the war in Iraq is not only morally wrong but a 
horrible breach of American law.80 
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Rebecca Davis, co-founder of the pro-war group Military Families Voice of Victory, 
called Watada “a coward and a traitor,” a sentiment echoed in editorials and blogs 
nationwide.81   
 
CODE PINK 
 A third group from this period, Code Pink: Women for Peace, started in 
November 2002, just before the invasion of Iraq, when its members launched a four-
month long, 24-hour-per-day peace vigil in front of the White House.  The vigil 
culminated with fifty protests around the US on March 8, 2003, National Women’s Day.  
Among the twenty-five women arrested at the Washington, D.C. protests were Alice 
Walker, author of The Color Purple, and Amy Goodman, host of Democracy Now! Like 
GSFP and IVAW, Code Pink was organized around a common identity as well as a 
political goal.  The group’s name was simultaneously a jab at the Bush Administration’s 
color-coded terror alert system, an embrace of the femininity of the color pink, and a 
parental call to arms – “Code Pink” also being the hospital term for an infant abduction 
emergency.  Bright pink clothing, hats, and accessories soon became a calling card for 
the group, which grew to include nearly 200 autonomous chapters.82 
 Code Pink engaged in a wide variety of anti-war activities.  For example, the 
group participated in Congressional lobby days, prepared papers on the conditions of 
Iraqi women, organized eight separate protests of 100,000 or more people, helped bring a 
delegation of Iraqi women to the US, coordinated humanitarian visits to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and donated over $500,000 in medical supplies and humanitarian aid to 
refugees of Fallujah, Iraq.  During December of 2004 and 2005, Code Pink also 
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campaigned against G.I. Joes and other military-inspired toys as Christmas gifts, echoing 
IVAW with the slogan, “War is not a game.”  However, Code Pink is most well known 
for its disorderly conduct, such as banner drops and attempted citizen’s arrests.83   
With calls to end the war, Code Pink interrupted several speaking engagements 
and official addresses by Bush Administration officials, including Condoleezza Rice, 
Donald Rumsfeld, John Bolton, Dick Cheney, and Karl Rove.  At the 2004 Republican 
National Convention, undercover Code Pink activists disrupted speeches by President 
Bush and California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.  A few months later, Code Pink 
struck again during Bush’s second inauguration speech in January 2005.  The group also 
interrupted a number of government functions, including testimony by General David 
Petraeus, Senate hearings on Guantanamo Bay, and a Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) meeting at which the agency further de-regulated American media 
ownership.84 
 Code Pink’s actions, inspired by groups like ACT UP and Earth First!, were 
predictably unpopular with the American Right.  However, the backlash against the group 
was not limited to Fox News, against whom Code Pink organized pickets.  Liberals, such 
as Daily Kos’ Markos Moulitsas, also attacked the group because they targeted all of the 
war’s supporters – not just Republicans.  As early as March 2003, Code Pink had issued 
“pink slips” to Senators Hillary Clinton and Diane Feinstein for their support of the 
invasion, while giving “badges of honor” to those who voted against it.  The group 
continued to hound pro-war Democrats, especially after the 2006 elections, which were 
widely viewed as a mandate for peace.  Code Pink activists disrupted numerous speeches 
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by Clinton, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and others, and they also camped out in front of 
Pelosi’s San Francisco home.85     
 In Fall 2007, Code Pink also became entangled in an on-going struggle between 
the federal government and the city of Berkeley, California.  For years, Berkeley High 
School had maintained a policy against allowing military recruiters on campus, but 
Bush’s 2001 No Child Left Behind Act removed local control by attaching federal 
education funding to recruiter access.  Under threat of a lawsuit from the Pentagon, the 
school district finally complied in 2007.  The same year, Berkeley passed a resolution in 
support of prosecuting Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for war crimes.  In October, 
Code Pink and Grandmothers Against the War, among others, began picketing a Marine 
Corps recruitment center, which had recently relocated to downtown Berkeley.  Counter-
demonstrators, led by a local radio personality, soon joined them.86   
As tensions between the two sides escalated, the Berkeley City Council 
intervened, passing a series of resolutions in January 2008.  Among them, the council 
assigned parking spots directly in front of the recruitment center to Code Pink, requested 
that the city attorney investigate legal means to oust the recruitment center, and classified 
the recruiters as “uninvited and unwelcome intruders.”  In response, incensed state and 
federal lawmakers, notably South Carolina Senator Jim DeMint, proposed a series of 
laws that would cut funding for Berkeley’s schools, transportation, and children’s lunch 
programs.  Many of the bills’ supporters were Southern conservatives, who apparently 
found no irony in advocating for federal intervention.  The Berkeley city council 
responded with a new resolution, clarifying that they opposed the war, not American 
troops.  Mayor Tom Bates, himself an Army veteran, apologized for any offense to 
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soldiers and affirmed that the recruiters had the right to stay in Berkeley, though “we 
wish they would leave.”87 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Weighing the success of the anti-war movement is difficult.  On the one hand, the 
movement ultimately achieved its objective of troop withdrawal, as the last US troops 
were removed from Iraq at the end of 2011.  Though the occupation was not as 
significant of an issue in the 2008 Presidential elections as the sinking US economy, 
Senator Hillary Clinton’s campaign for the Democratic nomination suffered for her early 
support for the war, and Republican nominee John McCain publicly endorsed 
maintaining a US military presence in Iraq for 100 years.  On the other hand, many other 
aspects of the War on Terror, both domestically and abroad, continue unabated.  For 
example, while expanding the US troop presence in Afghanistan and intervening in 
countries such as Libya, the Obama Administration also renewed key portions of the 
PATRIOT Act and authorized the National Defense Authorization Act as well as the 
domestic use of Predator drones.  Moreover, the conclusion of the Iraq occupation can 
only be celebrated half-heartedly, given the enormous loss of life over its eight years, the 
continued presence of contractors, and the uncertain future that Iraq faces.88 
 Building on the organizing networks established by the global justice movement a 
few years earlier, organizations like UFPJ, ANSWER, GSFP, IVAW, and Code Pink 
used mass protest to pursue two major, overlapping goals:  to build public support for 
peace and to apply political pressure on the war makers.  At the first task, the peace 
movement was strikingly successful.  For while pro-war voices remained both potent and 
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well-amplified, public opinion on the war shifted greatly between early 2003 and the Fall 
2008 elections.  According to opinion polls by the Pew Research Center, CNN, Gallup, 
CBS, and the New York Times, support for US military action in Iraq was just over 
seventy percent at the time of the invasion.  Public support then steadily dwindled, 
dipping below fifty percent by the end of 2004 and below forty percent by the end of 
2006.  Between 2006 and 2008, public support hovered between thirty and forty 
percent.89 
 This accomplishment is especially impressive given that in addition to overt 
support for the war from the likes of Clear Channel and Fox News, the Bush 
Administration also enjoyed considerable influence among other corporate media.  CBS’ 
Katie Couric, for example, reported feeling “pressure from government officials and 
corporate executives to cast the war in a positive light,” while the Washington Post ran 
140 front-page stories focusing on administration officials’ claims about Iraq in the six 
months before the invasion.  The Bush Administration also maintained an enormous 
budget for influencing public opinion.  During Bush’s first term, the administration spent 
$250 million on public relations contracts, nearly doubling the $128 million spent during 
Clinton’s second term.  Among the administration’s most well known propaganda 
scandals were the greatly inflated and dramatized reports of Private Jessica Lynch’s 
capture and rescue in March 2003 and the death of former NFL football player Corporal 
Pat Tillman in 2004.  The military covered up Tillman’s death by “friendly fire,” instead 
trumpeting his death as an act of heroism; he was awarded the Silver Star, and his funeral 
was broadcast nationally.90   
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 But while activists’ efforts eventually rivaled and undercut Bush era propaganda, 
the relationship between public opinion and actual political influence was much less 
clear.  Paralleling support for the war, the 2002 mid-term elections veered Republican, 
while the 2006 mid-term elections gave Democrats the majority of both Congressional 
houses.  The 2004 Presidential election did not feature an anti-war candidate, though one 
of the most prominent attacks of the campaign was a Republican-financed assault on the 
military service record of Democratic candidate John Kerry, who had received three 
purple hearts, the Silver Star, and the Bronze Star during the Vietnam War – and was 
later active in Vietnam Veterans Against the War.  In short, the anti-war movement 
played an increasingly significant, but still limited, role in national elections through 
2008.  Outside of US party politics, the movement’s impact is also difficult to ascertain.91 
 In terms of global support, Bush’s “Coalition of the Willing” steadily shrunk as 
the occupation wore on.  In 2004, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Spain, and Thailand withdrew their troops 
from Iraq.  In 2005, the Netherlands and Portugal withdrew, followed by Italy, Japan, and 
Norway in 2006.  In 2007, Denmark and Slovakia withdrew.  In 2008, Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Singapore, 
Tonga, and the Ukraine withdrew from Iraq. In 2009, Australia, El Salvador, Estonia, and 
Romania withdrew, as well.  In 2011, the UK and US withdrew their all of their 
remaining troops.  While many factors, including US foreign aid and political 
developments in Iraq, contributed to participation in and defection from the coalition, 
political pressure from peace movements around the world also played a role.92 
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 In the area of military recruitment, declining support for the war caused recruiters 
to miss their quotas frequently (for example, in April 2005, the Army missed its goal by 
forty-two percent).  The increased funding for, and aggressiveness of, recruitment 
campaigns during the period also seems to reflect some difficulty in these efforts.  In 
2005, the Army spent $100 million to revitalize its image and sponsor outreach at music 
concerts and sporting events.  Between 2003 and 2006, the military also provided more 
than 100,000 “moral waivers” to previously ineligible recruits – including 900 waivers 
for felony convictions in 2006.  Furthermore, in 2003, there were 279 substantiated cases 
of misconduct by US Army recruiters, and another 320 in 2004.  However, the direct 
influence of the movement’s counter-recruitment efforts is unclear, especially as 
shrinking economic opportunities and sky-rocketing college tuition costs favored 
recruiters.93 
 Perhaps most importantly, the movement also achieved only minimal success at 
applying economic pressure on the war’s proponents.  Public shaming forced Blackwater 
to change its name and CACI International to withdraw from the private interrogation 
business.  On a wide scale, however, the massive, growing corporations of the US 
military-industrial complex were not pressed to abandon their war efforts or to use their 
influence to push for an end to the occupation.  In many ways, the private war industry 
parallels the decentralized vulnerability of global corporations discussed in Chapter 4.  
However, unlike a local grocery store or even Taco Bell, they are not easily boycotted.  
Rather, companies like Lockheed Martin and Halliburton have proven virtually immune 
to public pressure.  For while they are intimately involved in the US government, both 
through political contributions and a revolving door of public/private executives, the US 
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government is also their primary consumer.  In fact, even the government of Iraq could 
not successful ban Blackwater from operating within its borders.  Exerting democratic 
influence on American foreign policy is an incredibly difficult objective.  Forcing a US 
withdrawal from Iraq, even after eight years, is thus both a tiny victory, when compared 
to the war machine as a whole, and a substantial victory, given how unconcerned with the 
public that machine is.   
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CONCLUSION: 
THE SHIFTING POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE NEOLIBERAL ERA 
 
 
1960s Movement of Movements  
 
 
 Neoliberalism  
 
 
1980s Direct Action Movements  
 
 
 Neoliberal Globalization 
 
 
1990s Global Justice Movement  
 
 
 The War on Terror 
 
 
2000s Anti-war Movement  
 
 
I take rightwing money and government repression as givens, sort of like 
the conditions or environment in which we exist.  What interests me more 
is our own choices.  
 
          - Mark Rudd1 
 
 
There are no magic answers, no miraculous methods to overcome the 
problems we face, just the familiar ones:  honest search for understanding, 
education, organization, action that raises the cost of state violence for its 
perpetrators or that lays the basis for institutional change –and the kind of 
commitment that will persist despite the temptations of disillusionment, 
despite many failures and only limited successes, inspired by the hope of a 
brighter future. 
 
                    - Noam Chomsky2 
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Since the 1960s, American structures of power have undergone a series of 
paradigmatic shifts.  During the 1980s, the Right, under the leadership of Ronald Reagan, 
overhauled the federal government, undermining the legislative reforms of the 1960s and 
shifting the benefits of state resources to the wealthy.  The following decade, during the 
administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, the same basic interests furthered 
the neoliberal process domestically and expanded it at the global level, through the de-
regulation of international investments.  In the 2000s, George W. Bush continued the 
process of domestic and global neoliberalism, openly expanding the latter through 
military force.   
The American social movements of the post-1960s period responded to these 
changes, often at a delayed pace.  They were largely defensive movements, and they 
reacted not just to changing cultural conditions, but also to specific actions by American 
elites.  Earth First! and other similar groups of their era attempted to counteract a series 
of neoliberal policy decisions, including the privatization of national forests, cuts to 
social programs, and assaults on the rights of women and other marginalized groups.  The 
punk activists at 924 Gilman and ABC No Rio confronted similar problems.  Some of 
them were specific to the punk culture, but most were framed by broader trends on the 
American political landscape – gentrification, the mainstreaming of bigotry, and the 
elimination of public spaces.  In the 1990s, the global justice movement, in its many 
forms, confronted the rapid expansion of neoliberal policies on a worldwide scale, 
ranging from new international agreements that gave corporations immunity from the 
rule of law to the establishment of sweatshops in the United States, Mexico, Southeast 
Asia, and elsewhere.  The peace movement of the following decade, though growing 
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prior to the invasion of Iraq, emerged almost entirely to oppose the imperial decisions of 
the Bush Administration and their corporate-military allies (and faded as Bush left 
office).   
And while there is nothing intrinsically problematic with movements being 
reactions to negative changes, in these cases, such a dynamic has often limited activists 
by allowing them to demand only a return to the status quo – itself often an intolerable 
situation.  An end to the hyper-aggressive anti-environmentalism of the Reagan era 
became the similar, though less openly hostile, policies of the Bush I and Clinton 
Administrations (which still did little to slow the global march toward climate change 
catastrophe).  Likewise, abandoning the endless war foreign policy of the Bush II 
Administration has largely meant a return, under Barack Obama, to the more covert 
Reagan and Clinton era policies of widespread assassinations and proxy wars.  However, 
the contributions of post-1960s activists must be assessed with an understanding of the 
hostile overall political climate in which they operated.   
The complex dynamics of the New Deal, World War II, and the Cold War created 
vulnerabilities in the American power structure, but by the late 1970s, they had been 
largely shored up.  By establishing a last line of defense against the neoliberal agenda, 
however, 1980s era groups not only provided examples of open resistance, they also 
safeguarded options for subsequent activists –Earth First! by protecting wilderness for the 
next generation, and 924 Gilman Street, more indirectly, by providing members a space 
in which to develop analytical tools that they could later apply to other circumstances.  
Groups like Earth First! excelled at the tactics of direct action (i.e., sit-ins, lockdowns), 
and the methods that they perfected were widely adopted by global justice activists.  
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However, without a higher body to intervene, as the federal government had during the 
Civil Rights Movement, the strategic impact of Earth First!’s direct action was minimal.  
In other words, beyond creating a hassle for clear-cutters and developers, activists were 
generally unable to apply political pressure on their opponents. 
For all their heroics, the activists of Earth First! and 924 Gilman were not able to 
grow a mass movement capable of pressing for their demands on more than a local scale.  
The dynamics of social movements are such that not every activist has to operate in an 
identical manner.  It may be unfair to expect these particular organizations be 
ambassadors for their broader movements, given that more moderate groups, like the 
Sierra Club, were certainly able to benefit from many of Earth First!’s more militant 
activities.  It is, nonetheless, difficult to imagine very many people who do not self-
identify as radicals, activists, or punks participating in, or even alongside, either 
organization.  And without clear and massive public support, movements for the 
environment, democracy, and basic human rights will remain on the defensive.  These are 
not the movements of the powerful; their primary strength is in their potential to organize 
superior numbers.   
In the areas of broad appeal and strategy, global justice activists in Chiapas, 
Seattle, Immokalee, and elsewhere made some key advancements.  The 1999 Seattle 
protests, for example, have become most famous for the direct action disruptions that 
kept the World Trade Organization from meeting.  However, the events organized to 
counter the free trade summit also included a variety of teach-ins, panel discussions, 
parties, rallies, and conferences.  Organizers tried to find ways to maximize the 
involvement of sympathetic allies – not just those willing to risk arrest in the city’s 
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streets.  Similarly, the Coalition of Immokalee Workers developed a strategy for 
pressuring Taco Bell that required a wide base of allies, each of which contributed in 
unique ways.3 
The global justice activists of the 1990s searched for vulnerabilities within the 
emerging global power structure, while also building cross-national alliances and 
solidarity networks.  The following decade, peace activists used these very networks to 
coordinate opposition to a US war on Iraq months before the invasion.  Though they 
struggled to apply political pressure, they confronted the war machine at many points, 
developed alternative media networks, and, eventually, influenced public opinion enough 
to temporarily soil the Republican brand.  By the 2012 Presidential elections, even 
Republican nominee Mitt Romney admitted, “We don’t want another Iraq.”4 
Broadly speaking, movements for political and social change must achieve two 
related tasks:  1) applying pressure on those with power, and 2) growing public support 
for their cause.  Social movement activists have been fairly successful at exerting local 
influence over the last few decades, but their impact on national politics has been limited.  
Most importantly, activists have been unable to counter the “pro-business,” neoliberal 
trends that are now pervasive in both major political parties. The political Left, which 
represents social justice, environmentalism, and other causes of the marginalized, is not 
the base of the Democratic Party, and, particularly since the ascendancy of Bill Clinton, it 
has held little sway.  With notable exceptions such as Dick Gephardt, Democrats 
generally supported NAFTA and the WTO.  In the limited choice between the two major 
political parties, there was no fair trade option.  Both parties also supported the invasion 
of Iraq, and, in 2004, as in 1968, the Democratic Party failed to nominate an anti-war 
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presidential candidate, despite a massive, public peace movement.  But while these 
examples say much about the deficiencies of the Democratic Party and the two-party 
political system more broadly, they also, more importantly, reflect the failure of 
American social movements to rival corporate political influence. 
 It is difficult to measure the exact size of social movements, but both the global 
justice movement of the 1990s and the peace movement of the early 2000s were 
comparable to, if not larger than, the more famous movements of the 1960s period.  
Those earlier movements may have been more effective, but their success was not due to 
greater strength in numbers.  Rather, even with large numbers, recent movements have 
struggled to gain, and sustain, access to national media, both because concentrated 
corporate media conglomerates are more deliberate in what they black out and because 
the sheer volume of the 24-hour news cycle limits the impact of brief events like rallies 
and marches.  For example, the large and widespread acts of protest and civil 
disobedience on the eve of the invasion of Iraq prompted little more than condescending 
musings from the Bush Administration, and they faded in popular memory and media 
coverage once the occupation began.  In contrast, the sustained action of Camp Casey 
became difficult for the corporate media and the White House to ignore.  Recognizing a 
disadvantage in messaging, activists have also taken direct action, by developing 
alternative and DIY media institutions (i.e., Democracy Now!, Indymedia, Facebook, 
Twitter) and improving media tactics, such as the savvy self-promotion of groups like 
SmartMeme and the Yes Men (who make documentaries to promote their own actions). 
 Internet-based networking, especially through social media, has allowed activists 
to coordinate huge days of action.  On October 24, 2009, the climate change group 
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350.org sponsored a day of more than 4,000 environmental demonstrations in 170 
countries.  Though the tactic of simultaneous actions was not new –millions of people 
participated in Earth Day in 1970 and Earth First! organized similar actions in its Mt. 
Graham campaign– the reach of the internet has elevated this method to a new level.  
Similarly, though national media initially ignored mass protests in Wisconsin in February 
2011, the thousands of photographs of the occupied capitol posted to the internet each 
day were disseminated widely. These networking opportunities have increased the 
potential for movements to have a wide impact across regional and national borders, and 
perhaps even provoke coverage from corporate media.  Less clear, however, is whether 
movements can take advantage of these opportunities and translate their numbers into 
sustained political pressure.  Public support can be fleeting, and movements need to 
involve sympathizers in concrete ways that do not require them to become full-time 
activists. 
On the other end of the spectrum, American elites have maintained a constant 
offensive since the 1960s.  Because the powerful, by definition, have power, they play by 
a different set of rules. They are the side of oppression (only those with power can 
oppress), so they can also use underhanded tactics and bait various bigotries and 
prejudices in order to bolster support for their aims.  With these caveats, however, the 
recent history of the American Right may provide some important lessons for people’s 
movements.  In the aftermath of the 1960s, activists on the Right made major, deliberate 
pushes to pressure and incapacitate the movements of the weak.  They undercut reform 
legislation, including environmental protections, labor laws, aid for the poor, and anti-
discrimination policy.  They limited the electoral power of social movements, by 
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increasing corporate funding to both major parties, re-mapping voting districts, passing 
discriminatory voter ID laws, and disenfranchising prisoners and felons.  They also 
deliberately co-opted the language of social movements in order to use their strengths 
against them, for example by re-defining “freedom” according to neoliberal standards and 
by framing socialism and feminism as irrational, evil belief systems unworthy of further 
exploration. 
At the same time that American elites were diminishing the power of social 
justice movements, however, they also expanded their own.  They established precisely 
focused, yet far-reaching organizations like the Heritage Foundation, ALEC, and the 
Business Roundtable in order to develop long-term strategies and push for their interests, 
both covertly and overtly.  They shifted financial rules and tax laws in order to make 
themselves much richer, and thus more powerful, at the expense of the rest of society.  
And they made themselves generally less vulnerable, both by removing laws and 
regulations that made them accountable to their victims and by decentralizing their 
operations through subcontracts, franchises, and complex bureaucracy.  As early as the 
mid-1970s, the influence of the corporate and religious Right was sufficient to push the 
Democratic Party to adopt ever more conservative positions.  By 1992, the Democratic 
Party had widely adopted the basic premises that informed neoliberal policies, freeing the 
Republican Party to present a vision that continually pushed the envelope of Rightwing 
extremism. In other words, Democratic victories provided corporate interests access to 
the White House, while Republican victories allowed corporate interests to run the White 
House themselves.  With tangible goals and a long-term vision for achieving them in 
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mind, conservative strategists created a political context that benefited them even in the 
worst-case scenario.   
Despite the important contributions of American social movements, and the great 
risks and sacrifices taken by activists, their victories have been few and far between.  One 
problem is that these movements – of the 1960s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s – generally 
have not understood themselves as waves of the same larger push.  As a result, they have 
not focused on creating long-term opportunities for the activists of the next wave.  Those 
on the Right, on the other hand, have taken this lesson to heart.  Just as Grover Norquist 
advises, activists must ask themselves “If we win this battle, how will it feed on itself and 
lead to future victories…?”5  This is the question that guided decades of steady Civil 
Rights agitation in the first half of the 20th century.  The NAACP and others won tangible 
gains against the Jim Crow power structure that not only improved people’s lives in the 
present, but also set the stage for future activists.  The cracks that they made in the Jim 
Crow system were then expanded by the sit-ins and freedom rides of the early 1960s.  
Successful movements must create and expand weaknesses in the structures of power that 
they oppose.  To do so, moderate and radical activists must plan their actions in ways that 
complement one another’s work. 
By essentially all standards, social movements, the movements of the “weak,” 
have established their ethical superiority over those in power.  They are the side that 
opposes, rather than facilitates, the destruction of the planet.  They are the side that 
opposes, rather than reinforces, racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of 
oppressive discrimination.  They are the side that opposes, rather than champions, 
slavery, exploitation, genocide, and war.   
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Too often, however, a belief in the righteousness of the cause has served as a 
substitute for actual organizing.  In short, far too few activists have felt the need to do the 
frustrating and difficult work of appealing to those not already in the movement.  This 
failure is especially egregious, given that repression, whether the harassment and 
imprisonment of activists or the public conflation of dissent and terrorism, is a key tool of 
those in power – and it is far less viable without the tacit consent of the people.  
Movements are much more than just self-identified “activists,” and hostile political 
contexts, such as the 1980s under Reagan and the 2000s under Bush leave activists 
isolated and weak.  
Noam Chomsky offers that “there are no magic answers…to overcome the 
problems we face.”  We have to be smarter, and we have to grow our numbers.  We have 
to build movements that are large enough to win.  We have to embrace both the strengths 
and the vulnerabilities of the other side.  We have to find ways to pressure the powerful, 
not hope for their best behavior.  We have to foster not only a culture of resistance but 
also a culture of democracy, human rights, tolerance, cooperation, critical thinking, and 
possibility.  We have to accept that we are in this for the long haul.   
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EPILOGUE: 
BAILOUTS, AUSTERITY, AND OCCUPY EVERYTHING 
 
 
The point is, today everyone can see that the system is deeply unjust and 
careening out of control. Unfettered greed has trashed the global economy. And it 
is trashing the natural world as well. We are overfishing our oceans, polluting our 
water with fracking and deepwater drilling, turning to the dirtiest forms of energy 
on the planet, like the Alberta tar sands. And the atmosphere cannot absorb the 
amount of carbon we are putting into it, creating dangerous warming. The new 
normal is serial disasters: economic and ecological. These are the facts on the 
ground. 
 
                                    - Naomi Klein, activist-scholar1 
 
 
I’m so scared of this anti-Wall Street effort.  I’m frightened to death…They’re 
having an impact on what the American people think of capitalism. 
 
                             - Frank Luntz, Republican strategist2 
 
 
After two terms of Bush Administration economic policies, and nearly three 
decades of full-scale neoliberalism at the federal level, Milton Friedman’s experiment in 
unrestrained greed hit a wall.  In 2008, 2.6 million Americans lost their jobs, the majority 
in the last few months of George W. Bush’s presidency.  From 2007 to 2012, US banks 
foreclosed on 3.6 million American homes.  But while the banks’ own predatory 
investment and lending practices were the major cause of the economic crisis, they –not 
the victims of their actions – were quickly rescued by bailouts from the Treasury 
Department and the Federal Reserve System (“the Fed”).  In Bush’s final months, 
Congress approved the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), a $700 billion program 
to relieve banks of their bad investments.  Much more secretively, the Fed (the country’s 
central banking system) committed as much as $7.7 trillion, not only covering the losses 
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of the major banks, but also allowing them to further consolidate their power and lobby 
against new regulatory oversight.3   
 Despite the important cultural implications of electing Barrack Obama the 
country’s first African-American president, the Civil Rights Movement’s vision of a 
more equal society remained largely unfulfilled.  By 2010, the richest twenty percent of 
Americans held about eight-five of the nation’s wealth, while 15.1% of the population 
lived in poverty.  The wealthiest nation in the world also hosted a homeless population of 
3.5 million people, while maintaining 18.5 million empty homes.  Moreover, decades of 
conservative narratives about the need for “color-blind” policies could not hide the truth 
that American inequality was, in fact, highly racialized.  In 2010, the median household 
wealth of white (non-Hispanic) families was $110,729, while $69,590 for Asian families, 
$7,424 for Hispanic families, and $4,955 for Black families.4   
This reality, however, did not prevent the American Right from exploiting anti-
Obama, anti-Muslim, and anti-immigrant bigotries– as well as disillusion with the 
inaction of the Democratic Party – in their quest for Republican Congressional gains in 
the 2010 mid-term elections.  More importantly, far right candidates were also bolstered 
by the US Supreme Court’s Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision, 
which granted corporations the right to spend unlimited funds on political campaigns, 
often anonymously.  After decades of increased corporate involvement in political 
campaigns, Citizens United effectively established a new era of neoliberalism – the 
complete privatization of elections.  Two years after the decision, US Senator Bernie 
Sanders revealed its impact by publishing a list of just twenty-six American billionaires 
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whose disclosed political campaign contributions for 2012 topped $61 million – in the 
first six months of the year alone.5   
 This expansion of elite power did not go uncontested, however.  In 2011, mass 
protests in Egypt, Spain, Greece, England, Wisconsin, Ohio, and elsewhere shifted the 
public narrative around global and domestic economic policy.  Though shaped by local 
factors, many of these struggles were rooted in austerity measures and other issues related 
to economic inequality.  In August, activists surrounded the White House in opposition to 
the Keystone XL oil pipeline, intended to increase access to Canada’s tar sands, the 
harvesting of which NASA scientist James Hansen describes as “game over for the 
planet.”6  Over the course of two weeks of protest, more than 1,000 arrests were made, 
and President Obama eventually relented to delay the pipeline decision until further 
environmental studies were conducted.  On September 17, another extended protest 
began when activists established a campsite near Wall Street in New York City’s 
Zuccotti Park.7 
 
OCCUPY WALL STREET 
 A week after the Wall Street occupation started, the movement received an 
unlikely boost when footage of a police officer calmly pepper-spraying the faces of 
peaceful protestors was circulated widely on the internet.  The protestors, crying in pain, 
had been trapped behind police fences –a police strategy known as “kettling”– and could 
not escape Deputy Inspector Anthony Bologna’s assault.  The next week, on October 1, 
New York City police arrested 700 protestors on the Brooklyn Bridge following a march 
into the streets that appeared to be led by the police themselves.  Like the police dogs and 
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fire hoses of Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963, these blatant abuses of protestors acting 
within their perceived rights –and with legitimate grievances– fanned the flames of 
discontent.  By mid-October, activists all over the world declared a day of action.8 
 On October 15, protests and encampments of various sizes were organized in as 
many as 950 cities in eighty-two countries.   In Spain, where an anti-austerity movement 
pre-dated Wall Street actions, as many as eighty cities participated.  Other protest cites 
around the world included Tokyo, Hong Kong, London, Rome, Berlin, Manila, Lisbon, 
Johannesburg, Vienna, Buenos Aires, and Mexico City.  In the US, there were actions in 
Birmingham; Jackson, Mississippi; and Little Rock, Arkansas.  There were also 
demonstrations in Tucson and Phoenix, Arizona.  There were marches in New York City 
and Berkeley, California as well as Seattle, Washington; South Bend, Indiana; and 
Austin, Texas.  In many cities, members of Code Pink and Iraq Veterans Against the War 
helped organize events, and Cindy Sheehan was one of nineteen demonstrators arrested at 
a protest in Sacramento, California.9 
 In Iowa, there were demonstrations in Des Moines, Dubuque, Iowa City, Cedar 
Falls, and Mason City.  Florida protests included St. Petersburg, Tampa, Orlando, Miami, 
Jacksonville, Daytona Beach, and Tallahassee, while Montana’s included Missoula, 
Billings, Helena, and Butte.  In New Mexico, protestors rallied in Albuquerque, Santa Fe, 
Taos, and Las Cruces; in Illinois, they demonstrated in Chicago, Bloomington-Normal, 
Peoria, Elgin, Aurora, and Rockford.10 
 As the encampments spread to cities large and small, efforts to clear them became 
more concerted.  On October 25, police in Oakland, California fired a tear gas canister 
directly at Iraq War veteran Scott Olsen’s head, fracturing his skull. Police then threw a 
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flash grenade at protesters who attempted to assist him.  As video footage of the day’s 
events circulated on the internet, Oakland, and its history of police violence, became the 
focus of nationwide attention.  A week later, students, teachers, nurses, and others 
spearheaded Oakland’s first general strike since 1946.  The day culminated in a march 
that shut down operations at the Port of Oakland.11 
 In November, additional police violence against Occupy protestors was both 
widespread and well documented.  Among the most iconic images were of pepper-
spraying assaults on Elizabeth Nichols (age 20) in Portland, Dorli Rainey (age 84) in 
Seattle, and a group of students at the University of California-Davis.  The attack on the 
UC-Davis students by Lt. John Pike was especially heinous.  While the campus police 
chief expressed being “very proud” of the day’s events, students and faculty called for the 
resignation of Chancellor Linda Katehi.  In the aftermath of the attack, Republican 
presidential candidate Newt Gingrich advised Occupy protestors to “go get a job right 
after you take a bath,” while Fox News’ Megyn Kelly and Bill O’Reilly agreed on air that 
pepper spray was “a food product, essentially.”12  In fact, however, police grade pepper 
spray is five times as potent as the strongest naturally grown pepper and has been linked 
to as many as seventy deaths in the United States.13 
 By December, police had evicted Occupy encampments in dozens of cities, and 
many others were voluntarily removed as winter approached.  Though many elements of 
Occupy continued (some activists shifted their focus to preventing home evictions, for 
example), the movement’s popularity and media impact faded.  Even at the time of this 
writing, a year later, Occupy’s legacy is unclear, particularly regarding concrete policy 
changes.  Because Occupy wedded itself to a tactic (occupying space), rather than a 
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strategy to pressure those in power, its momentum was difficult to sustain.  Additionally, 
a rift emerged between militants and those wishing to establish a broad-based coalition.  
However, in just a few short months, Occupy and its class-based “99% vs. the 1%” 
framework captured the imagination of a broad spectrum of Americans and shifted the 
national dialogue.  Economic issues dominated the political landscape throughout the 
2012 elections, and President Barrack Obama’s re-election campaign was rooted in 
painting Republican nominee Mitt Romney as the face of the wealthy elite. 
Future studies of Occupy will no doubt provide deeper insight into its 
accomplishments and shortcomings.  However, one reaction to the movement is 
especially telling.  In December 2011, Frank Luntz, one of the nation’s most highly 
regarded conservative strategists, addressed a meeting of the Republican Governors 
Association.  Admittedly shaken by the success of OWS, Luntz advised conservatives to 
abandon the term “capitalism” in favor of “economic freedom” or “free market,” 
reasoning that the American public increasingly considers capitalism “immoral.”  He also 
told Republican leaders to replace the term “government spending” with “waste” and to 
encourage protestors to focus their anger away from Wall Street and toward the White 
House, so that Republicans could capitalize on their feelings of disillusion. Barely two 
months into the Wall Street occupation, conservative activists not only acknowledged the 
seriousness of the movement’s strength, they also began considering how to outmaneuver 
it.14 
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